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USING LEGAL PROCESS TO  
FIGHT TERRORISM: DETENTIONS, 
MILITARY COMMISSIONS, 
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS, AND 
THE RULE OF LAW 
LAURA A. DICKINSON∗
In response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the chorus of 
those arguing that international law cannot serve as an effective tool in the 
fight against terrorism has grown.  In fact, one might say that September 11 
has swelled the ranks of international relations realists, who view 
international law primarily as a cover for strategic interests and thereby as 
lacking any independent bite.1  According to this view, for the United 
States to comply with the letter of international law would be to don a 
straight-jacket that would hamper efforts to protect national and 
∗ Associate Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law.  I owe the following people 
special thanks for help at various stages of this project: Bethany Berger, Paul Schiff Berman, Anne 
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Tom Morawetz, Mary-Ellen O’Connell, Jeremy Paul, Tanina Rostain, Susan Silbey, and Jim Silk. 
Earlier versions of the Article were presented at Yale Law School Human Rights Workshop and the 
International Law Section’s session at the American Association of Law Schools Annual Meeting.  I am 
grateful to participants at all of these sessions for their useful feedback.  I also acknowledge the diligent 
research assistance of Dana Belding, Benjamin Buckley, Paige Fogarty, Kathleen Kim, Marianne 
Sadowski, and Tiffany Stevens.
1. See Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory: A 
Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 205, 206 (1993) (describing the “Realist challenge” embodied in “the 
defiant skepticism . . . that international law could ever play more than an epiphenomenal role in the 
ordering of international life”).  From the realist perspective, states in the international realm always act 
only in their own national interest.  Thus, international law is irrelevant.  The only relevant laws are the 
“laws of politics,” and politics is “a struggle for power.”  HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG 
NATIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE 4–5, 26 (4th ed. 1967).  See also Terry Nardin, 
Ethical Traditions in International Affairs, in TRADITIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ETHICS 1, 13 (Terry 
Nardin & David R. Mapel eds., 1992) (“Every student of international affairs has encountered the view 
that international law is ‘not really law’ because it lacks effective institutions for making and applying 
laws, and that it is therefore of negligible importance in international affairs.”). 
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international security.2  Instead, because of the serious nature of the threat, 
ordinary rules should be bent, if acknowledged at all.  This type of thinking 
has even spilled over into domestic law.  Anyone who harps too much on 
the need for law at best is naive3 and at worst aids and abets terrorists.4
This resurgent realism with respect to international law has taken 
several forms.  Some have argued that the United States need not pay 
overly precise attention to international law in its military response to the 
attacks.5  Others have suggested that the detention of captured terrorism 
2. See, e.g., Jeanne J. Kirkpatrick, Law and Reciprocity, 78 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 59, 67 
(1984) (arguing that “we cannot permit . . . ourselves to feel bound to unilateral compliance with 
obligations which do in fact exist under [international law], but are renounced by others”).  Cf. Robert 
H. Bork, The Limits of “International Law,” 18 NAT’L INTEREST 3, 10 (1989/90) (dismissing 
international law as a device that “serves, both internationally and domestically, as a basis for a rhetoric 
of recrimination directed at the United States”).  For recent expressions of the realist view, see, e.g.,
Bob Barr, Protecting National Sovereignty in an Era of International Meddling: An Increasingly 
Difficult Task, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 299, 309 (2002) (arguing that “if action is in our interests, we 
should act in furtherance of these interests; if it is not, we should not act, even if such action is 
‘legitimized’ by the imprimatur of some international organization, whether the U.N., NATO, or some 
other group”); John R. Bolton, The United States and the International Criminal Court, The Risks and 
Weaknesses of the International Criminal Court from America’s Perspective, 64 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 167, 171 (2001) (contending that “[t]he idea that nations and individuals can be bound through 
‘international law’” is “naïve, abstract to the point of irrelevance from real international relations, and in 
many instances simply dangerous”). 
3. See, e.g., Ruth Wedgwood, The Case for Military Tribunals, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2001, at 
A18 (“These criticisms . . . [of the proposed military commissions] reflect a . . . dangerous naïvete 
about the threat we face.”). 
 4. In testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Attorney General John Ashcroft 
warned: “[T]o those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty; my message is this: 
Your tactics only aid terrorists—for they erode our national unity and diminish our resolve.”
Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001), available at http://www.senate.gov/~judiciary/ 
print_testimony.cfm?id=121&wit_id=42 [hereinafter Ashcroft Testimony] (testimony of John Ashcroft, 
Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice). 
5. See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, Military Actions Against Terrorists Under International Law, 
The Fog of Law: Self Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter,
25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 539, 540 (2002) (arguing that the legal framework governing the use of 
force in the United Nations Charter “is overly schematized and scholastic, disconnected from state 
behavior, and unrealistic in its aspirations for state conduct”).  This is not to say either that the 
Administration’s decision to conduct a military campaign against the Taliban regime or that the manner 
in which it was conducted violated international law.  Rather, what is significant is that the 
Administration did not appear to see the necessity of publicly justifying its actions by reference to 
international legal principles.  For example, in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, Deputy Secretary 
of Defense Paul Wolfowitz argued, without any reference to international law, that the Administration’s
aim was not simply to capture individuals and hold them accountable, but to “end[ ] states who sponsor 
terrorism.”  Elisabeth Bumiller & Jane Perlez, Bush and Top Aides Proclaim Policy of “Ending” States 
that Back Terror; Local Airports Shut After an Arrest, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2001, at A1.  Similarly, 
President Bush himself declared that “our responsibility to history is . . . clear: to answer these attacks 
and rid the world of evil.”  Todd Purdum, After the Attacks: The Strategy; Leaders Face Challenges 
Far Different from Those of Last Conflict, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2001, at A15.  See also Patrick E. 
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suspects is not, or should not be, governed by international law.6  And still 
others have suggested that the United States need not comply with the 
principles established under international law in prosecuting individual 
terrorists.7  I will focus here on the latter two arguments. 
Tyler & Elaine Sciolino, Bush’s Advisers Split on Scope of Retaliation, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2001, at 
A1 (reporting on a letter released by “a number of conservatives” call on the president to “‘make a 
determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power’ even if he cannot be linked to the terrorists 
who struck New York and Washington last week”). 
 6. With respect to the Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters captured by the U. S. military and now 
detained at Guantanamo Naval base, for example, the Administration’s initial public statements 
regarding the detainees’ status and rights under international law suggested that the “Bush 
administration would respect international law only so far as it chose to.”  Editorial, The Guantanamo 
Story, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2002, at A24.  At first, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld maintained 
that the Geneva Conventions, discussed infra at text accompanying notes 84–98, did not apply to the 
detainees.  Donald H. Rumsfeld, Department of Defense News Briefing (Jan. 11, 2002) (transcript 
available at http://www.dod.gov/news/Jan2002/t01112002_t0111sd.html).  Although he asserted that 
the detainees would generally be treated humanely in a manner consistent with the treatment required 
by the Conventions, id., he also stated that those requirements would be observed only “for the most 
part.” Id.  Moreover, he categorically asserted that the detainees would “be handled not as prisoners of 
war, because they’re not, but as unlawful combatants,” id., even though the Geneva Conventions 
require a “competent” tribunal to make an individualized determination as to whether a detainee 
qualifies as a prisoner of war.  Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 
12, 1949, art. 5, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 140 [hereinafter POW Convention].  This 
position was immediately criticized, particularly overseas, as demonstrating that the “U.S. 
[A]dministration is more at home with an improvised process that sometimes skirts the frontiers of 
legality than with international agreements that impose firm reciprocal responsibilities.”  Editorial, Stick 
to the Prison Rules: The Geneva Convention Protects Us All, GUARDIAN, Jan. 18, 2002, at 19.  The 
Administration later reversed course and accepted the applicability of the Geneva Conventions, but only 
as to Taliban fighters and not Al Qaeda members.  Katherine Q. Seelye, In Shift, Bush Says Geneva 
Rules Fit Taliban Captives, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at A1.  Moreover, the Administration continues 
to maintain that none of the detainees qualifies as prisoners of war.  This only slightly less extreme 
position has continued to draw criticism, including a rare statement of disapproval by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross.  See Thom Shanker & Katharine Q. Seelye, Behind-the-Scenes Clash Led 
Bush To Reverse Himself on Applying Geneva Conventions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2002, at A12.   
  Some commentators have even suggested that detainees should be tortured.  For example, 
Alan Dershowitz has argued that torture should be used at least in the “ticking bomb case” in which 
there is evidence that a suspect who refuses to talk has information that could prevent an imminent 
disaster.  Alan Dershowitz, Want To Torture? Get a Warrant, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 22, 2002, at A19.  
According to Dershowitz, such a use of torture would not violate constitutional guarantees of due 
process because “due process is the process you are due under the circumstances of the case, and the 
process that an alleged terrorist who is planning to kill thousands of people may be due is very different 
than the process that an ordinary criminal may be due.” 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast, Jan. 20, 
2002), available at 2002 WL 8424860.  See also ALAN DERSHOWITZ, SHOUTING FIRE: CIVIL LIBERTIES 
IN A TURBULENT AGE  470–76 (2002).  Dershowitz neglects to mention either the Eighth Amendment’s
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause or the absolute prohibition on torture contained in international 
law, specifically the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, which the United States has ratified.  Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, art. 1, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, at 
1, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 113–14. 
 7. For example, the Administration has suggested that suspects might be tried in military 
commissions with limited procedural protections for the accused, see infra notes 28–36 and 
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On November 13, 2001 President Bush issued an executive order 
asserting the authority to use military commissions to try individual 
terrorism suspects captured by the United States.8  Such commissions 
would be conducted unilaterally by the United States and would not be 
required to include any procedural safeguards to protect the rights of the 
accused.9  Even though the Administration added some procedural 
protections in its subsequent regulations for the tribunals, these regulations 
still offer no actually enforceable rights to the accused, provide no 
guarantee that the tribunals will be open to the media or the public, and do 
not permit any independent judicial review.10  Moreover, those who have 
supported the use of the commissions have made clear—if not in their 
explicit rhetoric then in the procedures that they have proposed and 
condoned—that they view law as an inconvenience at moments when real 
interests are threatened and real action is necessary.  Indeed, the 
Administration has thus far shown little interest in affording the detainees 
even military trials;11 accordingly, over a year later an unknown number of 
people are still being held in indefinite and secret detention, without any 
independent determination having been made about the actual guilt of 
individual detainees.12
In a sense, then, this crisis has forced us to revisit the question of what 
the rule of law gets us as a nation and as a people, particularly the role that 
legal process values themselves might play in long-term efforts to combat 
terrorism.  This is a crucial question for anyone interested in the ongoing 
vitality of international law (particularly international human rights law).  
In this Article, I approach the issue from a number of different angles.  
First, I lay out the argument that the Administration’s treatment of 
detainees as well as the proposed military commissions run counter to the 
rule of law—both domestically, by violating American constitutional 
accompanying text, and has not seen fit to mount more than a cursory defense, under international law, 
of this proposal.  See infra notes 118–121 and accompanying text.  Administration officials have also 
suggested that suspects might be detained indefinitely without trial.  Katherine Q. Seelye, Rumsfeld 
Lists Outcomes for Detainees Held in Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2002, at A10. 
 8. Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001—Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Noncitizens in 
the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001) [hereinafter Nov. 13 Order]. 
9. Id.
10. See Military Comm’n Order No. 1 (Dep’t of Defense Mar. 21, 2002), at 
http://defenselink.mil/news/mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf [hereinafter DOD Regulations]. 
 11. Seelye, supra note 7. 
12. See David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 960–65 (2002) (describing the 
campaign of secret preventive detentions); Katharine Q. Seelye, Guantánamo Bay Faces Sentence of 
Life as Permanent U.S. Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2002, at A1 (noting that 598 detainees from 
forty-three countries are being held at Guantanamo naval base and that none has been charged with any 
crime). 
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protections, and internationally, by flouting established principles of 
international law.  Significantly, however, supporters of the commissions 
have largely brushed aside these objections (particularly those based on 
international law), relying primarily on a realpolitik conception of such 
legal requirements as a luxury we simply cannot afford when confronting 
terrorist threats.  Thus, no matter how persuasive the legal arguments 
against current Administration policies may be, they are inevitably 
susceptible to the international relations realist critique. 
Accordingly, in Part II of this Article, I address such realist concerns 
head-on by arguing that, far from being a straight-jacket that threatens our 
security, the respect for legal process values, in particular the respect for 
international law, will actually best serve our long-term strategic interests 
in containing terrorism.  Just as the Roosevelt Administration recognized 
that holding trials of Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg would ultimately 
serve U.S. interests by generating a historical record, demonstrating 
American commitment to the value of legal process, and fostering respect 
for the rule of law abroad, so too, I suggest that in the current crisis, 
international law and international security do not conflict but rather 
reinforce each other.  I also argue that, from the standpoint of U.S. strategic 
interests, an international proceeding to try at least those primarily 
responsible for the September 11 attacks is likely to be the most effective 
way of holding terrorism suspects accountable for their actions. 
One of the most common arguments against the use of international 
tribunals in this context is that such tribunals are impractical both because 
they are so difficult to establish and because they are unlikely to be 
embraced in the current political climate.  Therefore, in Part III, I address 
this concern by noting at least one way in which an international tribunal 
process could be initiated expeditiously and, perhaps even more promising, 
I also present two alternative “quasi-international” models that have 
received insufficient consideration thus far. First, the United States could 
establish an internationalized military commission that—in addition to 
including measures to ensure that the proceedings complied with domestic 
constitutional law and international law—could permit judges or jurists 
from other countries to preside with American judges.  Second, the United 
States could support the creation of a UN-assisted court in Afghanistan 
attached to the peacekeeping force there, modeled on similar courts 
currently in use in East Timor.  Such a court, in which Afghan judges 
would sit alongside judges from other countries, might be particularly 
appropriate for trying cases involving lower-level Al Qaeda operatives 
captured within Afghanistan as well as cases involving violations of the 
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laws of armed conflict committed by both Taliban and Northern Alliance 
forces.  Both of these models are likely to be more politically palatable 
within the United States, while still retaining many of the benefits of an 
international process.
Finally, Part IV takes a step back and addresses the law skeptics’
perspective at a more theoretical level.  The argument that legal niceties 
cannot work in the context of international relations is based on the 
perception that law is inevitably used merely to advance strategic interests 
and that it can never hope to bridge intractable social and political divisions 
among peoples.  Strikingly, however, these are precisely the same types of 
arguments that critical legal theorists since the early twentieth century 
(beginning with the legal realists and later including critical legal studies 
scholars and others) have repeatedly made about ordinary domestic law.  
Yet for the most part, these critical scholars have not jettisoned the entire 
idea of legal process or judicial adjudication, and thus it might be fruitful to 
consider why they have not.  While a complete study of such a question is 
beyond this Article’s scope, I offer some tentative observations⎯inspired 
by the seminal work of theorist Robert Cover⎯about the importance of fair 
adjudicatory processes despite the fact that societies are always to some 
degree riven by conflict.  These observations provide yet another argument 
for the importance of legal process even in a time of political turmoil. 
I.  DETENTIONS, MILITARY COMMISSIONS, AND THE RULE OF 
LAW
The debate over the Administration’s treatment of detainees and its 
proposed military commissions has thus far been waged primarily on the 
terrain of American constitutional law.  In particular, opponents of the 
Administration’s actions argue that indefinite secret detentions, as well as 
the proposed military commissions themselves, place in jeopardy core 
procedural rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and violate 
fundamental separation of powers principles.13  In addition, although 
 13. For arguments concerning the constitutionality of the detentions, see generally Cole, supra
note 12, at 978–85.  For arguments opposing the commissions based on American constitutional law, 
see generally Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 4 (statement of Laurence Tribe, Harvard Law School) [hereinafter 
Tribe Testimony]; Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 4 (statement of Neal Katyal, Georgetown University Law 
Center) [hereinafter Katyal Testimony]; George P. Fletcher, War and the Constitution, AM. PROSPECT,
Jan. 1–14, 2002, at 26–29; Harold Hongju Koh, The Case Against Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 337 (2002); Laurence Tribe & Neal Katyal, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military 
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international law arguments have received less attention in the public 
discourse,14 the Administration’s actions appear to violate important 
treaties to which the United States is a party, as well as core elements of 
customary international law.  All of these concerns can be categorized as 
“rule of law” arguments.  They rely for their force on an assumption that 
legal protections and procedural safeguards embody values that must be 
defended, even in the midst of a war against terrorism.  Many of these 
arguments have been made elsewhere, and so this Part is primarily intended 
as an overview. 
A. UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Both the ongoing detentions—which include U.S. citizens and 
noncitizens alike15—and the military commissions envisioned in President 
Bush’s November 13, 2001 order and subsequent Department of Defense 
regulations would dramatically curtail the rights typically accorded to 
prisoners and defendants in U.S. civilian courts.  Indeed, the military 
commission order aptly summarizes the Administration’s position with 
regard to legal process more generally, stating flatly that “it is not 
practicable to apply . . . the principles of law and rules of evidence 
Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002); Letter from Law Professors and Lawyers, to Sen. Patrick J. 
Leahy (Dec. 5, 2001), at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/liman/letterleahy.pdf. 
 14. For arguments opposing the commissions based on international law, see generally Koh, 
supra note 13; Daryl A. Mundis, The Use of Military Commissions to Prosecute Individuals Accused of 
Terrorist Acts, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 320, 324–25 (2002); Diane F. Orentlicher & Robert Kogod Goldman, 
When Justice Goes to War: Prosecuting Terrorists Before Military Commissions, 25 HARV. J. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 653, 659–63 (2002). 
 15. For a discussion of the detentions of noncitizens, see generally Cole, supra note 12, at 959–
65.  In addition to noncitizen detentions, at least two people who claim that they are U.S. citizens, 
Yasser Esam Hamdi and Jose Padilla, have also been held in military detention without any formal 
charges and without being provided any of the rights accorded citizens. 
Yasser Esam Hamdi and Jose Padilla, the two Americans labeled “enemy combatants” for 
what the government contends is more direct involvement with terrorist groups, are seeking 
rights once thought to be fundamental to American citizens, like a lawyer’s representation and 
a chance to challenge their detentions before a civilian judge. 
Adam Liptak, Neil A. Lewis & Benjamin Weiser, After Sept. 11, a Legal Battle On the Limits of Civil 
Liberty, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2002, at 1.  In response to legal claims brought by civil liberties groups 
and others, the government has argued that these individuals have forfeited their American citizenship 
and therefore are not entitled to any of the rights American citizens enjoy.  See Katharine Q. Seelye, 
Traces of Terror: The Courts: Lawyer Asks for Access to Prisoner Born in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 
2002, at A16 (“In a broad assertion of presidential authority that could ultimately be tested in the 
Supreme Court, the government said in court papers on Wednesday that anyone it designated an ‘enemy 
combatant’ did not have to be provided the legal protections accorded most American citizens.”).  As to 
the military commissions, the executive order authorizing the commissions applies only to noncitizens, 
but does not distinguish between noncitizens captured overseas and noncitizens captured on U.S. soil.  
See Nov. 13 Order, supra note 8, § 2(a). 
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generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States 
district courts.”16
Because of intense secrecy surrounding the government’s activities, it 
is difficult to determine precisely how many people have been placed in 
secret preventive detention in the United States since September 11, 2001.  
In early November 2001, when the number was 1147, the government 
responded to growing criticism of the number of persons it was detaining 
by refusing to release further information.17  The vast majority of the 
detainees appear to have been held on pretextual immigration charges.18
Others have been detained as “material witnesses” in undisclosed criminal 
investigations.19  Immigration detainees have been tried in proceedings 
closed to the public, the press, legal observers, and family members.20
Indeed, immigration judges do not even list the cases on the public docket, 
and refuse to confirm or deny that the cases even exist.21  Moreover, many 
of those detained on immigration charges have been held for weeks or even 
months without any charges at all.22  As David Cole has noted, the Justice 
Department practices, taken together, amount to a policy of “lock up first, 
ask questions later, and presume that an alien is dangerous until the FBI has 
a chance to assure itself that the individual is not.”23  Indeed, Cole points 
out that, under the government’s “sleeper” theory, “the fact that a 
suspicious person has done nothing illegal only underscores his 
dangerousness; Al Qaeda is said to have ‘sleeper’ cells around the world, 
groups of individuals living quiet and law-abiding lives, but ready and 
willing to commit terrorist attacks once they get the call.”24  Under this 
theory, “the absence of evidence of illegal conduct is not a reason to release 
a ‘suspicious’ person.”25  Given this rationale, it is not surprising that the 
number of detainees far surpasses the number who appear to have any 
 16. Nov. 13 Order, supra note 8, § 1(f). 
17. See Todd S. Purdum, A Nation Challenged: The Attorney General; Ashcroft’s About-Face on 
the Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2001, at B7. 
18. See Cole, supra note 12, at 962–63.  Cole has further noted that: 
The real reason for their incarceration is not that they worked without authorization or took 
too few academic credits, for example.  Rather, the government has used these excuses to 
detain them because it thinks they might have valuable information, because it suspects them 
but lacks sufficient evidence to make a charge, or simply because the FBI is not yet convinced 
that they are innocent. 
Id. 
19. See id. at 960–61. 
20. See id. at 961. 
21. See id.
22. See id. at 962. 
23. See id. at 963. 
24. See id.
25. See id.
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connection to terrorism.26  And these detentions, of course, do not even 
include the hundreds of people being confined by the military in 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,27 Afghanistan, or elsewhere throughout the world. 
As to the military commissions, the executive order declared that 
suspects designated by the President would be brought to trial not before a 
jury, but before a “military commission sitting as the triers of both fact and 
law.”28  The trials could be completely closed to the public,29 and the order 
did not guarantee that those accused would be entitled even to know the 
charges against them or the evidence to be used at trial.  Proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt would not necessarily be required for conviction,30 and 
the accused would not be permitted to invoke the privilege against self-
incrimination, nor would they be entitled to hire counsel of their own 
choosing.31  The ordinary rules of evidence would be suspended.32
Verdicts and sentences, including the death penalty, could be imposed by a 
two-thirds vote.33  No legal guarantee would prevent suspects from being 
detained indefinitely without charge.  And, under the terms of the order, 
those accused would not have the right to any kind of appeal, or indeed to 
any post-conviction remedy whatsoever, in any court—domestic, foreign, 
or international.34  Not only would the proposed proceeding have limited 
26. See id. at 960 (noting that only a single detainee—Zaccarias Moussaoui—has been charged 
with any involvement in the crimes under investigation, and he was arrested before September 11).  
Government officials have claimed that ten or eleven of the detainees may be members of Al Qaeda.  
See David Firestone & Christopher Drew, A Nation Challenged: The Cases; Al Qaeda Link Seen in 
Only a Handful of 1,200 Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2001, at A1.  Yet, as David Cole points out, 
“that simply raises the question of why the other 1,990 or so individuals were detained.”  Cole, supra
note 12, at 960. 
 27. As of September 16, 2002, 598 detainees from forty-three countries are being held at 
Guantanamo naval base.  See Seelye, supra note 12, at A1. 
28. Nov. 13 Order, supra note 8, § 4(c)(2). 
29. See id. § 4(c)(4) (providing that the Secretary of Defense shall issue guidelines allowing for, 
“in a manner consistent with the protection of information classified or classifiable under Executive 
Order 12,958 of April 17, 1995, as amended, or any successor Executive Order, protected by statute or 
rule from unauthorized disclosure, or otherwise protected by law, . . . the . . . closure of, and access to 
proceedings”). 
30. See id. § 4(c). 
 31. The November 13 order provided that the Secretary of Defense would issue guidelines 
providing for the “conduct of the prosecution by one or more attorneys designated by the Secretary of 
Defense and conduct of the defense by attorneys for the individual subject to this order,” but did not 
provide that accused individuals would have the right to hire counsel of their own choosing.  Id. §
4(c)(5).  For a discussion of the subsequent Department of Defense Regulations, see infra text 
accompanying notes 38–55. 
32. See id. § 1(f).  See also id. § 4(c)(3) (providing for the “admission of such evidence as 
would . . . have probative value to a reasonable person”). 
33. See id. §§ 4(c)(6)–(c)(7), 4(a). 
34. See id. § 7(b)(2).  According to the terms of the order: 
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the rights of the accused beyond what is normally guaranteed by the 
Constitution in civilian trials,35 it would have offered far less protection to 
the accused than court-martial trials under the U.S. Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (“UCMJ”).36
After an enormous public outcry over the November 13 order,37 the 
Department of Defense (“DOD”) issued regulations that purport to provide 
[T]he individual shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding, 
directly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or proceeding sought on the individual’s
behalf, in (i) any court of the United States, or any State thereof, (ii) any court of any foreign 
nation, or (iii) any international tribunal. 
Id.  The only review of any kind contemplated by the order is the purely discretionary review by the 
President or the Secretary of Defense.  See id. § 4(c)(8) (allowing for “submission of the record of the 
trial, including any conviction or sentence, for review and final decision by [the President] or by the 
Secretary of Defense if so designated by [the President] for that purpose”). 
 35. The Constitution generally requires: (1) indictment by grand jury, U.S. CONST. amend. V 
(“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when 
in actual service in time of War or public danger . . . .”); (2) a trial by jury, id. art. III, § 2 (“The Trial of 
all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury . . . .”); (3) a public trial, id. amend. VI 
(“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury . . . .”); (4) a right to confront witnesses and subpoena defense witnesses, id. (“[T]he 
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him [and] to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor . . . .”); (5) a privilege against self-
incrimination, id. amend. V; (6) a conviction that is based only upon proof beyond a “reasonable 
doubt,” In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects the accused 
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute 
the crime with which he is charged.”), and that employs detailed procedural protections to ensure 
accuracy before the imposition of the death penalty, see, e.g., Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 51 
(2001) (subjecting capital sentencing proceeding to due process analysis); and (7) a right to invoke the 
writ of habeas corpus to challenge detention, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of 
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended . . .”). 
 36. The Uniform Code of Military Justice establishes that defendants in court-martial 
proceedings must be accorded the following rights: (1) the right to choose counsel, 10 U.S.C. § 838 
(2000); (2) the right to challenge the military judge and other members of a general or special court-
martial panel “for cause,” id. § 841; (3) the right of appeal to civilian judges confirmed by the Senate, 
id. § 867; (4) the right to unanimous decision by a court-martial panel before the death penalty may be 
imposed, id. § 852; (5) the right to presumption of innocence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, id. §
851; and (6) the right to public proceedings, U.S. Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1984, at §
806. 
37. See Kenneth Anderson, What to Do with Bin Laden and Al Qaeda Terrorists?: A Qualified 
Defense of Military Commissions and United States Policy on Detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval 
Base, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 591, 592 (2002) (“The Military Order has provoked a storm of 
protest from various civil libertarians, civil and human rights organizations, newspaper editorialists, 
academics, members of Congress, and sundry others, mostly on the political left, but including some 
prominent conservatives such as New York Times columnist William Safire and Rep. Bob Barr (R-
Ga.)”) (footnotes omitted); Katharine Q. Seelye, In Letter, 300 Law Professors Oppose Tribunals Plan,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 2001, at B7 (reporting that more than 300 law professors have signed a letter 
protesting President Bush’s order to establish military tribunals, arguing that such tribunals are “legally 
deficient, unnecessary and unwise”). 
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additional procedural protections to the accused.38  The DOD regulations 
state that the accused are entitled to be informed of the charges against 
them.39  In addition, defendants are to be furnished with government 
evidence, both incriminating and exculpatory, prior to trial40 and are also 
accorded the opportunity to gather evidence of their own.41  Finally, 
defendants are to be provided military defense counsel and given the 
opportunity to hire civilian counsel,42 and all charges must be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.43
On closer examination, however, these increased “protections” turn 
out to be of almost no benefit to the accused at all.  To begin with, even on 
their own terms, the regulations still fall far short of offering meaningful 
due process guarantees.  For example, although the accused may hire 
civilian counsel, that counsel must be a United States citizen admitted to 
the Bar and must possess a security clearance.44  Moreover, even with such 
a clearance, counsel may still be denied access to evidence or be prevented 
from attending actual proceedings of the trial.45  In addition, although the 
regulations specify that proceedings should be “open to the maximum 
extent practicable,”46 they still give broad unreviewable authority to the 
commission to close the proceedings to the public as well as to the accused 
and civilian defense counsel.47  Furthermore, the members of the 
commission must be commissioned officers of the U.S. armed forces.48
While defendants may appeal to a panel that can include civilians, those 
civilians must also have received commissions as military officers.49
Even more importantly, neither the commissions nor the appeal body 
is actually authorized to make binding final judgments.  Rather, their 
rulings are only recommendations to the Secretary of Defense or the 
38. See DOD Regulations, supra note 10. 
39. See id. § 5(a). 
40. See id. § 5(e). 
41. See id. § 5(h). 
42. See id. § 4(c)(3)(B). 
43. See id. § 5(c).  Although the regulations purport to require a unanimous verdict before a 
death sentence could be imposed, see id. § 6(f), the regulations also provide that, in the event the 
regulations conflict with the November 13, 2001 executive order, the order shall prevail.  See id. § 7(b).  
Because the executive order specifies that a death sentence could be imposed based only on a 2/3 vote 
of the panel, Nov. 13 Order, supra note 8, at § 4(c)(7), the subsequent regulations may not actually alter 
this relaxed requirement. 
 44. DOD Regulations, supra note 10, at § 4(c)(3)(B). 
45. Id.
46. Id. § 6(d)(5)(A). 
47. Id. § 6(b)(3). 
48. Id. § 4(a)(3). 
49. Id. § 6(h)(12). 
1418 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:1407
President.50  And, indeed, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has indicated that 
prisoners may continue to be detained even if acquitted by the 
commissions.51
Thus, the procedural rules offered in the regulations appear to be 
largely for show.  Acquittals may mean nothing.52  There is no ability to 
seek review by a non-military court or appellate body.  And even the 
limited procedural protections delineated in the regulations turn out not to 
be actual rights accorded to the accused.  Rather, the DOD order 
specifically asserts that it does not create any right enforceable against the 
United States.53  Nor does it amend language in the original executive order 
declaring there is to be no remedy available to defendants in any court—
domestic or international—for alleged violations of due process.54
Accordingly, there is no way to ensure that these procedural regulations are 
followed and, even if there were, a not guilty verdict would be no guarantee 
of release from indefinite detention.  Accordingly, even under the 
seemingly more generous regulations, the proposed proceedings can hardly 
be called a trial at all.55
In addition to these severe limits on the individual rights of the 
accused, the detentions and the proposed military commissions also depart 
from the constitutional scheme because these policies were implemented 
through a unilateral assertion of executive authority without explicit 
congressional ratification or approval by the judiciary.56  As the U.S. 
Supreme Court has stated, the constitutional system of checks and balances 
survives even in time of war or national crisis.  Indeed, in Ex Parte 
50. Id. § 6(h)(4)–(6). 
51. See Seelye, supra note 7.  Thus, even under the DOD Regulations, the protections offered to 
the accused remain far less than those provided under the UCMJ.  See supra note 36. 
 52. Although the regulations provide that an actual verdict of not guilty by the commission may 
not be altered by the Secretary of Defense or the President to a verdict of guilty, DOD Regulations, 
supra note 10, at § 6(h)(2), they explicitly authorize the Secretary of Defense to vacate a judgment and 
remand.  Id. at § 6(h)(5). Moreover, given the suggestion that even those acquitted may continue to be 
detained, the actual judgment of the commission seems likely to make little practical difference to the 
detainees. 
53. Id. § 10. 
 54. Nov. 13 Order, supra note 8, at § 7(b)(2). 
 55. For this reason, it is unnecessary to engage in a debate about whether or not military 
commissions may sometimes be permissible under either American constitutional or international law.  
For example, some commentators have pointed out that military commissions are permitted under the 
Geneva Conventions.  See Anderson, supra note 37, at 614–20.  However, such authorization, in and of 
itself, does not necessarily sanction the sort of show “trials” that would be acceptable under the 
executive order and the DOD regulations. 
56. See Katyal Testimony, supra note 13 (arguing that the Nov. 13 Order “usurp[s] the power of 
Congress”). 
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Milligan,57 a nineteenth-century case addressing the constitutionality of 
military commissions, the Court waxed eloquent on precisely this question: 
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, 
equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection 
all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances.  No doctrine, 
involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of 
man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the 
great exigencies of government.58
Thus, the Constitution requires that Congress, the judiciary, and the 
Executive branch share governmental authority, a requirement that the 
Administration’s actions brush aside.  With regard to the detentions, the 
Justice Department has argued repeatedly over the past year that the 
judiciary has no oversight role.59  With regard to the proposed military 
commissions, neither the original executive order nor the subsequent DOD 
regulations envision any role for Congress or the judiciary. 
Yet, as critics note, Congress, not the Executive, is given the 
constitutional authority to “define and punish . . . Offenses against the Law 
of Nations.”60  The Administration’s executive order and the DOD 
regulations, by contrast, lodge complete authority to define crimes 
punishable by the military commission with the Secretary of Defense, 
answerable only to the President.  And the scope of these commission-
eligible crimes may be broad indeed.  For example, although the military 
commissions as envisioned could only try noncitizens, no distinction is 
made between noncitizens captured overseas and noncitizens captured on 
U.S. soil.61  Thus, permanent resident aliens, who may have lived in the 
57. See 71 U.S. (Wall.) 2 (1866). 
58. See id. at 120–21. 
 59. Indeed, in various legal proceedings, the government has argued that the federal courts have 
no jurisdiction over the detainees in Guantanamo Bay, see Rasul v. Bush, 2002 WL 1760825 (D.D.C.) 
(embracing Administration position that aliens held outside the sovereign territory of the U.S. cannot 
use U.S. courts to pursue habeas petitions), no ability to review the executive decision to declare U.S. 
citizens enemy combatants and strip them of constitutional due process rights, see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting the government’s assertion that “enemy combatants who are 
captured and detained on the battlefield in a foreign land” have “no general right under the laws and 
customs of war, or the Constitution . . . to meet with counsel concerning their detention”), no power to 
order the release of the names of detainees, see Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 
CIV.A.01-2500(GK), 2002 WL 1773067, at *2–*5 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2002) (rejecting Justice Department 
claim that detainees’ names may be kept secret), and no ability to open detention hearings to the public 
or the media, see Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, No. 02-1437, 2002 WL 1972919, at *1 (6th Cir. Aug. 
6, 2002) (rejecting the government’s arguments seeking “the power to secretly deport a class if it 
unilaterally calls them ‘special interest’ cases”). 
 60. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
61. See Nov. 13 Order, supra note 8, § 2(a). 
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United States for years, could be arrested and tried before military 
commissions.  In addition, the order contemplates trials for substantive 
offenses that include not only “violations of the laws of war,” but also 
“other applicable laws,”62 without any limiting language as to which laws 
might fall within the ambit of the order.  Finally, even an acquittal may not 
result in release, and no review by a civilian court is available. 
As a matter of legal precedent, critics observe that in the past, military 
commissions with such dramatically curtailed procedural protections have 
been established only when Congress has declared war or authorized such 
tribunals.63  Here Congress has done neither.  Thus, the Supreme Court’s
1942 decision in Ex Parte Quirin,64 which upheld the constitutionality of 
the trial of Nazi saboteurs before military commissions, provides no 
support in the current situation, because in Quirin, Congress declared war 
and specifically authorized the commissions in its Articles of War.65
Furthermore, the scope of the order issued by President Roosevelt 
establishing the commissions at issue in Quirin is much narrower than the 
Bush order because Roosevelt limited the substantive offenses triable 
before the commissions to “sabotage, espionage or other hostile or warlike 
62. Id. § 1(e). 
63. See Koh, supra note 13, at 339–40.
 64. 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
 65. Those defending the use of the commissions have argued that Congress has authorized them 
by enacting the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which contains language stating: 
The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial do not deprive 
military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction 
with respect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be tried by 
military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals. 
10 U.S.C. § 821 (2000).  They note that this language is virtually identical to the language in the 
Articles of War on which the Quirin Court relied in determining that Congress had expressly approved 
of the commissions in that case.  See, e.g., Ashcroft Testimony, supra note 4 (“But for those who would 
disagree with [the view that the President has the inherent authority to establish military commissions], 
the identical provision of authority that . . . was present in the Quirin situation is now present in the U.S. 
Code of Military Justice.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Correspondence, AM. PROSPECT, Feb. 11, 2002, at 4–5
(“The congressional authorization found sufficient in Quirin is the same law invoked in Bush’s order.”).  
See also Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Constitutional Validity of Military Commissions,
5 GREEN BAG 2d 249, 252–54 (2002). 
  Nevertheless, the Quirin court did not rely solely on this language to justify the military 
commissions; rather, such language was accompanied by an official declaration of war.  See also 
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 30.  In contrast, the Congressional Use of Force Resolution passed after the 
September 11 attacks only authorized the President to use “force” against persons involved in the 
attacks in order to prevent future harm to the United States, thereby stopping far short of a full 
declaration of war.  See Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).  In addition, in 1996 Congress passed 
the War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (1996), which provided that those accused of “war crimes”
would be tried in civilian courts.  No such provision existed at the time of the Quirin decision. 
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acts.”66  The Bush order, by contrast, defines the offenses triable before the 
commissions as including violations of “the laws of war and other 
applicable laws.”67  The Bush order would thus extend the scope of 
military commissions beyond that which the Court upheld in Quirin, both 
to circumstances in which Congress has not declared war or specifically 
authorized the commissions and to violations far beyond the laws of war.  
Whatever narrow exception the Supreme Court carved out in Quirin surely 
does not authorize the President unilaterally to shift the forum for ordinary 
domestic prosecutions to military commissions.  Finally, the War Crimes 
Act, passed by Congress in 1996, envisions that persons who commit 
statutorily defined “war crimes” be punished in civilian courts,68 which is 
just the opposite of what President Bush’s order seeks. 
In short, as George P.  Fletcher has pointed out, “[t]here is no tradition 
or constitutional authority legitimating trial by a military tribunal when the 
crime is subject to prosecution under American law and the appropriate 
American courts are open and functioning.”69  Accordingly, both the mass 
detentions and the proposed military commissions pose serious problems 
under domestic constitutional law. 
B.  INTERNATIONAL LAW
Although less explored by critics of the commissions, strong rule of 
law arguments can also be made that the Administration’s actions violate 
well-established international law requirements. The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), to which the United 
Sates is a party, expressly mandates a variety of procedural protections that 
the current practice of indefinite secret detentions and proposed procedures 
for the military commissions ignore.70  In particular, Article 12 requires 
that defendants be assured the right to choose their own counsel, to have 
reasonable opportunities to prepare their defenses, to be presumed innocent 
until proven guilty, to know the charges against them, and to appeal.  The 
treaty also forbids discrimination on account of “race . . . and national 
 66. Proclamation of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 56 Stat. 1964, 1964 (July 2, 1942).  See 
also Quirin, 317 U.S. at 30 (concluding that prosecution did not violate prohibition on federal common 
law of crime because Congress explicitly incorporated law of war into military tribunals). 
 67. Nov. 13 Order, supra note 8, § 1(e). 
 68. 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (1996). 
 69. Fletcher, supra note 13, at 28. 
70. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
[hereinafter ICCPR].  Although the DOD Regulations nominally provide some of these protections, 
such protections are not enforceable rights under the terms of the regulations.  See supra text 
accompanying notes 44–55. 
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origin,” a provision that the November 13 military commissions order 
expressly violates by subjecting only noncitizens to its truncated 
procedures.71  Although the treaty allows trials to be closed for national 
security reasons, closure must be strictly limited.72  Moreover, trials under 
the ICCPR must be held before “independent tribunals,”73 a requirement 
that a military commission run by members of the military without any 
recourse to a civilian judicial body could not satisfy. 
In addition to protecting the rights of defendants at trial, the ICCPR 
also provides pre-trial rights that the Administration has ignored.  Article 9, 
which protects “liberty and security of the person,” specifically requires 
that those arrested must be promptly informed of the reasons for their 
arrest, that those arrested or detained be notified of any charges against 
them, and that detainees be able to challenge the lawfulness of their 
detention before a court.74  The Administration, both in its detention 
policies and in its proposed procedures for the conduct of military 
commissions, has failed to assure that any of these rights is respected. 
The Human Rights Committee, charged with monitoring the 
implementation of the ICCPR, has emphasized that while the ICCPR does 
not categorically bar all trials by special military courts, they “present 
serious problems as far as the equitable, impartial and independent 
administration of justice is concerned.”75  The Committee has asserted that 
use of such courts should be “exceptional and take place under conditions 
which genuinely afford the full guarantees stipulated in article 14.”76  And 
while it is true that the ICCPR allows for derogation from certain rights in 
times of “public emergency,” derogation may be made only in situations 
that “threaten the life of the nation” and only to the extent “strictly required 
by the exigencies of the situation.”77  As the Human Rights Committee’s
General Comment to the provision makes clear, departure from each 
specific right must be limited to what is absolutely necessary.78  Moreover, 
certain rights, such as the right to life and the right to be free from torture, 
71. Id. art. 12, 999 U.N.T.S. at 176. 
72. See id.
73. Id.
74. See id. art. 9, 999 U.N.T.S. at 175. 
 75. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 13: Compilation of General Comments 
and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies (Article 14), par. 4, U.N. 
Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (1984). 
76. Id.
 77. ICCPR, supra note 70, at art. 4, 999 U.N.T.S. at 174. 
78. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 29: States of Emergency (Article 4), 
pars. 4–5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001) [hereinafter HRC General Comment 29]. 
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are expressly non-derogable,79 and other rights, even if not expressly non-
derogable, may nonetheless be non-derogable if they serve to protect 
expressly non-derogable rights.  As the Human Rights Committee has 
asserted, the “provisions of the Covenant relating to procedural safeguards 
may never be made subject to measures that would circumvent the 
protection of non-derogable rights.”80  Thus, because the right to life is 
non-derogable, “any trial leading to the imposition of the death penalty in a 
state of emergency must conform to the provisions of the Covenant, 
including all the requirements of Article 14.”81  In any event, the United 
States has not invoked the procedures that would allow for derogation.82
In addition, a strong argument can be made that the detentions and the 
use of the proposed commissions would violate the Geneva Conventions, to 
which the United States is also a Party.83  For those suspects who qualify as 
prisoners of war (“POWs”), use of the military commissions as proposed 
would directly conflict with the terms of the POW Convention.  Under the 
terms of the treaty, suspects may not be detained indefinitely without trial.  
Rather, the Conventions spell out specific rights that, at a minimum, POW 
suspects must be guaranteed.  Although POWs may be tried for violations 
of the laws of war or for committing other crimes,85 such trials must take 
place before an independent and impartial tribunal: “In no circumstances 
 79. ICCPR, supra note 70, art. 4, at par. 2, 999 U.N.T.S. at 174 (listing which rights are non-
derogable). 
80. HRC General Comment 29, supra note 78.
81. Id.  Furthermore, because the treaty forbids derogations that would interfere with other 
obligations under international law, ICCPR art. 4, 999 U.N.T.S. at 174, a strong argument can be made 
that the applicable fair trial provisions in the Geneva Conventions cannot be limited under any 
circumstances.  See infra notes 83–99 and accompanying text.  See generally Hernan Montealegre, The 
Compatibility of a State Party’s Derogation Under Human Rights Conventions with Its Obligations 
Under Protocol II and Common Article 3, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 41 (1983). 
 82. For a discussion of the ways in which the proposed commissions violate the ICCPR, see 
generally Mundis, supra note 14, at 324–25. 
83. The Geneva Conventions primarily implicated here are the POW Convention, supra note 6 
and the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3522, 75 U.N.T.S 287, 292. 
84. POW Convention, art. 105, 6 U.S.T. at 3396, 75 U.N.T.S. at 214. 
85. Indeed, the Conventions not only contemplate such trials, they also obligate the high 
contracting parties to conduct them.  Individuals suspected of committing grave breaches of the 
Conventions must be prosecuted.  Id. art. 129, 6 U.S.T. at 3418, 75 U.N.T.S. at 236.  Grave breaches 
include: 
[A]ny of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the 
Convention: willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, 
willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, compelling a prisoner of 
war to serve in the forces of the hostile Power, or willfully depriving a prisoner of war of the 
rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in this Convention. 
Id. art 130, 6 U.S.T. at 3420, 75 U.N.T.S. at 238.  Finally, “[t]hose tried for grave breaches, regardless 
of POW status, are to be guaranteed the rights accorded by Article 105.” Id.
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whatever shall a prisoner of war be tried by a court of any kind which does 
not offer the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality as 
generally recognized.”86
In addition to this general requirement of independence and 
impartiality—a requirement the proposed military commissions likely 
could not meet because neither the order establishing the military 
commissions nor the subsequent DOD regulations guarantees an appeal to 
a civilian tribunal—the Geneva Conventions also mandate that POWs be 
accorded at trial the specific procedural rights articulated in Article 105.
Such rights include the right to “defence by a qualified advocate or counsel 
of [the suspect’s] own choice” or, if the suspect does not choose counsel, 
the right to have counsel provided; the right to “calling of witnesses;” the 
right “to the services of a competent interpreter;” and the right to have a 
period of at least two weeks to prepare a defense, as well as the right of the 
suspect’s attorney to have access to facilities to enable preparation of a 
defense.87  POWs are also entitled to an appeal88—again, a right that 
neither the November 13 order nor the DOD regulations guarantees.  
Furthermore, the treaty obligates contracting parties to provide POWS 
essentially the same minimum procedural protections that a member of the 
detaining authority’s armed forces would have at trial.89  Accordingly, to 
the extent that a trial before military commissions would not conform to the 
same standards laid down for the trial of members of the U.S. Armed 
Forces under the UCMJ (and the November 13 order and subsequent DOD 
regulations suggest that the proposed commissions would not), the Geneva 
Conventions would bar the use of the commissions for POWs. 
At least some of the suspects now detained by the United States, either 
in Afghanistan or at Guantanamo naval base, may well qualify as POWs.  
Prisoners of war are defined under the Conventions as persons who have 
fallen into the power of the enemy and who are either “armed forces of a 
Party to the conflict as well as members of militias and members of other 
volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces,” or “other militias or 
volunteer corps” provided they fulfill the following four conditions: “(a) 
That of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (b) 
That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (c) That 
of carrying arms openly; and (d) That of conducting their operations in 
86. Id. art. 84, 6 U.S.T. at 3384, 75 U.N.T.S. at 202. 
87. Id. art. 105, 6 U.S.T. at 3396, 75 U.N.T.S. at 214. 
88. See id. art. 106, 6 U.S.T. at 3398, 75 U.N.T.S. at 206. 
89. See id. art. 102, 6 U.S.T. at 3394, 75 U.N.T.S. at 212. 
90. See id. art. 106, 6 U.S.T. at 3398, 75 U.N.T.S. at 206. 
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accordance with the laws and customs of war.”91  Some Taliban fighters 
might meet these criteria.  Moreover, to the extent that there is any 
ambiguity about whether a detainee qualifies as a POW, the Geneva 
Conventions expressly require that the detainee presumptively be treated as 
a POW until a decision is made by a competent tribunal.92  Indeed, in a 
case brought on behalf of the Guantanamo detainees, the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights has issued a preliminary decision on 
precisely this question.  In order to “ensure that the legal status of each of 
the detainees is clarified and that they are afforded the legal protections 
commensurate with the status they are found to possess, which may in no 
case fall below the minimum standards of non-derogable rights,” the 
Commission has requested “that the United States take the urgent measures 
necessary to have the legal status of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay 
determined by a competent tribunal.”93
Even those who do not qualify as POWs retain certain rights at trial.  
First, such persons are protected, at a minimum, under the Fourth Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 
(Civilian Persons Convention).  According to the authoritative 
Commentary to the Geneva Conventions of the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC), an interpretation that the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has endorsed, “[n]obody in enemy 
hands can fall outside the law.”94  That is, all detainees fall somewhere 
91. Id. art. 4, 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138. 
92. See id. art. 5, 6 U.S.T. at 3324, 75 U.N.T.S. at 142.  They further require that: 
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and having 
fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, 
such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their 
status has been determined by a competent tribunal. 
Id. 
 93. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Pertinent Parts of Decision on Request for 
Precautionary Measures, Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, March 12, 2002 [hereinafter Inter-
American Commission Guantanamo Decision]. 
 94. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949: 
COMMENTARY 51 (J.S. Pictet ed., 1958) [hereinafter ICRC COMMENTARY].  The commentary further 
states: 
Every person in enemy hands must have some status under international law: he is either a 
prisoner of war and, as such, covered by the Third Geneva Convention, a civilian covered by 
the Fourth Convention, [or] a member of the medical personnel of the armed forces who is 
covered by the First Convention.  There is no intermediate status . . . . 
Id.  See also Prosecutor v. Delalic, No. IT-96-21-T, para. 271 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia 
Trial Chamber II Nov. 16, 1998), at http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/trialc2/ 
judgement/index.htm [hereinafter Celebici Case] (“[T]here is no gap between the Third and Fourth 
Geneva Conventions.  If an individual is not entitled to the protections of the Third Convention as a 
prisoner of war . . . he or she necessarily falls within the ambit of [the Fourth Convention], provided 
that its article 4 requirements [defining a protected person] are satisfied.”), aff’d, No. IT-96- 21-A (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber Feb. 20, 2001), at http://www.un.org/icty/celebici 
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within the protections of either the POW Convention or the Civilian 
Persons Convention.  Under the Civilian Persons Convention, detainees “in 
case of trial . . . shall not be deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial,”
even if they are suspected of activities hostile to the detaining power.95
Second, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions can be read to 
protect the rights of detainees who do not qualify as POWs.  Common 
Article 3 forbids, with respect to judicial proceedings used to try captured 
combatants or other civilians, “the passing of sentences and the carrying 
out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly 
constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized 
as indispensable by civilized peoples.”96  Moreover, the ICRC 
Commentary states that the fundamental guarantees of Common Article 3 
apply even if nonstate combatants lack all the hallmarks of classic rebel 
forces.97  Thus, while Al Qaeda members may not posses the attributes of a 
classic rebel group—which under the Conventions is defined as a group 
that is organized, has a responsible command, acts on a determinate 
territory, and is capable of respecting and ensuring respect for humanitarian 
law—the Commentary suggests that they still possess rights under the 
Geneva Conventions.  Although Common Article 3 and the related ICRC 
commentary address civil wars against insurgents,98 the same rationale 
should apply to an international conflict against non-state actors such as Al 
Qaeda. 
Third, the Geneva Conventions also protect the rights of detainees, 
regardless of POW status, who are tried for violations of the “grave 
breaches” provisions of the Geneva Conventions. These protections include 
the guarantee of the right to counsel of the detainee’s own choosing and the 
other rights established under Article 105.99
/appeal/judgement/index.htm.  In the Celebici Case, the ICTY determined that Bosnian Serbs detained 
in the Celebici prison camp, some of whom may have participated in the hostilities to a degree, 
qualified as protected persons under the Geneva Conventions even though they did not have the status 
of POWs.  Id. See also generally Human Rights Watch, Background Paper on Geneva Conventions and 
Persons held by U.S. Armed Forces (Jan. 29, 2002), at www/hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/pow-bck.htm. 
 95. Civilian Persons Convention, supra note 83. 
96. Id.
97. See ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 94. 
 98. POW Convention, supra note 6, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. at 3318–20, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136–38 (noting 
that Common Article 3 applies “in the case of an armed conflict not of an international character”). 
99. See POW Convention, supra note 6, art. 129, 6 U.S.T. at 3418, 75 U.N.T.S. at 236.  For a 
discussion of “grave breaches” provisions of the Convention, see supra note 85.  Admittedly, aside 
from those tried for grave breaches (who are entitled to the rights specified in Article 105), the Geneva 
Conventions do not provide a great deal of specificity as to the content of the due process protections 
accorded to detained individuals who do not qualify as POWs.  One might look for clarification, 
however, to Article 75 of Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions, which provides a range of 
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Finally, regardless of their status under international humanitarian 
law, the detainees cannot lose the core protections of international human 
rights law.  As the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights recently 
announced, the detainees retain certain fundamental rights even if they do 
not qualify as POWs because “no person under the authority and control of 
a state, regardless of his or her circumstances, is devoid of legal protection 
for his or her fundamental and non-derogable human rights.”100  As 
discussed above, such rights include the basic due process rights 
guaranteed under Article 14 of the ICCPR if any non-derogable rights, such 
as the right to life, are at stake.101
fundamental guarantees to all persons arrested who do not qualify as prisoners of war.  See Protocol I 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Victims of International 
Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, Art. 75, 1125 UNTS 3, 16 ILM 1391.  While the United States has not 
ratified Protocol I, government officials have previously asserted that the United States supports the 
fundamental guarantees contained in Article 75, see Michael J. Matheson, The United States Position 
on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, 2 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 419, 427–28 (1987), which are appropriately deemed part 
of customary international law.  See JORDAN J. PAUST, MICHAEL SCHARF, LEILA SADAT, M. CHERIF 
BASSIOUNI, JIMMY GURULE, BRUCE ZAGARIS & SHARON A. WILLIAMS, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW 817 (2d ed. 2000); Orentlicher & Goldman, supra note 14, at 661.  Article 75 requires that 
unprivileged combatants be accorded in all circumstances trials by impartial and regularly constituted 
courts that, at a minimum, afford the presumption of innocence, the right to counsel before and during 
trial, the right of defendants to be present at proceedings and to call witnesses and examine witnesses 
against them, the right to be promptly informed of the charges or reasons for detention, the right to a 
public judgment, and the right of defendants not to testify against themselves or to confess their guilt, 
among other rights.  The November 13 Order, even as modified by the DOD regulations, falls far short 
of these minimum requirements.  As currently envisioned, there is no guarantee that the defendant will 
be present at the proceedings (a requirement of Article 75) because the regulations permit the 
proceedings to be closed to both the defendant and defendant’s counsel. DOD Regulations, supra note 
10, at § 6(b)(3).  Nor do the Order or regulations specify that the accused will be promptly informed of 
the charges or reasons for detention.  In addition, neither the Order nor the regulations require that the 
judgment be announced publicly.  Furthermore, Article 75 prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, 
religion, and numerous other grounds, a subject that is untouched in the Order and regulations.  And, of 
course, a military panel operating in secret without review by an outside civilian body, and which is 
only authorized to provide recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and the President, id., §
6(h)(4)–(6), could hardly be said to satisfy Article 75’s requirement that all proceedings be before an 
independent and regularly constituted court respecting the generally required principles of regular 
procedure. 
  Perhaps most importantly, even the rights that appear to be provided in the regulations do not 
satisfy Article 75’s requirements because the regulations do not guarantee those procedural protections.  
To the contrary, the regulations state flatly that none of the procedures provided shall be deemed rights 
enforceable against the United States.  Id. § 10.  Moreover, any claimed violations of the procedures 
could not be appealed to a civilian court, and even in the unlikely event that detainees could 
successfully challenge their “trials,” acquittals would not necessitate their release from custody.  See 
supra text accompanying note 51.  Thus, although some commentators have emphasized the limited 
nature of the rights guaranteed by Article 75, see, e.g., Anderson, supra note 37, at 620, the military 
commissions as currently envisioned fail to satisfy even those rights. 
 100. Inter-American Commission Guantanamo Decision, supra note 93. 
101. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
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Because the United States has ratified the ICCPR and the Geneva 
Conventions, they are the supreme law of the land.102  The United States 
might claim that the ICCPR is non-self-executing and that no statute 
implementing the treaty was ever enacted,103 but under the principle 
established nearly two centuries ago by Chief Justice Marshall in Murray v.  
Schooner Charming Betsey,104 statutes (and by implication executive 
orders) must be interpreted so as not to conflict with customary 
international law, which would include the provisions of the ICCPR.  
Furthermore, no such claim may be made with respect to the Geneva 
Conventions, which have been fully implemented as a matter of domestic 
law.105
Both the indefinite detentions and the proposed military commission 
trials violate not only our treaty commitments, but also well-established 
principles of customary international law.  For example, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the foundation of the modern international 
human rights system, sets forth several requirements that the 
Administration’s actions do not meet.  Article 10 provides that, in general, 
“[e]veryone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and 
obligations and of any criminal charge against him.”106  Article 11 provides 
that “[e]veryone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed 
innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he 
has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.”107  These principles 
are widespread as a matter of both international and domestic law.  Indeed, 
the regional human rights conventions—the American Declaration on the 
 102. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  It states that: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound 
thereby . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). 
103. See COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL 
RIGHTS, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 102-23, at 19 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 645, 657 (reporting the 
Administration’s argument for the inclusion of a declaration that the substantive provisions of the 
ICCPR are not self-executing).  Even this argument, however, is undermined somewhat by the 
acknowledgment in the same report that “existing U.S. law generally complies with the Covenant; 
hence, implementing legislation is not contemplated.” Id.
 104. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804) (Marshall, C.J.). 
105. See, e.g., War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (1996).  For an elaboration of this argument, see 
Koh, supra note 13. 
 106. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(A), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. 
A/810 (1948). 
107. Id. art. 11. 
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Rights and Duties of Man108 and the American Convention on Human 
Rights,109 the European Convention on Human Rights110 and the European 
 108. American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, Inter-Am. C.H.R, 
OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82, doc. 6 rev. 1, at 17 (1948), reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human 
Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc. 6 rev. 1, at 17 (1992).  The American 
Declaration’s relevant provisions include the right of the accused to be “presumed . . . innocent until 
proved guilty,” to be  “given an impartial and public hearing,” and to be “tried by courts previously 
established in accordance with pre-existing laws.” Id.  In addition, anyone who has been deprived of 
liberty has the right “to have the legality of his detention ascertained without delay by a court.” Id.
 109. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 8, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 147–48
[hereinafter American Convention].  The American Convention ensures every person the “right to a 
hearing, with due guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial 
tribunal, previously established by law.” Id.  At a criminal trial, the accused “has the right to be 
presumed innocent;” the right to “be assisted without charge by a translator or interpreter if he does not 
understand or does not speak the language of the tribunal or court;” the right to “[p]rior notification in 
detail . . . of the charges against him;” the right to “[a]dequate time and means for the preparation of his 
defense;” the right to “defend himself personally or to be assisted by legal counsel of his own choosing, 
and to communicate freely and privately with his counsel;” the right to “be assisted by counsel provided 
by the State, paid or not as the domestic law provides, if the accused does not defend himself personally 
or engage his own counsel within the time period established by law;” the right to “examine witnesses 
present in the court and to obtain the appearance, as witnesses, of experts or other persons who may 
throw light on the facts;” the right not to be “compelled to be a witness against himself or to plead 
guilty;” and the right “to appeal the judgment to a higher court.” Id.  Criminal proceedings must be 
public, “except insofar as may be necessary to protect the interests of justice.” Id.  Furthermore, the 
American Convention states: 
Anyone who is deprived of his liberty shall be entitled to recourse to a competent court, in 
order that the court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his arrest or detention and 
order his release if the arrest or detention is unlawful.  In States Parties whose laws provide 
that anyone who believes himself to be threatened with deprivation of his liberty is entitled to 
recourse to a competent court in order that it may decide on the lawfulness of such threat, this 
remedy may not be restricted or abolished.  The interested party or another person in his 
behalf is entitled to seek these remedies. 
Id. art. 7, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 147. 
 110. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 
213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention].  The European Convention’s relevant provisions 
include the right “to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law,” although proceedings may be closed to the press and public  
in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the 
interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the 
extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity 
would prejudice the interests of justice. 
Id. art. 6, 213 U.N.T.S. at 228.  At trial, the accused has the right to “be presumed innocent until proved 
guilty,” to “be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and 
cause of the accusation against him,” to “have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his 
defence,” to “defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not 
sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the interests of justice so require,”
to “examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of 
witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him,” and to “have the free 
assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the language used in court.” Id.  Moreover, 
anyone who is arrested “shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons 
for his arrest and of any charge against him,” shall be “brought promptly before a judge or other officer 
authorised by law to exercise judicial power, and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to 
release pending trial.” Id. art. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. at 226.  In addition, anyone deprived of liberty by arrest 
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Charter,111 the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights,112 and the 
Arab Charter on Human Rights113—all contain procedural protections that 
the ongoing detentions and the proposed regulations for use of the military 
commissions do not meet.114  So, too, does the statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.115
or detention “shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be 
decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”  Id.
 111. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1, 20, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/unit/charte/index_ en.html.  The European Charter’s relevant 
provisions include the right “to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent 
and impartial tribunal previously established by law.” Id.  At trial, an accused “shall have the 
possibility of being advised, defended and represented.  Legal aid shall be made available to those who 
lack sufficient resources in so far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice.” Id.  In 
addition, each accused has the right to be “presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law” and 
to be guaranteed “[r]espect for the rights of the defence.” Id.
 112. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev.5 (Jan., 
1981), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982).  The African Charter’s relevant provisions include the right of 
an accused to be “tried within a reasonable time by an impartial court or tribunal,” the right to be 
“presumed innocent until proved guilty,” and the right “to defence, including the right to be defended 
by counsel of his choice.” Id. art. 7.  The Charter also guarantees “the right to an appeal to competent 
national organs against acts of violating his fundamental rights as recognized and guaranteed by 
conventions, laws, regulations and customs.” Id.
 113. Arab Charter on Human Rights, Sept. 15, 1994, art. 7, reprinted in 18 HUM. RTS. L.J. 151, 
152 (1997).  The Charter requires that the accused “shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty at a 
lawful trial in which he has enjoyed the guarantees necessary for his defence.” Id.  In addition, the 
Charter provides that “[e]veryone has the right to liberty and security of person and no one shall be 
arrested, held in custody or detained without a legal warrant and without being brought promptly before 
a judge.” Id. art. 8. 
 114. While some of these regional conventions allow for derogation in times of public emergency, 
as in the ICCPR, derogation must be strictly limited to the exigencies of the situation.  See, e.g.,
European Convention, supra note 110, art. 15, at 232–34; American Convention, supra note 109, art. 
27, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 152.  The European Court of Human Rights has construed derogation authority 
narrowly, particularly in response to terrorism: “The Court, being aware of the danger . . . of 
undermining or even destroying democracy on the ground of defending it, affirms that the Contracting 
States may not, in the struggle against espionage and terrorism, adopt whatever measures they deem 
appropriate.”  Kass v. Germany, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 18 (1978).  Although the European Court 
has allowed states to make limited departures from the due process protections assured by Article 5, the 
Court has done so only after determining that the state has fulfilled the formal requirements for a public 
emergency derogation under Article 15 and that such derogation is justified.  Compare Brogan v. 
United Kingdom, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 117 (1988) (disallowing U.K.’s departure from Article 5’s
requirements where no formal derogation made), with Brannigan v. United Kingdom, 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. 
594 (1993) (allowing the U.K. to make limited departure from Article 5’s requirements, permitting 
suspects to be detained for seven days before being brought before a judge, only after determining that 
the U.K. had made a proper derogation under Article 15).  Moreover, the court has allowed states only 
to make very limited derogations of rights.  Compare Brannigan, supra, with Aksoy v. Turkey, 23 Eur. 
Ct. H. R. 553 (Dec. 18, 1996) (refusing to allow Turkey to derogate from Article 5 by detaining 
suspects for 14 days before bringing the suspects before a judge and noting that the long delay in 
judicial oversight and the lack of a habeas remedy distinguished this case from Brannigan).  The 
American Convention expressly provides that the “judicial guarantees essential for the protection of 
such [non-derogable] rights,” such as the right to life, are non-derogable.  American Convention, supra 
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While it is true that the United States has used military commissions 
in the past, these precedents largely predate the Geneva Conventions, the 
ICCPR, and the modern development of due process standards in 
international human rights and international humanitarian law.116
Moreover, the two most notable examples of military commission trials—
note 109, art. 27, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 152.  Relying on this provision, the American Court of Human 
Rights has concluded that the right to have the lawfulness of one’s detention considered promptly by a 
judge in habeas or other proceedings is essential, because such judicial oversight protects against other 
serious human rights violations such as torture, disappearance, and summary execution.  Advisory 
Opinion OC-8/87, Inter-American Court of Human Rights (1987).  For a discussion of derogation under 
the regional conventions, see generally MARK JANIS, RICHARD KAY & ANTHONY BRADLEY,
EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 387–401 (2d ed. 2000). 
115. See International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 
3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993); ICTY STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL, art. 21, 
at http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/statute.html [hereinafter ICTY Statute] (recognizing right of 
accused to choose legal counsel or have one appointed and providing that ICTY will fund legal 
representation for indigent defendant; providing that defendant must be immediately informed of nature 
of charges against him or her and obligating prosecution to disclose all exculpatory evidence; requiring 
that defendant be given adequate time to prepare defense; providing that trials are open to public and 
media, and that judgments must also be made public, while allowing trial chamber, in extreme cases, to 
close proceedings to public if necessary; preserving presumption of innocence; conferring right of 
appeal to separate appellate chamber of ICTY). 
 116. Jack Goldsmith and Cass Sunstein recently have speculated about the fact that the Bush 
military commission order received far more criticism than a military commission order issued by 
President Roosevelt after World War II.  See Jack L. Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tribunals 
and Legal Culture: What a Difference Sixty Years Makes, 18 CONST. COMMENT (forthcoming 2002).  
According to Goldsmith and Sunstein, the increased hostility to Bush’s order is attributable to 
Americans’ greater mistrust of government in the post-Vietnam, post-Watergate era.  While that change 
in cultural attitude may be a factor, I believe a far more important explanation is the development of a 
robust and widely internalized set of human rights norms in the decades following World War II. 
Goldsmith and Sunstein dismiss this suggestion, breezily opining (without support) that “[t]he severest 
reactions to the Bush Order, in November and December 2001, were premised on violations of 
American constitutional and civil liberties traditions, and not on violations of international law.” Id.
Further, they state (also without support) that “[f]or the most part, the people who criticized Bush’s
Order were not at the time familiar with the Order’s potential international law difficulties.” Id.
Contrary to these assertions, however, a number of commentators did in fact offer criticisms of 
Administration actions throughout the fall of 2001 and the winter of 2002 from the perspective of 
international law.  See, e.g., Koh, supra note 13; Orentlicher & Goldman, supra note 14; Anne-Marie 
Slaughter, Beware the Trumpets of War: A Response to Kenneth Anderson, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 965 (2002) [hereinafter Slaughter, Beware the Trumpets of War]; Laura Dickinson, Courts Can 
Avenge Sept. 11: International Justice—Not War—Will Honor Our Character While Securing Our 
Safety, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 24, 2001, at 66; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Al Qaeda Should Be Tried Before 
the World, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2001, at A23 [hereinafter Slaughter, Al Qaeda Should Be Tried]; 
Richard Goldstone, Prosecuting Al Qaeda: September 11 and its Aftermath, Crimes of War Project, 
Dec. 7, 2001, at http://www.crimesofwar.org/expert/al_goldstone.html; Michael Scharf, Editorial: The 
Case for an International Trial of the Al-Qaeda and Taliban Perpetrators of the 9/11 Attacks, AM.
SOC’Y INT’L L., Spring 2002, at 12.  Moreover, because the American civil liberties tradition in the 
twentieth century developed largely in tandem with the growth of international human rights norms and 
institutions, even those who did not explicitly invoke international law could not fail to have been 
influenced by six decades of development in international human rights law. 
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the trials before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and in the 
Far East at the conclusion of World War II—not only predate these 
international law developments, but also contain many more protections for 
the rights of the accused than are provided in the November 13 order and 
DOD regulations, which—as discussed previously117—do not actually offer 
any enforceable procedural rights and which do not even guarantee release 
upon acquittal.  Thus, there is little, if any, precedent or legal justification 
for the current Administration actions. 
C. RESPONSES TO “RULE OF LAW” ARGUMENTS
Those defending the use of the commissions, particularly those within 
the Administration, have framed their support primarily in pragmatic, 
rather than legal, terms.  To be sure, they have responded to some of the 
constitutional challenges to the preventive detentions and the proposed 
military commissions.118  But significantly, when it comes to international 
law, they have not seen fit to mount more than a cursory defense of their 
actions under prevailing international legal instruments. 
For example, during his congressional testimony defending the 
military commissions, Attorney General John Ashcroft made little 
reference to international law, and those references that he did make were 
both perfunctory and puzzling.  For instance, he suggested that, because the 
U.S. Senate had “voted [ninety] to nothing that [Slobodan] Milosevic 
should be tried in a war crimes commission,” and because the U.S. 
Congress had, more broadly, supported the use of international war crimes 
commissions following World War II and more recently had supported the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Congress should likewise 
support the military commissions proposed in the November 13 order.119
Yet, he neglected to address the extent to which, as discussed above, all of 
117. See supra text accompanying notes 44–55. 
 118. For example, they have emphasized that the U.S. Constitution gives the President the 
unilateral authority to establish military commissions in a time of national crisis, noting that Quirin,
while not affirmatively establishing this proposition, does not rule it out.  For example, in his testimony 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Ashcroft stated: 
[I]t is my position that the President has an inherent authority and power to conduct war and 
to prosecute war crimes . . . .  The Supreme Court did address in the Quirin Case . . . the issue 
of war crimes commissions . . . and it cited the authority of the congressional declaration of 
war as language recognizing the president’s power . . . but I don’t believe that the court 
indicates or predicates its assumption . . . upon that particular authority. 
Ashcroft Testimony, supra note 4.  For arguments elaborating on this theme, and debating it, see supra 
note 65. 
119. See Ashcroft Testimony, supra note 4. 
2002] USING LEGAL PROCESS TO FIGHT TERRORISM 1433
the international tribunals he named had provided significantly greater 
protections for the rights of the accused than the November 13 order.120
Ironically, various plausible arguments based on international legal 
norms might have been advanced in favor of the commissions had the 
Administration been so inclined.  For example, Administration officials 
might have asserted that the attacks and their aftermath qualified as the 
kind of emergency justifying derogation from certain provisions of the 
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights under Article 4.121
Great Britain, in fact, has pursued this course and has formally invoked 
Article 4 of the Covenant to declare a public emergency justifying 
derogation from certain rights.122  The United States, by contrast, has not 
done so. 
Despite the availability of legal arguments, however, those supporting 
the Administration’s actions have justified them primarily in the language 
of policy.  They have made clear that they view law—at least the typical 
legal protections afforded defendants in criminal trials—to be a nuisance 
(or, worse, a danger) in the context of fighting terrorism. They contend that 
the normal principles governing adjudication of criminal responsibility 
ought to be suspended for several reasons.  First, such trials take a long 
time and cost a great deal of money.  Thus, they argue that trials of untold 
numbers of terrorists in civilian courts would be inefficient.123  Second, 
civilian trials would present risks to civilian judges and jurors, who might 
be targeted by terrorists in retaliation for their decisions.124  Third, they 
argue that there is no need to protect rights of people who are, after all, 
120. See, e.g., supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
121. See supra text accompanying notes 77–82.  See also supra note 114. 
 122. Declaration of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Concerning 
ICCPR, United Nations Treaty Collection—Declarations and Reservations, December 18, 2001, 
www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty5_asp.htm. 
123. See, e.g., Lieutenant Colonel Denise Lind, Remarks at Panel on Military Commissions, 
University of Connecticut School of Law, (Jan. 24, 2002) (video transcript on file with author). 
124. See, e.g., Ashcroft Testimony, supra note 4.  He further asked: 
We have judges in the United States now that are constantly protected because of their prior 
involvement in terrorist trials.  Can you imagine making a courthouse in the city a target for 
terrorist activity as a result of focusing the world’s attention on some trial in the normal 
setting for these war crimes? 
Id.  Wedgwood has also noted that: 
An al Qaeda member trained in surveillance can easily follow jurors home, even when their 
names are kept anonymous.  Perhaps it is only coincidence that the World Trade Center 
towers toppled the day before al Qaeda defendants were due to be sentenced for the earlier 
bombings of East Africa embassies—in a federal courthouse in lower Manhattan six blocks 
away.  But certainly before Sept. 11 no one imagined the gargantuan appetite for violence and 
revenge that bin Laden has since exhibited.  Endangering America’s cities with a repeat 
performance is a foolish act. 
Wedgwood, supra note 3. 
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international terrorists.  For example, they contend that it is ludicrous to 
suggest that we should have read Al Qaeda members their Miranda rights 
before apprehending them in the caves at Tora Bora.125  Fourth, the 
evidence available to convict terrorists does not necessarily fit the strict 
evidentiary requirements, such as the chain of custody requirement or the 
hearsay rule, applicable in civilian courts.126  Indeed, much of the evidence 
is secret, we are told, and could compromise national security if it came to 
light in a public trial.127  Furthermore, public trials are subject to capture by 
grandstanding defendants who might use the process to air their views and 
thereby undermine the fight against terrorism.128  Fifth, it is alleged that 
indefinite secret detentions and military commissions give the government, 
and in particular the Executive branch, needed control over the process.129
In short, the view is that we cannot afford much law here.  Stern measures 
are needed for violent times. 
125. See, e.g., Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 4 (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“Do we really want to litigate in a 
criminal trial whether the soldiers who apprehended bin Laden should have obtained a search warrant 
before entering his cave?  Now, that’s meant to be humorous . . . or whether he understood his Miranda 
rights?”); Wedgwood, supra note 3 (“U.S. Marines may have to burrow down an Afghan cave to smoke 
out the leadership of al Qaeda.  It would be ludicrous to ask that they pause in the dark to pull an 
Afghan-language Miranda card from their kit bag.  This is war, not a criminal case.”). 
126. See, e.g., Preserving Freedoms While Fighting Terrorism: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, supra note 4 (statement of Pierre-Richard Prosper, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes 
Issues, Dep’t of State) [hereinafter Prosper Testimony] (“After the fact, when a particular location has 
been stabilized, the particular armed forces or members of the armed forces will be able to go in and 
conduct investigations . . . and often . . . at that point in time, you will have serious questions as to chain 
of custody if you will because the scene may not have been secured; obviously there’s a conflict going 
on.”); Wedgwood, supra note 3 (“Hearsay statements . . . cannot be considered in a trial by jury.  
Historically, Anglo-American juries were thought incapable of weighing out-of-court statements, and 
the Supreme Court attached many of these jury rules to the Constitution.  So bin Laden’s telephone call 
to his mother, telling her that ‘something big’ was imminent, could not be entered into evidence if the 
source of information was his mother’s best friend.  In a terrorist trial, there are few eyewitnesses 
willing to testify, because conspiracy cells are compartmentalized, and witnesses fear revenge.”). 
127. See, e.g., Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 4 (statement of George Terwilliger, III) (“[The commissions] 
may be critical to the government in . . . protecting the sensitive sources and methods by which relevant 
evidence to be presented in the tribunal proceedings is obtained. That in turn can preserve our ability to 
collect and use the intelligence necessary to win the war.”); Wedgwood, supra note 3 (“There is also the 
problem of publishing information to the world, and to al Qaeda, through an open trial record. As 
Churchill said, your enemy shouldn’t know how you have penetrated his operations.”). 
 128. For example, Ashcroft, in his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, asked:
Now, when we come to those responsible for this, say in Afghanistan, are we supposed to 
read them the Miranda rights, hire a flamboyant defense lawyer, bring them back to the 
United States, create a new cable network of Osama PD or what have you, provide a world-
wide platform from which propaganda can be developed? 
Aschcroft Testimony, supra note 4. 
129. See, e.g., Warren Richey, Tribunals on Trial: Fragile Freedoms, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Dec. 14, 2001, at 1. 
2002] USING LEGAL PROCESS TO FIGHT TERRORISM 1435
It seems to me that the way to combat such law skeptic arguments is 
not merely to raise repeatedly the formal legal objections discussed above. 
Although such arguments are compelling to those who are already 
convinced about the importance of the rule of law in this context, they have 
little traction with those who believe that legal niceties must be jettisoned 
in periods of national emergency.  Accordingly, the next part of this Article 
develops arguments regarding the strategic value of legal process and, in 
particular, multilateral legal process.  Upholding such legal process values, 
I argue, actually advances both our short- and long-term strategic interests. 
II.  THE STRATEGIC VALUE OF MULTILATERAL LEGAL PROCESS 
Critics of the Administration’s actions with regard to suspected 
terrorists have offered a variety of alternatives for holding individual 
suspects accountable without violating the rule of law.  Some suggest that 
military commissions might be acceptable if enough safeguards were put in 
place, such as consultation with Congress, judicial review, and some 
minimal rights for the accused.130  Others argue that existing domestic 
130. See, e.g., Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, supra note 4 (statement of Cass Sunstein, University of Chicago School of 
Law) (noting that “the legitimate interests behind the President’s military order can be accommodated 
while also producing what the president wants which is full and fair trials,” and suggesting that the 
military commissions would be appropriate if, first, the language of the order were narrowed to clarify 
that that the commissions would only be used to try violations of the laws of war; second, the 
“essentials of procedural justice” were protected, including the right of the accused to know charges 
against them, to reasonable rules of evidence, to be defended by counsel, to respond to the evidence, to 
be tried in a public proceeding except where strictly necessary, and to be presumed innocent; and third, 
the neutrality of the judges were assured, perhaps by appeal to a civilian court or the use of federal 
judges on the commissions); Tribe Testimony, supra note 13 (noting that “military commissions are 
well founded in our history [and] . . . do not per se violate the Constitution,” but arguing that to assure 
constitutionality, Congress should authorize them explicitly and narrow the original order by, for 
example, “insist[ing] on at least a limited appeal to the court of military justice or to some other 
independent body” and specifying that the military commissions needn’t be held in secret).  Tribe 
developed this argument further in a subsequent magazine article, suggesting that the “core” of the 
November 13 Order, “its gratuitous branches pruned, [. . . .may well be] . . . consistent with the 
Constitution.”  Laurence Tribe, Trial by Fury: Why Congress Must Curb Bush’s Military Courts, NEW 
REPUBLIC, Dec. 10, 2001, at 18, 20.  Tribe argues that it is in wartime that: 
“[D]ue process of law,” both linguistically and historically, permits trying unlawful 
combatants for violation of the laws of war, without a jury or many of the other safeguards of 
the Bill of Rights—provided the trials are conducted by tribunals impartial enough to render 
fair verdicts, and provided each accused may hear the case against him and receives a fair 
opportunity to contest it through competent counsel. 
Id.  Thus, according to Tribe, with some additional safeguards for the rights of the accused, as well as 
with congressional authorization, the commissions could be constitutional.  See also Tribe & Katyal, 
supra note 13, at 1309–10. 
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courts are sufficient to try terrorists.131  And still others have argued that an 
international tribunal of some kind would present the best forum for trying 
those most responsible.132  A fourth option that has received less attention 
(at least in the United States) is the possibility of trials, Lockerbie-style, in 
neutral, third party countries.133  And recently, a final option has emerged: 
the idea of simply returning suspects to their native countries for trial.134
Supporters of these alternatives generally contend that one can 
effectively prosecute suspected terrorists without abandoning the basic 
hallmarks of legal process.  Although there may be some disagreement 
about the precise contours of the basic elements that cannot be 
eliminated—the core rights of the accused that cannot be abridged—
supporters of each alternative suggest that trials could be conducted in such 
a way as to protect these fundamental principles while at the same time 
addressing the pragmatic concerns of those who support the commissions 
as originally proposed.  For example, procedures could be put in place—
such as those set forth in the Classified Information Procedures Act135 and 
Military Rule of Evidence 505136—to protect secret information and not 
compromise sources.  Such procedures could even be enhanced, if 
necessary. Some other evidentiary rules could also be relaxed.  Trials 
before judges rather than juries could be arranged to address the concern 
that jurors would be targeted.  And a strong judge would be able to put 
some limits on defendant grandstanding.137  In sum, this group has 
emphasized that practical concerns can be addressed without abandoning 
the core elements of the rule of law. 
 131. Koh, supra note 13, at 343–44; Harold Hongju Koh, We Have the Right Courts for Bin 
Laden, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2001, at A39.  See also Bill Keller, Trials and Tribulations, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 15, 2001, at A31. 
132. See, e.g., Slaughter, Beware the Trumpets of War, supra note 116; Mark Drumbl, Judging the 
11 September Terrorist Attack, 24 HUMAN RIGHTS Q. 323 (2002); Dickinson, supra note 116; 
Goldstone, supra note 116; Scharf, supra note 116; Slaughter, Al Qaeda Should Be Tried, supra note 
116. 
 133. In 1999, after years of sanctions imposed by the U.N. Security Council and a series of 
complex negotiations, Libya agreed to surrender two of its nationals suspected of committing the 1988 
bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, for trial by a Scottish court sitting in the 
Netherlands.  For a discussion of the verdict, in which one of the suspects was convicted and the other 
acquitted, see generally Sean D. Murphy, Verdict in the Trial of the Lockerbie Bombing Suspects, 95 
AM. J. INT’L L. 405 (2001). 
134. See Seelye, supra note 7 (reporting that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has indicated 
that some detainees at Guantanamo Naval Base may be returned to their home countries). 
 135. 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–16 (2000). 
 136. MIL. R. EVID. 505. 
137. See Slaughter, supra note 116 (explaining that judges prevented Milosevic from 
grandstanding). 
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In this Part, I argue that of all the proposed options, an international 
proceeding, at least to try those most responsible for September 11, would 
be the wisest course to pursue.  My analysis does not, however, take 
adherence to the rule of law as an unshakeable shibboleth.  Instead, I seek 
to explore what it is that the rule of law actually accomplishes from a self-
interested U.S. perspective in this context.  Thus, I look beyond the 
formality of the rule of law itself to the tangible benefits that adherence to 
legal process secures.  My argument is that, at least in its response to the 
current crisis, a strong commitment to international legal process actually 
serves the strategic interests of the United States.  Domestically, amid the 
debate about how much we should trade civil liberties for security, some 
have suggested that such a choice is a false one;138 similarly, in the 
international arena, adherence to the rule of law does not mean that security 
must be compromised.  Rather, in many instances the two may be mutually 
reinforcing.  Of course, a commitment to the value of legal process does 
not necessarily mandate an international proceeding as opposed to other 
possible fora.  Moreover, an international proceeding need not be the only 
mechanism used; undoubtedly a variety of legal avenues are necessary to 
bring the large number of Al Qaeda and Taliban operatives to justice.139
Nonetheless, I argue that an international proceeding (perhaps in 
combination with other approaches) would do the best job of fulfilling our 
strategic interests in fighting terrorism and ensuring our long-term security. 
Significantly, the current debates about the desirability of summary 
executive action versus the importance of international legal process echo 
discussions that took place within the Roosevelt Administration after 
World War II.  Although forceful arguments were made that Nazi and 
Japanese prisoners should be summarily executed, the Administration 
ultimately decided to create international war crimes tribunals, first at 
 138. David Cole eloquently summarizes this argument:
[L]iberty and security are not necessarily mutually exclusive values in a zero-sum game.  
Liberty often plays a critical role in maintaining security.  One of the justifications for 
guaranteeing political freedoms is that a free people are less likely to be driven to extreme 
violence.  A political process that treats people with equal dignity and allows dissidents to 
voice their views and organize to change the rules through political means is likely to be more 
stable in the long run.  Recent experience in England and Israel has shown that cracking down 
on civil liberties does not necessarily reduce violence, and may simply inspire more violence.  
As Justice Brandeis wrote, the Framers knew “that fear breeds repression; that repression 
breeds hate; [and] that hate menaces stable government.”
Cole, supra note 12, at 956 (2002) (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, 
J., concurring)) (footnote omitted).  See also, e.g., Harriet Chiang, ACLU Strives for Balance Between 
Civil Rights and Danger, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 6, 2002, at A3 (quoting Steven Shapiro, National Legal 
Director of the American Civil Liberties Union, as saying that his organization has been trying, since 
September 11, “to resist the notion that we have to trade off liberty for security”). 
139. See infra Part III.B. 
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Nuremberg and later in Tokyo.  Needless to say, these tribunals have 
helped generate momentum for a decades-long development of 
international human rights norms, instruments, and courts, culminating 
most recently in the creation of an international criminal court.  For the 
purpose of this Article, however, what is most important about the decision 
to create international trials is that many of the reasons put forth for 
proceeding with the tribunals were strategic ones, grounded in realpolitik 
considerations of the long-term United States interest.  Further, the legacy 
of Nuremberg in many ways testifies to the wisdom of these strategic 
choices.  Thus, this Part begins with a discussion of this momentous 
decision and the ways in which the strategic values of legal process 
articulated then may still hold true today.  Then, this Part suggests several 
additional ways in which an international legal process to try those most 
responsible for the September 11 attacks might best serve our particular 
strategic interests in combating terrorism and ensuring domestic safety. 
A. THE “NUREMBERG MOMENT” AND THE STRATEGIC DECISION TO 
INVOKE LEGAL PROCESS
During World War II, the Allied governments considered a variety of 
options for handling captured Axis war criminals.  The British proposed 
that the leading Nazi war criminals should be summarily executed or 
subjected to summary military trials, a plan that President Roosevelt 
initially accepted.140  Indeed, at one point Stalin was the only major Allied 
leader arguing for the trial of Nazi war criminals, although he at times 
advocated summary executions and forced labor, and in any event his 
conception of a trial was quite suspect.141  In the end it was the United 
States, led by Henry Stimson’s war department, that prevailed upon the 
others to agree to trials of the war crimes suspects and put an end to plans 
for summary executions or summary military trials.142  That decision—
which was a close thing—embodied a deep commitment to the values of 
legal process and the need to tame vengeance with justice.  And it was a 
momentous decision as well, both because it reflected a strong commitment 
to those values within the United States, and because it represented a hope 
that adherence to those values in international fora could help to instill 
them in the societies that had brought about the war’s major atrocities.  The 
legacy of the Nuremberg and, to a lesser extent the Tokyo trials, has to a 
great degree borne out these hopes.  The decision about what to do with 
140. See TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 28–33 (1992). 
141. See id. at 30–31. 
142. See id. at 33–40. 
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captured Al Qaeda members suspected of plotting the September 11 attacks 
and other major terrorist acts is similarly momentous, and we should take a 
lesson from the decision to favor justice over vengeance in the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo war crimes trials.  In hindsight, of course, it is difficult to 
pinpoint precisely which arguments within a complex array of factors 
actually produced a specific historical decision, and the choice to try, rather 
than summarily execute, suspected Axis war criminals was undoubtedly the 
result of numerous considerations.  Nevertheless, both the difficulty of the 
decision and the terms of the debate are instructive. 
Largely due to the influence of Henry Morgenthau, Jr., then Secretary 
of the Treasury, President Roosevelt originally agreed in 1943 to a British 
plan for summary executions of the top 50 or 100 Nazi leaders.143  Indeed, 
Morgenthau apparently favored summary execution of a much larger 
number, along with the complete de-industrialization of Germany, in order 
to reduce it to a pastoral and agricultural country.144  Henry Stimson, then 
Secretary of War, vehemently opposed this plan and finally prevailed in the 
President’s mind after news of Morgenthau’s plan was leaked to the 
press.145  Although the majority of Americans might well have favored 
summary executions of the Nazis, the enormous outcry at news of 
Morgenthau’s plan to reduce Germany to agricultural servitude likely had a 
significant impact on the ultimate decision to put the Axis war criminals on 
trial.146
For Stimson and others, such as George Marshall and Murray 
Bernays, “Morgenthau’s summary executions simply stood against the 
American domestic legal tradition.”147  Indeed, Gary Bass has argued that a 
central reason for the decision to hold trials stemmed from the desire to 
project a liberal democratic conception of fairness and due process into the 
international arena.148  Bass observes that all international war crimes 
tribunals have been established by liberal democratic states, and that 
illiberal states have never established bona fide war crimes tribunals when 
they have fought each other.149  Although such projection is not always 
successful, it is significant that the need to inculcate legal process values 
143. See GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE, THE POLITICS OF WAR
CRIMES TRIBUNALS 181 (2000); TAYLOR, supra note 140, at 31. 
 144. See BASS, supra note 143, at 157–60. 
145. See id. at 168–69. 
146. See id.
147. Id. at 164. 
148. See id. at 163–65, 180–81. 
149. See id. at 19. 
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internationally was one of the core elements of the decision to hold the 
trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo. 
Moreover, the decision stemmed from the belief that anything less 
than a fair trial for the Axis war criminals would be folly, and would lead 
to a resurgence of the conditions that helped to cause World War II itself, 
along with its attendant atrocities.  For example, Stimson argued to 
Roosevelt that: 
we should always have in mind the necessity of punishing effectively 
enough to bring home to the German people the wrongdoing done in 
their name, and thus prevent similar conduct in the future, without 
depriving them of the hope of a future respected German community.  
Remember, this punishment is for the purpose of prevention and not for 
vengeance.150
Thus, many of the arguments for holding trials were deeply pragmatic ones, 
based on a strategic calculation about the political value of legal process. 
The idea that legal process might serve political ends has been echoed 
by scholars.  Indeed, Judith Shklar has argued that legal process always
serves political ends—the question is not whether law is political, but 
rather the particular political values that it serves.151  In her view, the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg served liberal ends by 
promoting “legalistic values in such a way as to contribute to constitutional 
politics and to a decent legal system.”152  In addition, a growing literature 
in the area known as “transitional justice” has sought to identify additional 
values served by trials for those accused of mass atrocities.153  Such values 
include: establishing a historical record such that the fact of the atrocities 
and responsibility for them cannot be denied; imposing individual 
responsibility and therefore avoiding the problem of collective guilt; 
providing redress to victims; supporting the development of democracy and 
the rule of law in countries or regions where the mass atrocities were 
ordered or planned; development of norms; and deterrence. 
150. Id. at 157. 
151. See JUDITH SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 144 (1986). 
152. Id. at 145. 
153. See generally MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING
HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998); CARLOS NINO, RADICAL EVIL ON TRIAL
(1996); MARK OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE LAW (1997); STEVEN R. 
RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY (2d ed. 2001); RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
(2000); TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (Neil Kritz ed., 1995). 
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Many of these values were articulated in the arguments after World 
War II.  Stimson’s conviction that trials should take place stemmed in part 
from the view that such trials would be the best way to establish a historical 
record of Nazi atrocities and Allied efforts to thwart them.  According to 
Stimson, such trials “will afford the most effective way of making a record 
of the Nazi system of terrorism and of the effort of the Allies to terminate 
the system and prevent its recurrence.”154  As Bernays wrote, if the Nazi 
criminals were not tried, “Germany will simply have lost another war.  The 
German people will not know the barbarians they have supported, nor will 
they have any understanding of the criminal character of their conduct and 
the world’s judgment upon it.”155
Stimson also emphasized the role trials could play in promoting 
democracy and the rule of law within Germany, in establishing norms for 
the future, and in perhaps providing a measure of deterrence for future 
atrocities.  According to Stimson, plans such as Morgenthau’s proposed 
summary executions “do not prevent war; they breed war.”156  He argued 
that: 
It is primarily by the thorough apprehension, investigation and trial of all 
the Nazi leaders and instruments of the Nazi system of terrorism such as 
the Gestapo, with punishment delivered as promptly, swiftly and as 
severely as possible, that we can demonstrate the abhorrence which the 
world has for such a system and bring home to the German people our 
determination to extirpate it and its fruits forever.157
Significantly, Stimson believed that, in order to serve these strategic 
goals, any trial had to be full and fair, adhering to the basic elements of due 
process.  He emphasized that the “procedure must embody, in my 
judgment, at least the rudimentary aspects of the Bill of Rights, namely, 
notification to the accused of the charge, the right to be heard, and within 
reasonable limits, to call witnesses in his defense.”158  Indeed, according to 
Stimson: 
[T]he very punishment of these men in a dignified manner consistent 
with the advance of civilization will have all the greater effect upon 
posterity.  Furthermore, it will afford the most effective way of making a 
154. See BASS, supra note 143, at 165. 
155. See id. at 170 (quoting Stimson Diaries, vol. 48, Oct. 24, 1944, p. 179–80). 
156. See id. at 163. 
157. DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM: LAW, MEANING, AND VIOLENCE 344–45 (1994). 
158. See BASS, supra note 143, at 165 (emphasis omitted). 
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record of the Nazi system of terrorism and of the effort of the Allies to 
terminate the system and prevent its recurrence.159
Nuremberg (and to a lesser extent, Tokyo) left a legacy of respect for 
legal process that endures, particularly when contrasted with the likely 
result of the proposed alternatives: summary executions or summary 
military trials.  The defendants’ responsibility for the acts for which they 
were on trial was proved according to strict standards of evidence.  The 
deeds for which they were held liable were specified both in the Charter 
and in their indictments, providing them an opportunity to know the 
charges in advance of the trial so that they could prepare a defense.  The 
standard for liability (at least in the Nuremberg trials) required direct causal 
involvement and not the looser notion of simple moral liability.  And by 
and large the trials were fair⎯the judges and the prosecution abided by the 
rules set out in the Charter, and those rules did not bias the inquiry against 
the defense.160
Moreover, this legacy has contributed to specific strategic benefits 
over time.  It is true that the charges of retroactivity and victor’s justice 
have left some blemishes on the historical legitimacy of the trials.  And the 
proceedings certainly did not deter all future outbreaks of genocide or 
aggressive war in the world.  Nonetheless, more modest, but no less 
important, values were served.  For example, according to Shklar, the 
“main value” of the trials was the “historical facts about Nazi government 
which they brought to light.”161  Once the evidence was duly presented 
according to the fair procedures of the trial, it was impossible to deny 
credibly the Nazi role in the atrocities of the war.  Thus, “even the critics of 
the Trial in Germany [did] not deny that the crimes against humanity were 
159. See id.  Stimson’s focus on the importance of procedural justice is also reflected in scholarly 
work that delineates the values inherent in legal process and the core elements of adherence to the rule 
of law.  For example, David Luban, drawing on Lon Fuller’s pathmarking work on legal process, has 
identified several such elements: (1) public rules; (2) that are non-retroactive; (3) that correspond to 
their actual administration with like cases being treated alike and implementation being taken by the 
state rather than unauthorized lynch mobs; and (4) that result in adjudication which respects the various 
elements of procedural fairness, publicity, and impartiality that constitute natural justice and due 
process of law conceived in its most general aspects.  See LUBAN, supra note 157, at 345–46.  The 
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials may be said to have fallen short of these ideals in some respects.  Indeed, 
because neither the concept of crimes against humanity nor the principle of individual criminal 
responsibility for war crimes or crimes against peace existed as a full-fledged legal category prior to 
Nuremberg, the tribunals imposed a sort of retroactive justice.  And, because no Allied suspects were 
tried for such crimes, the tribunals might be said to have failed to treat like cases alike, thereby 
amounting only to victor’s justice. 
160. See id. at 353–54. 
 161. SHKLAR, supra note 151, at 154. 
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in fact committed, nor have the Nazi leaders become martyr figures.”162  In 
addition, the trials had as one of their aims the development of democracy 
and the rule of law in post-War Germany and Japan.  While the results in 
Japan are the subject of debate,163 the “rehabilitation of Germany after 
World War II is one of the great political successes of the century, turning a 
fascist enemy into a democratic ally.”164  The trials of the major war 
criminals cannot be seen as solely responsible for this shift—the enormous 
economic reconstruction plans in both countries perhaps deserve most of 
the credit⎯nor can their role be seen as necessarily insignificant.  For 
example, according to polling after the war, approximately two-thirds of 
Germans in the American zone supported Nuremberg, and half thought that 
all the defendants were guilty.165  Significantly, far fewer supported the 
subsequent trials in Germany, which were run by Americans alone.166  To 
be sure, this willingness to embrace legal process may in part be the result 
of the “traditional legalism of Germany’s professional and bureaucratic 
classes.”167  Because Japan lacked such a legal tradition, many believe that 
the Tokyo trials had less of an effect on postwar Japan.168  Nevertheless, 
subsequent to the trials, there was a rapid development of strong rule of law 
institutions in Japan as well. 
Perhaps most important, Stimson and others argued that a trial that 
was not part of a legal system, and thus remote from domestic principles of 
legal justice, would defile the entire concept of law.  In the end, they were 
able to make the case that to eliminate the Nazis without a trial and without 
producing the evidence of their action ultimately would have a corrosive 
effect upon the future of law and order in both in Germany and throughout 
Europe.169  As Shklar points out, not to conduct such trials “would have 
been to invite a perfect blood bath, with all its dynamic possibilities for 
anarchy and conflict on an already disoriented continent.”170  The decision 
to hold trials at Nuremberg, therefore, was both historically and 
162. Id. at 160. 
163. See, e.g., R. JOHN PRITCHARD, AN OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE 
TOKYO WAR TRIAL, NISSAN OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES, NO. 5, at 3, 47–51 (1987); B.V.A. ROLING,
THE TOKYO TRIAL AND BEYOND, REFLECTIONS OF A PEACEMONGER 85–91 (1993).  For a 
comprehensive critique of the Tokyo Trial, see RICHARD H. MINEAR, VICTOR’S JUSTICE: THE TOKYO 
WAR CRIMES TRIAL (1971). 
 164. BASS, supra note 143, at 295. 
 165. RICHARD L. MERRITT, DEMOCRACY IMPOSED: U.S. OCCUPATION POLICY AND THE GERMAN 
PUBLIC 1945–49 160–61 (1995). 
166. See id. at 163. 
 167. SHKLAR, supra note 151, at 156. 
168. See id. at 179–91.  Shklar describes the Tokyo trial as a “complete dud.” Id. at 181. 
169. See id.
 170. SHKLAR, supra note 151, at 158. 
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strategically significant and remains an important wellspring for 
international legal process values today. 
In choosing our path, we might well consider the lessons to be learned 
from the debates preceding the Nuremberg trials.  As Stimson and others 
recognized (and as the postwar history of Germany and Japan reflects), 
international trials conducted according to basic due process standards 
serve important, pragmatic aims.  In the current context as well, such trials, 
more than any other option, have the best chance of creating an accurate 
historical record of the attacks, holding individuals accountable—thereby 
absolving the Arab-Muslim world from collective responsibility—and 
supporting the development of democracy and the rule of law in 
Afghanistan and elsewhere. 
When reports circulate—particularly in the Arab-Muslim world—that 
the United States government committed the September 11 attacks,171 the 
urgent need for establishing such a record is evident.  While it may be true 
that a record created in a court of law has greater impact in societies that 
place high values on legal process to begin with, nonetheless the impact of 
such a trial in this respect cannot be underestimated, even in countries 
without a strong legal tradition.  After all, even Libya accepted the results 
of the Lockerbie terrorism trial, and believed such a trial, in a neutral third 
country, to be important. 
The impact of such a trial on the development of democracy and rule 
of law in countries and regions that are the breeding grounds for terrorism 
also cannot be ignored.  Of course, it would be foolish to suggest that a 
mere trial of terrorism suspects could stop terrorism, let alone create the 
rule of law in a country such as Afghanistan or Sudan.  But it would be 
equally foolish to suggest that the summary execution of terrorists would 
not fan the flames of the sentiments that inspire terrorists.  The Bush 
Administration certainly has not suggested the summary execution of 
captured terrorism suspects, but in proposing unilateral summary trials with 
truncated procedures and no real prospect of release, even if the suspects 
are acquitted, the Administration has barely paid lip service to the values of 
legal process.  As the debates surrounding Nuremberg (and the legacy of 
the trials themselves) indicate, however, we ignore these values at our own 
peril. 
If it is true that we are now in our own Nuremberg moment, then we 
must take seriously these important benefits of international legal process, 
171. See, e.g., Iraqi TV Says US Attacked Itself, BBC NEWS, Sept. 11, 2002, at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2251496.stm. 
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all of which flow directly from the Nuremberg experience itself.  This is 
not the end of the analysis, however, because the new reality of a global 
campaign to combat terrorism brings with it still more reasons to choose a 
path that fosters international cooperation and respect for the rule of law.  
The remainder of this Part, therefore, briefly summarizes the significant 
strategic benefits of international legal process in our altered sociopolitical 
context. 
B. CEMENTING THE INTERNATIONAL COALITION TO COMBAT TERRORISM
AND STRENGTHENING INTERGOVERNMENTAL NETWORKS NEEDED TO 
FIGHT TERRORISM
In addition to the benefits discussed above with regard to the 
Nuremberg proceedings, an international process for holding individual 
terrorists accountable would help the United States hold together the 
international coalition it needs to fight terrorism effectively and foster 
intergovernmental efforts that are key to long-term terrorism prevention.  
Terrorism is a transnational problem that spans virtually the entire world, 
and strong multilateral efforts are required if it is to be contained.172  The 
Al Qaeda network alone draws on the nationals of multiple countries who 
leave their homes to train in terrorist camps in host countries such as 
Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan, and the Philippines, and who are then sent to 
target countries such as the United States, where they live in cells, waiting 
to be deployed.173
Immediately following the September 11 attacks, the United States 
drew on the support of numerous countries around the globe in efforts to 
combat terrorism. On the day after the attacks, the UN Security Council 
issued a resolution strongly condemning the attacks and recognizing “the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with 
 172. Even before September 11, terrorism experts were calling for enhanced multilateral 
cooperative intelligence efforts to combat transnational threats such as terrorism.  See, e.g., John C. 
Gannon, Chairman, Address at the Conference Sponsored by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung on the Role of 
Intelligence Services in a Globalized World (May 21, 2001), at http://www.cia.gov/ 
nic/speeches/speeches/role_intel_services.htm. 
173. See Sam Dillon, Indictment by Spanish Judge Portrays a Secret Terror Cell, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 20, 2001, at A1; Susan Sachs, An Investigation in Egypt Illustrates Al Qaeda’s Web, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 20, 2001, at A1; Benjamin Weiser & Tim Golden, Al Qaeda: Sprawling, Hard-to-Spot Web of 
Terrorists-in-Waiting, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2001, at B4.  See generally UNITED KINGDOM PRIME
MINISTER’S OFFICE, RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE TERRORIST ATROCITIES IN THE UNITED STATES, 11 
SEPTEMBER 2001: AN UPDATED ACCOUNT (2001), available at http://www.pm.gov. 
uk/news.asp?newsID=3025. 
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the Charter.”174  Shortly thereafter, the Security Council issued another 
resolution, explicitly invoking its authority under Chapter VII of the United 
Nations Charter, referring to the previous resolution’s recognition of the 
right to self defense, reaffirming the need to combat by “all means”
terrorist acts threatening international peace and security, requiring states to 
take steps to block terrorist finances and end any state support for 
terrorism, and calling on states to increase cooperative intelligence-
gathering and law enforcement efforts.175  The North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (“NATO”) for the first time invoked Article 5 of its charter, 
which declares an attack against one member to be an attack against all.176
The Organization of American States (“OAS”) invoked a similar 
provision.177  As of the end of December 2001, 146 countries had acted to 
freeze terrorist assets, 136 countries had offered a diverse range of military 
assistance, and forty-six multilateral organizations had declared their 
support.178
 174. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1368 (2001).  In 
this resolution, the Security Council did not explicitly invoke Chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter, although it asserted that it “regards such acts, like any act of international terrorism, as a threat 
to international peace and security.” Id.
 175. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg. at 1–4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001).  
The resolution does not explicitly authorize the use of force in response to the September 11 attacks, 
although some have read its invocation of Chapter VII authority, coupled with its reaffirmation of 
Resolution 1368’s recognition of “the right of individual or collective self-defence” and its statement 
“reaffirming the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 
threats to international peace and security caused by international terrorist acts,” id. at 1, as an implicit 
authorization of the use of force.  For a lucid overview of the debate about whether the Security Council 
Resolutions authorize the use of force, see Drumbl, supra note 132, at 328–29. 
 176. Article 5 states: 
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North 
America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if 
such an armed attack occurs, each of them . . . will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by 
taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems 
necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North 
Atlantic area. 
North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, 63 Stat. 2241, 2244, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246.  See also NATO 
to Support U.S. Retaliation, CNN.COM, Sept. 12, 2001, at http://www.cnn.com/2001 
/WORLD/europe/09/12/nato.us (reporting that NATO invoked Article 5 in response to the attacks for 
the first time in fifty-two years). 
 177. C.P. Res. 796, O.A.S. C.P., Doc. CP/RES.796 (2001) (resolving “to condemn, as an attack 
against all the States of the Americas, the acts of terrorism perpetrated within the territory of the United 
States of America on September 11, 2001, that resulted in the murder of thousands of citizens from 
many Member States and other nations”) (emphasis added). 
178. See COALITION INFORMATION CENTERS, THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: THE FIRST
HUNDRED DAYS 8 (2001), available at www.whitehouse.gov/new0s/releases/2001/12 
/100dayreport.html [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE REPORT].  Specifically, with respect to military 
assistance, eighty-nine countries have granted over-flight authority for U.S. military aircraft, seventy-
six countries have granted landing rights for U.S. military aircraft, and twenty-three countries have 
agreed to host U.S. forces involved in offensive operations.  Id at 8.
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An international legal process would help to build on these 
cooperative efforts.  First, as discussed in more detail below, an 
international process would likely have greater legitimacy internationally 
than the proposed military commissions or even domestic trials within the 
United States.179  If other governments perceive the United States as acting 
fairly and with appropriate deference to international norms, they are more 
likely to continue as active members of a coalition to combat terrorism.  
Second, even beyond the question of perceived legitimacy, the international 
proceeding itself, by involving participants from many countries, would 
strengthen both formal and informal intergovernmental networks and 
institutions. 
An international proceeding would involve participants from many 
nations in the prosecution and punishment of terrorism suspects, which 
would give those nations a stake in the process, lead to the development of 
a cadre of governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental 
personnel with expertise in addressing the problem of terrorism, and foster 
channels of communication and collaboration among them.  As at the 
Nuremberg Tribunal,180 the Tokyo Tribunal,181 and the modern 
international tribunals—the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”)182 and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda (“ICTR”)183—panels of judges from multiple countries could sit 
together to determine suspects’ guilt or innocence.  Prosecutors could be 
drawn from multiple countries as well.  Indeed, creating such a forum for 
179. See infra Part II.G. 
 180. At Nuremberg, judges from the United States, France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union 
presided over the trials. National Archives and Records Administration, National Archives Collection 
of World War II War Crimes Records, 238.3, Records of the Office of the U.S. Chief of Counsel for the 
Prosecution of Axis Criminality (OusCCPAC), summary of history.  For an account of the proceedings, 
see generally TAYLOR, supra note 140. 
 181. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East drew judges from eleven countries: 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the Netherlands, France, Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, 
China, India, and the Philippines. National Archives and Records Administration, National Archives 
Collection of World War II War Crimes Records, 238.7, Records of the International Military Tribunal 
for the Far East (IMFTE), summary of history. 
 182. Judges from France, Guyana, the United Kingdom, Germany, China, Zambia, Australia, 
Jamaica, Turkey, Sri Lanka, Italy, the United States, Egypt, Malta, the Netherlands, Korea, Singapore, 
Ireland, the Czech Republic, Japan, Mali, Canada, and Colombia currently sit on the ICTY.  United 
Nations, ICTY General Information, at http://www.un.org/icty/glance/index.htm (last modified July 24, 
2002). 
 183. The ICTR shares its appeals chamber with that of the ICTY, and thus the judges from France, 
Guyana, Australia, Turkey, Sri Lanka, Italy, and the United States.  United Nations, ICTR General 
Information, at http://www.un.org/ictr (last visited Aug. 2, 2002).  Its trial chambers include judges 
from South Africa, Norway, Senegal, Tanzania, Lesotho, Madagascar, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Slovenia, 
and Russia.  Id.
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both personal and official encounters among jurists from many nations is 
precisely the sort of international process that fosters future cooperation 
and obedience to international legal norms.  As Abram Chayes and Antonia 
Handler Chayes have argued, states comply with international norms in 
part because of the way in which their representatives interact within 
international institutions.184
In order to see how an international process helps to create a context 
for the development of intergovernmental networks, we can look at the 
problem of secret evidence.  Critics have charged that an international 
process offers the greatest potential for damaging leaks, which will make 
countries reluctant to provide the intelligence information needed at trial.185
Due to the transnational nature of terrorism, however, information-sharing 
is absolutely essential, and countries will refuse to disclose information 
only at their peril, with or without an international legal process.  Indeed, as 
UN Security Council Resolution 1373 recognizes, enhanced multilateral 
information-sharing is an intrinsic part of any serious effort to contain 
terrorism.186  In tracking down and locating Al Qaeda suspects, the United 
States has already relied considerably on intelligence provided by other 
countries.187
An international criminal proceeding could help to strengthen the 
needed intelligence-sharing networks and could help to provide a 
framework for screening sensitive information that would have greater 
legitimacy than a purely U.S.-run process.  Some intelligence experts have 
suggested—even before September 11—that an international terrorism 
184. See ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS, 88–134 (1995). 
185. See, e.g., Wedgwood, supra note 3. 
186. See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 175, at 3. 
187. See, e.g., Chris Hedges, A European Dragnet Captures New Clues to bin Laden’s Network,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2001, at B10; Warren Hoge, Blair Says New Evidence Ties bin Laden to Attacks,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2001, at B5; James Risen & Tim Weiner, Arrests Are Said to Have Disrupted 
Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2001, at B6 (reporting Defense Department assertions that, “[s]ince Sept. 
11, at least 23 foreign intelligence services—sometimes working with American intelligence, 
sometimes on their own—have disrupted terrorist cells and arrested hundreds of people around the 
world.”); James Risen & Tim Weiner, C.I.A. Is Said to Have Sought Help from Syria, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
30, 2001 [hereinafter Risen & Weiner, CIA] (noting that the CIA has opened lines of communication 
with intelligence officials from several nations that had in the past been accused of providing state 
support for terrorism, including Syria, Libya, and Sudan, and that many of these states “do not support 
what is widely seen as the main terrorist threat to the United States—Mr. bin Laden and Al Qaeda”); 
John Tagliabue & Raymond Bonner, German Data Led U.S. to Search for More Suicide Hijacker 
Teams, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2001, at A1; John Tagliabue, Italian Tapes Portray Young Arabs 
Operating on the Edges of Islamic Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2001, at B4.  For an account of U.S. 
efforts to develop enhanced cooperation with Pakistani intelligence officials, see Douglas Frantz, C.I.A. 
Leader Asks Pakistan for Help in bin Laden Hunt, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2001, at A1. 
2002] USING LEGAL PROCESS TO FIGHT TERRORISM 1449
court, run by the G-8 powers, would be beneficial precisely because it 
would strengthen and develop intelligence-sharing networks and 
procedures.188  Moreover, as in the domestic context, procedures could be 
put in place to protect highly classified information from coming to public 
view.189  The ICTY and ICTR already have adopted such procedures, but 
new rules could be developed to address specific concerns.  For example, 
evidence that might compromise security if it came to light could be 
reviewed in camera by a multilateral intelligence panel.  A decision made 
by such a panel to keep the information secret would have greater 
legitimacy than a purely unilateral determination within the United States.  
In addition, such a panel could form the basis for an enhanced structure for 
ongoing intelligence-sharing. 
To be sure, the United States might well be reluctant to disclose, even 
to a group of intelligence officials operating under conditions of secrecy, 
certain information that would be necessary to convict Al Qaeda 
operatives, if members of the panel included representatives from 
governments deemed less trustworthy.  The circle of governments to which 
we might be willing to disclose such information could well be, and 
perhaps should be, quite narrow.  Indeed, we may not even trust certain 
other countries enough to give credence to the information received from 
them, let alone enough to give them additional material.190  Nonetheless, 
there can be no doubt that information-sharing is already occurring and that 
it is necessary in the fight against terrorism.  Moreover, even a multilateral 
panel with representatives from only a few countries would be an 
improvement over a purely unilateral approach. 
This is just one example of the way in which an international process 
could further the cooperative efforts that are needed to track down, 
apprehend, and punish terrorists.  Certainly, such cooperative efforts could 
188. See Dov Waxman, Terrorism: The War of the Future, 23 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFFAIRS 201 
(1999).  See generally Symposium, Post Cold-War International Security Threats: Terrorism, Drugs, 
and Organized Crime, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 655 (1999) (arguing that a G-8 international court could 
result in concrete intelligence-sharing benefits, including coordination of standards and procedures, that 
would improve efforts to deter and punish transnational crimes). 
189. See, e.g., Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1–16 (2000). 
 190. Indeed, experts are cautious about the CIA’s moves to open lines of intelligence-sharing with 
nations such as Syria, Libya, and Sudan.  See Risen & Weiner, CIA, supra note 187.  As Gregory F. 
Treverton, former vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council, a group that oversees American 
intelligence analysis, observes: 
While we need the intelligence very much, the trick is that some of the people we’re sharing 
with are people with whom our partnership will be very limited . . . .  We are not close friends 
with all these nations.  All the people we share with have their own interests.  And they will 
cook the books to pursue their own interests. 
Id.
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develop without an international proceeding to impose criminal 
responsibility on individual suspects, but the existence of an international 
tribunal would provide a context and a set of personal and governmental 
networks for developing long-term joint efforts to combat terrorism. 
C. APPREHENDING, EXTRADITING, AND TRYING TERRORISM SUSPECTS
The creation of an international tribunal would more likely lead to the 
arrest and trial of terrorists.  Despite our military presence in Afghanistan, 
capture of all of the Al Qaeda leaders who masterminded the September 11 
attacks—even those who remain in Afghanistan—has proven to be elusive.  
To date, Osama bin Laden and most of the major figures suspected of 
plotting the attacks remain at large.191  We are likely to have more success 
extraditing terrorism suspects for trial in an international tribunal than in 
U.S. civilian courts or military commissions. 
Doubts about military commissions exist even among many of our 
allies.  Officials from Spain and other European countries, for example, 
have voiced concerns about extraditing suspects to the United States for 
trial.192  Spain has gone so far as to announce that it might not be willing to 
extradite terrorism suspects for trial in the United States unless assurances 
are made that they will be tried in civilian courts.193  Other European 
government officials have expressed similar reservations.194  For Arab-
Muslim states195 where top terrorists may be found, extradition of suspects 
 191. See John F. Burns, 10-Month Afghan Mystery: Is Bin Laden Dead or Alive, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 30, 2001, at A1. 
 192. For example, 
Spain told the Americans that it will not extradite eight men [charged with helping to prepare 
the assaults on the World Trade Center and Pentagon] unless Washington agrees to bring 
them before a civilian court, not the military tribunals that President Bush 
envisions. . . . Concerns were also raised that other European Union countries would be 
unwilling to hand over prisoners without similar assurances from the Americans. 
Clyde Haberman, Taliban Holdouts, Europe’s Reservations and Anthrax Frustrations, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 24, 2001, at B1.  See also Denis Barnett, Ashcroft in Rome As Tour Fails to Bear Fruit on Death 
Penalty, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 14, 2001 (“U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft arrived in 
Rome Friday unlikely to find in Italy a willing ally in his efforts to win European support for the 
extradition of terrorist suspects facing a possible death penalty in the United States.”). 
 193. Haberman, supra note 192.  See also Elisabeth Bumiller, Spain to Study U.S. Requests to 
Extradite Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2001, at B4 (noting that a “senior European Union 
official said last week that he doubted that any of the 15 nations would agree to extradition for military 
trials”). 
194. Id.
 195. Throughout this Article, I use the appellations “Arab-Muslim states,” “Arab-Muslim 
countries,” and “Arab-Muslim world” as shorthand for both the Arab countries of the Middle East and 
those countries with a predominantly Muslim population, such as Indonesia, Pakistan, and Malaysia.  I 
certainly realize that because these countries are not monolithic, generalizations about them are 
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to the United States may be even less palatable.196  An international 
proceeding, in contrast, would provide a face-saving way for such states to 
surrender terrorism suspects without seeming to capitulate to the United 
States. 
Moreover, such a process would be much more effective than trial in a 
neutral third country, the other face-saving option.  For example, in the 
Lockerbie case, Libyan officials’ reluctance to surrender suspects to the 
United States served to stall criminal proceedings for years. Ultimately, 
agreement was reached on a trial in a neutral third country (the 
Netherlands) under Scottish law.197  Such a process, pursued on an ad hoc 
basis, terrorist by terrorist, is bound to be cumbersome and time-
consuming.  If an international proceeding were established, however, it 
would create a ready-made alternative to the embarrassment of 
surrendering a suspect directly to the United States, while avoiding the 
drawbacks of a trial in a third country. 
D. PROTECTING U.S. CITIZENS ABROAD
The establishment of an international proceeding to try terrorism 
suspects in a manner consistent with fundamental due process standards 
would also protect U.S. citizens abroad.  The use of an international court 
would help to establish the minimum procedural standards acceptable to 
the international community, and would thereby strengthen the U.S. 
government’s hand in its efforts to shield American citizens apprehended 
abroad from trials without due process protections. 
In contrast, trials of terrorism suspects before the military 
commissions as originally proposed would endanger U.S. citizens abroad 
by weakening the U.S. government’s capacity to criticize and deter other 
countries from trying U.S. citizens before tribunals with inadequate 
procedural guarantees.  For example, when Peru tried U.S. citizen Lori 
Berenson before a military tribunal in a closed proceeding, the U.S. 
government protested, and in part due to those protests, helped to secure a 
inherently problematic.  For the purposes of this Article, however, the term provides a convenient way 
to refer to a set of countries that, in U.S. foreign policy, is often distinguished from, for example, 
“Western Europe” (an equally problematic moniker). 
196. What’s News World-Wide, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2002 (“Malaysia won’t extradite to 
the U.S. a Malaysian army captain who officials say had direct contact with three participants in the 
Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.”). 
197. See, e.g., Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law; Verdict 
in the Trial of the Lockerbie Bombing Suspects, 95 AM. J. INT’L. L. 405, 405 (2001) (Sean Murphy, 
ed.); Michael P. Scharf, International Law Weekend Proceedings: Terrorism on Trial: The Lockerbie 
Criminal Proceedings, 6 J. INT’L & COMP. L. 355, 356–58 (2000). 
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second trial for Berenson in a civilian court.198  Such protests would be far 
less likely to succeed if the United States were itself to insist on using 
similar commissions to convict noncitizens in the present circumstances.  
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that, after sentencing a Yemeni citizen to 
death on the basis of a secret trial held before a military commission, the 
United States would be able to persuade Yemen not to go forward with a 
summary secret trial of an American citizen suspected of terrorism.  And 
even in countries other than those whose nationals might be tried before the 
proposed commissions, U.S. officials, in seeking to protect their citizens 
from military tribunals or other summary proceedings, would be 
considerably less able to exert the necessary diplomatic pressure. 
Concerns about the potential repercussions to U.S. citizens abroad 
appear to have prompted the Bush Administration to reverse its position on 
the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the terrorism suspects 
detained at Guantanamo Naval Base.199  After initially maintaining that the 
Geneva Conventions do not pertain at all to these suspects, the 
Administration has shifted course and has acknowledged that the 
Conventions do apply to Taliban captives, though not to members of Al 
Qaeda.200  This shift was inspired, at least in part, by fears that eschewing 
the Geneva Conventions in this instance might render U.S. troops captured 
overseas more vulnerable.201  Similar concerns that we might be 
establishing a precedent whereby U.S. citizens could be subjected to 
military trials overseas without basic due process guarantees should be no 
less pressing. 
Furthermore, regardless of whether U.S. citizens might be involved in 
such trials, the United States would find it more difficult to criticize other 
 198. On June 1, 2000, Phillip Reeker, Acting Spokesman for the Department of State, in a press 
briefing stated that: 
The United States Government has at all levels been actively involved in Ms. Berenson’s case 
since her arrest in November 1995. We have consistently maintained that Ms. Berenson’s
military trial did not meet international standards of due process, and we have repeatedly 
urged the Government of Peru to grant her a new trial in civilian court with full due process 
protection. 
at http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/000601_dosbrief_peru.html.  See also Phillip 
Reeker, Deputy Spokesman, Department of State, Daily Press Briefing (June 21, 2002) (noting that the 
second, civilian, trial, which was held in public and at which Berenson was represented by counsel, was 
able to confront witnesses against her, was able to present evidence in support of her side of the case, 
and was able to file an appeal, “addressed some of the concerns we had about the military trial”), at 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2001/3722.htm. 
199. See supra note 6. 
 200. Shanker & Seelye, supra note 6. 
201. Id.  Similar concerns led to a similar shift during the Vietnam War. See William Glaberson, 
Critics’ Attack on Tribunals Turns to Law Among Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2001, at B1. 
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countries for using military courts to evade due process standards if it 
moves forward with the military commissions proposal. As Harold Hongju 
Koh, former Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights 
and Labor, has pointed out, “[w]hen the Chinese or Russians try Uighur or 
Chechen Muslims as terrorists in military courts, U.S. diplomats protest 
vigorously and the world condemns those tribunals as anti-Muslim.  But 
how can the U.S. object when other countries choose to treat U.S. military 
commissions the same way?”202
To be sure, any type of trial with basic due process protections—
whether domestic or international—would do more to protect U.S. citizens 
overseas than would the current practice of indefinite secret detentions or 
the proposed military commissions.  The existence of an international 
proceeding, however, would be particularly helpful because it would signal 
that multiple countries accept whatever procedures are adopted for such a 
tribunal as fair.  This in turn would strengthen the U.S. government’s hand 
in objecting to truncated procedures falling short of those guaranteed by the 
international process that other governments might attempt to impose on 
U.S. citizens apprehended abroad. 
E. ESTABLISHING THE INTERNATIONAL NATURE OF THE CRIME AND 
ISOLATING AL QAEDA FROM THE REST OF THE ARAB-MUSLIM WORLD
An international process, more than any of the other options, would 
establish the international nature of the crimes committed on September 11 
and would isolate the perpetrators from the rest of the world.  Although the 
attacks occurred on U.S. soil, in violation of U.S. law, and killed or 
wounded thousands of U.S. citizens,203 characterizing them solely in this 
way undermines the magnitude of the atrocities committed.  The acts 
perpetrated on September 11 were not only domestic crimes, but 
international ones, in several important respects. 
Perhaps most significantly, the attacks constitute a crime against 
humanity.  The attacks could easily be shown to consist of murder and 
other “inhumane acts . . . intentionally causing great suffering . . . or 
serious injury to body or to mental or physical health,” committed as part 
of a “widespread or systematic attack on a civilian population, with 
knowledge of the attack.”204  Moreover, under the reigning definition of 
 202. Koh, supra note 13, at 342. 
203. See WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 178. 
 204. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., Annex II, art. 7, at 
4, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
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crimes against humanity, as reflected in the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, there is no requirement that the attack be 
committed by a state actor.205  Thus, no link between the suspected Al 
Qaeda perpetrators and the Taliban government of Afghanistan need be 
shown.  Nor is there any requirement that there be a nexus to armed 
conflict,206 thus avoiding the thorny problem under international law of 
whether the attacks themselves qualify as the initiation of armed conflict.207
It is true that, to establish a crime against humanity, a prosecutor must 
show evidence of some kind of “organizational policy” behind the attack.  
But even media accounts of Al Qaeda’s plans indicate that such an 
organizational policy existed,208 so it likely would not be hard to prove. 
The attacks also could be shown to violate widely ratified 
international antiterrorism conventions.  The Hague Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft,209 the Tokyo Convention on 
Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft,210 and the 
Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the 
Safety of Civil Aviation211 make aircraft hijacking and other offenses 
committed aboard aircraft international criminal offenses.  Countries that 
have ratified these conventions must criminalize the offenses set forth in 
them as a matter of domestic law and either extradite suspects or try them 
domestically (or submit the cases to the authorities for investigation).  
Although the offenses defined in these conventions are somewhat limited 
in scope, the hijacking and the destruction of the four airplanes on 
September 11 likely would be included.212
205. See id. art. 7, at 4–5; Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International 
Criminal Court: An Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381, 452 (2000). 
206. See Rome Statute, supra note 204, art. 7, at 4–5.  Sadat & Carden, supra note 205, at 427–28. 
207. See, e.g., Drumbl, supra note 132, at 340 (noting the “conceptual, moral, and legal challenges 
of characterizing the September 11, 2002 attack as an armed attack”).  See also Jordan J. Paust, 
Addendum: Prosecution of Mr. bin Laden et al. for Violations of International Law and Civil Lawsuits 
by Various Victims, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. INSIGHTS (Sept. 21, 2001), at
http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh77.htm. 
 208. For example, the bin Laden videotape released by the Pentagon on December 13, 2001 
suggests not only that bin Laden had prior knowledge of the attacks, but that they formed part of a 
broader plan. See Scenes of Rejoicing and Words of Strategy from bin Laden and His Allies, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 14, 2001, at B4. 
 209. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 
1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 [hereinafter “Hague Convention”]. 
 210. Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 
1963, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 [hereinafter “Tokyo Convention”]. 
 211. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 
23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 [hereinafter “Montreal Convention”]. 
212. See id. arts. 1–2, 24 U.S.T. at 568–69, 974 U.N.T.S. at 178–81; Hague Convention, supra 
note 209, art. 1, 22 U.S.T. at 1644, 860 U.N.T.S. at 107; Tokyo Convention, supra note 210, art. 11, 
2002] USING LEGAL PROCESS TO FIGHT TERRORISM 1455
Moreover, while these conventions might not cover the destruction of 
the World Trade Center, the partial destruction of the Pentagon, and the 
enormous casualties on the ground, the recent International Convention for 
the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, poses no such problems.  Having 
entered into force on May 23, 2001, the treaty now has fifty-eight 
signatories and twenty-five parties.  (The United States signed the treaty on 
January 12, 1998, but has not yet ratified it.) It specifies that a person 
commits an offense if he or she: 
unlawfully and intentionally delivers, places, discharges or detonates an 
explosive or other lethal device in, into or against a place of public use, a 
State or government facility, a public transportation system or an 
infrastructure facility . . . with the intent to cause death or serious bodily 
injury . . . or . . . with the intent to cause extensive destruction of such a 
place, facility or system, where such destruction results in or is likely to 
result in major economic loss.213
While the drafters may have contemplated primarily a common bomb or 
other explosive device, at least one commentator has noted that it is “not
too much of a stretch to consider a plane filled with tons of jet fuel and 
used as an explosive missile as an ‘explosive device’ within the scope of 
Article 2.”214  Like the other terrorism treaties, the convention essentially 
requires that state parties either extradite or try suspects.215
In addition, the attacks might also be characterized as war crimes, 
although prosecuting the terrorists for such acts may prove more difficult 
under established international law.  The intentional targeting of civilians 
and civilian objects during armed conflict is a war crime.216  And the 
attacks of September 11 could clearly be shown to target, deliberately, 
civilians and civilian objects.  Nevertheless, it is unclear whether the 
attacks were of such a nature as to qualify as armed conflict for purposes of 
international law.217
704 U.N.T.S. at 230; Arnold N. Pronto, Comment, AM. SOC. INT’L L. INSIGHTS (Sept., 2001), at
http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh77.htm. 
 213. Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Jan. 12, 1998, art. 2, S. TREATY DOC.
NO. 106-6, at 4, 37 I.L.M. 249, 253. 
214. See Pronto, supra note 212. 
215. Id.  Also, unlike the some of the other terrorism treaties, the Convention expressly excludes 
the application of the political offense exemption in the context of extradition and mutual legal 
assistance.  Its scope also covers attempts, those who participate in the acts as accomplices, and those 
who participate by organizing or directing others to commit the acts.  Id.  It even includes groups of 
individuals linked to the act by a common purpose.  Id.
216. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 204, art. 2, at 2. 
217. See supra note 207. 
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Regardless of the legal label, however, the international character of 
the crimes—as crimes against humanity or as violations of the terrorism 
conventions—is beyond dispute.  If for no other reason, the fact that the 
perpetrators likely were citizens of numerous countries and that the 
casualty list included citizens from over eighty countries218 establishes that 
this was more than a crime against the United States. 
A purely domestic trial, whether civilian or military, would undermine 
the international nature of the crimes committed.  In arguing that domestic 
courts are perfectly suitable to try the perpetrators of the attacks, some have 
cited Israel’s trial of Adolf Eichmann as an example.219  Yet, the Eichmann 
trial should not necessarily be a model here.  Hannah Arendt, for example, 
has argued that the Eichmann trial suffered from serious problems precisely 
because it was a domestic proceeding.220  According to Arendt, the trial 
retold the story of the Holocaust as a crime against Jews, rather than 
conceiving of Jews as members of the human community more broadly, 
and the trial thereby distorted both the truly monstrous nature of the crimes 
in question and their international character.221  Moreover, although the 
Eichmann trial may well have served an important purpose in enabling 
victims to tell a story of the Jewish Holocaust,222 it did so only after an 
international trial had already demonstrated the truly international nature of 
the genocide and crimes against humanity that the Nazis had committed. 
If domestic trials in the United States were the primary means of 
imposing criminal liability on those responsible for the September 11 
attacks, and no one were tried in an international forum, similar problems 
might well arise.  The dominant narrative that would emerge would likely 
be one about Americans as the principal victims of the attacks, thereby 
particularizing the crimes in question.  It might also present a polarized 
picture of the United States alone in a battle against the terrorists.  An 
international process, by contrast, would have a much better chance of 
presenting a picture of the world united against terrorism and emphasizing 
the acts of September 11 as crimes against all of humanity. 
 218. WHITE HOUSE REPORT, supra note 178, at 5. 
219. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 131. 
 220. HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM 269–76 (1963). 
221. Id.  Arendt’s is not the only possible interpretation of the Eichmann trial, of course, and she 
has been criticized by many.  See, e.g., Leora Bilsky, In a Different Voice: Nathan Alterman and 
Hannah Arendt on the Kastner and Eichmann Trials, 1 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 509, 526 (2000).
Nevertheless, her insight, whether or not accurate, illuminates the potential danger of a purely domestic 
trial for such universal crimes. 
222. See, e.g., Shoshana Felman, A Ghost in the House of Justice: Death and the Language of the 
Law, 13 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 241, 242–51 (2001). 
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I should make clear that I am not arguing that domestic courts should 
never try international crimes.  To the contrary, such trials are an important 
means by which international human rights law is incorporated 
domestically.  The international human rights system is a complex 
intersection of multiple procedures—domestic, international, subnational, 
and transnational.  I am certainly not suggesting that all matters of 
international human rights law, or even international human rights criminal 
law, ought to be resolved by international institutions.  Indeed, such 
institutions are often poor substitutes for domestic processes. 
In extraordinary cases, however, an international forum is more 
appropriate than a domestic one.  The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, for example, recognizes this principle, and provides that 
only the most serious crimes of truly international concern should come 
before the court.223  Of course, the International Criminal Court, which 
only recently has come into being now that the requisite number of 
countries have ratified the convention,224 cannot serve as a forum in which 
to try the perpetrators of September 11 because the new court will only 
hear cases that arise after it was established.225  Nonetheless, the principle 
reflected in the statute of the court is relevant here. 
In order to determine whether a crime is sufficiently serious to warrant 
an international trial, several factors might be relevant. For example, one 
could evaluate the scope of the actual damage (number of victims and 
extent of damage to property) as well as the scope of the planned 
damage.226  The heinous nature of the acts involved might be another 
factor, as might be—to the extent that a group of individuals committed the 
crimes—the rank of the individuals in that group (with leaders being the 
most appropriate for international prosecution).227  Yet another factor might 
be the extent to which the victims and perpetrators are citizens of multiple 
countries, thus making it difficult to characterize the crime as having a 
particular location and making domestic resolution of the crimes complex.  
Indeed, this was one of the factors that shaped the way in which the United 
States and other Allied countries defined the “major war criminals” who 
would ultimately be subject to international, rather than domestic, justice at 
223. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 204, pmbl., arts. 1, 5, at 1–3. 
 224. The Rome Statute provides that the court can only be created once sixty states have ratified 
the treaty.  Id. art. 126, at 88.  As of the time of writing this article, seventy-eight states have now 
ratified the treaty.  See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Website, at
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXVIII/treaty10.asp. 
225. Id. art. 11, at 11. 
 226. Sadat & Carden, supra note 205, at 419. 
227. Id.
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Nuremberg.228  Certainly, a strong case could be made that the September 
11 attacks, which were coordinated by a worldwide terrorist organization 
run by large networks of individuals of multiple nationalities working in 
dozens of countries, in which thousands of people from over eighty 
countries around the world were killed or wounded in multiple locations in 
the United States, which took their toll in billions of dollars worth of 
damage to some of the tallest buildings in the world, and which shut down 
the U.S. air transport system and indeed much of the U.S. government, 
easily satisfies all of these factors. 
Moreover, an international trial for those most responsible for 
September 11 would not violate the so-called “complementarity principle.”
That principle, as reflected in the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, allows international proceedings only when domestic 
courts are unwilling or unable to adjudicate a given offense.229  Such a 
principle is intended to help alleviate the tension between international 
justice and nation-state sovereignty concerns.  By establishing a preference 
for domestic proceedings, where possible, it minimizes interference by 
international institutions in the internal affairs of a state against the will of 
that state. But the principle should not prevent an individual state, if it 
actually desires international adjudication, from seeking an international 
forum in a given case.  It is true that the Rome Statute might be read as 
foreclosing that option, because international adjudication is permissible 
only when a state is “unwilling or unable” to adjudicate the dispute. But 
one could plausibly read “unwilling or unable” to include circumstances in 
which a state might not want to adjudicate the leaders of an international 
crime of enormous magnitude in a domestic court.  It is also a fair question, 
in this case, whether U.S. courts and juries could in fact provide a fair trial 
to bin Laden and other top Al Qaeda leaders suspected of plotting the 
September 11 attacks. 
An international trial, then, at least for those most responsible for the 
attacks, would best establish the truly international nature of the crime in 
question.  Indeed, only such a forum could do justice to the magnitude of 
the crime. And only such a forum could avoid the portrait of the United 
States acting alone against the terrorists.  An international tribunal stands 
 228. TAYLOR, supra note 140, at 27–40. 
 229. Rome Statute, supra note 204, art. 17, at 14.  For a discussion of the complementarity 
principle, see generally Jonathan I. Charney, International Criminal Law and the Role of Domestic 
Courts, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 120 (2001); Michael A. Newton, Comparative Complementarity: Domestic 
Jurisdiction Consistent with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 167 MIL. L. REV. 20, 
26 (2001); Sadat & Carden, supra note 205. 
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the best chance of showing the world coming together and uniting against 
terrorism.  To the extent that any Arab or Muslim judges were to 
participate in such a proceeding, it would isolate Al Qaeda from the rest of 
the world, sending a message that Al Qaeda cannot claim to represent 
Islam.  If one of the primary strategic goals of the United States is to 
contain terrorist threats, then it is absolutely essential that followers of 
Islam not align themselves with Al Qaeda, and an international trial of Al 
Qaeda leaders, presided over by a panel that includes judges from Muslim 
nations, could be an important part of that effort. 
F. PROMOTING DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL NORMS RELATED TO 
TERRORISM
An additional benefit of an international process is the development of 
international norms relating to terrorism that would likely result.  
Numerous widely ratified treaties have outlawed certain acts of terrorism. 
As discussed above, the Montreal Convention, the Tokyo Convention, and 
the Hague Convention require state parties to criminalize the hijacking of 
planes and other similar acts regarding airplanes.  Other intergovernmental 
agreements and treaties criminalize the taking of hostages,230 attacks on 
diplomats,231 the endangerment of nuclear material,232 acts affecting the 
safety of maritime navigation and the continental shelf,233 and the marking 
of plastic explosives.234  More recent treaties have addressed the problem 
of terrorist bombing235 and financing.236  The general structure of these 
treaties is to require state parties to criminalize the acts in question and 
either to try suspects domestically (or submit them to the local authorities 
for investigation) or to extradite them. 
Nevertheless, greater norm development in this area is urgently 
needed. As even the titles of these antiterrorism conventions make clear, 
 230. Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 34th Sess., Supp. No. 
39, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/34/L.23 (1979). 
 231. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected 
Persons, Dec. 14, 1973, art. 2, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1978, 1035 U.S.T.S. 167, 169. 
 232. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, March 3, 1980, art. 7, T.I.A.S. 
No. 11080, at 11. 
 233. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988, art. 3, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 101-1, at 2–3, 27 I.L.M. 668, 674–75. 
 234. Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, Mar. 1, 1991, 
arts. 2–4, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-8, at 3–4, 30 I.L.M. 726, 727–28. 
 235. 1997 Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, supra note 213, art. 2, S. 
TREATY DOC. NO. 106-6, at 4–5, 37 I.L.M. at 253. 
 236. Convention for the Suppression of Financing Terrorism, Jan. 10, 2000, art. 2, S. TREATY 
DOC. NO. 106-49, at 4–5, 39 I.L.M. 270. 
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the international community has emphasized criminalizing specific acts 
rather than attempting to agree on a definition of terrorism.  That strategy 
has proven more effective in developing common ground than in working 
out a comprehensive definition.237  An international proceeding to try 
individuals suspected of carrying out the September 11 attacks could help 
in three different ways. 
First, an international proceeding would itself generate interpretive 
norms.  For example, the decisions of the International Tribunals for the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda have created a body of important legal 
interpretations of international criminal law, the law of armed conflict, and 
human rights law.  Those interpretations have helped to resolve long-
debated aspects of the law in this area.  As Sean Murphy has noted: 
[T]he ICTY is developing an unprecedented jurisprudence of 
international humanitarian law.  Prior to its creation, the principle 
sources of international judicial precedent remained the fifty-year-old 
decisions of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals. Now there is a further 
substantial and growing corpus of international judicial decisions that 
will ultimately affect international humanitarian law in a variety of areas, 
comprising (to name just a few) . . . the attribution of crimes to superiors 
pursuant to theories of “command responsibility”; the permissibility of 
defense to such crimes, such as those based on reprisal or duress; . . . the 
rights of suspects to counsel, cross-examination of witnesses, and 
exculpatory evidence; and the treatment of victims and witnesses.238
Second, as discussed previously,239 the establishment of these 
tribunals has contributed to the development of a cadre of lawyers, judges, 
and others who are familiar with, and committed to, the implementation of 
these norms.  Such governmental officials and members of civil society 
have formed both formal and informal relationships and networks that have 
helped develop the international human rights movement.  Moreover, 
because these jurists come from a diverse array of countries and 
backgrounds, they can draw on their experience and help to generate 
increased support within their own countries for international human rights 
norms. 
Third, and perhaps most important, an international proceeding has the 
capacity to act as a catalyst in a much larger sense for the development of 
norms.  As discussed previously, the Nuremberg trials are a good example 
237. See, e.g., PAUST ET AL., supra note 99, at 995. 
 238. Sean D. Murphy, Progress and Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 57, 95 (1999). 
239. See supra text accompanying notes 180–184. 
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of this phenomenon.  Consider that, at the time of their creation, although 
almost nobody seriously argued that the perpetrators should go 
unpunished,240 there was considerable disagreement about whether it was 
appropriate to create a legal proceeding.241  Charles Wyzanski, for 
example, contended that punishing those captured in war was not a legal 
but a political act.242
But the great achievement of Nuremberg (and the proceedings in the 
Far East that followed) was its “capacity . . . to project a new legal meaning 
into the future.”243  As Wyzanski himself later acknowledged, “the 
outstanding accomplishment of the trial, which could never have been 
achieved by any more summary executive action, is that it has crystallized 
the concept that there already is inherent in the international community a 
machinery both of the expression of international criminal law and for its 
enforcement.”244  Significantly, Wyzanski’s statement reveals that he came 
to believe not only that the tribunals were legitimate, but also that they 
served a norm-creating function that went beyond the realm of political or 
military power and that could not have been achieved through the use of 
such power.  Robert Jackson, chief prosecutor at Nuremberg, has made a 
similar argument: 
We have also incorporated [the trial’s] principles into a judicial 
precedent.  “The power of the precedent,” Mr.  Justice Cardozo said, “is
the power of the beaten path.” One of the chief obstacles to this trial was 
the lack of a beaten path.  A judgment such as has been rendered shifts 
the power of the precedent to the support of these rules of law.  No one 
can hereafter deny or fail to know that the principles on which the Nazi 
leaders are adjudged to forfeit their lives constitute law—and law with a 
sanction.245
Thus, an international process may help to inculcate norms for the 
future.  By drawing the attention of the world to an international 
proceeding, the Nuremberg trials created a significant moment that 
240. But see MONTGOMERY BELGION, VICTORS’ JUSTICE 42–131 (1949) (arguing that the alleged 
crimes were acts of war in which both sides were engaged and therefore did not warrant criminal 
punishment). 
241. See id. at 195; ANN TUSA & JOHN TUSA, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL 11–90 (1983). 
242. See CHARLES E. WYZANSKI, JR., Nuremberg—A Fair Trial? Dangerous Precedent, in
WHEREAS—A JUDGE’S PREMISES: ESSAYS IN JUDGMENT, ETHICS, AND THE LAW 164, 174–76 (1965). 
 243. ROBERT COVER, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE,
AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 173, 196 (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1995). 
 244. CHARLES WYZANSKI, JR., Nuremberg in Retrospect, in WHEREAS—A JUDGE’S PREMISES,
supra note 242, at 180, 189–90 (1965) (emphasis added). 
 245. ROBERT H. JACKSON, REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE,
TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIALS 437 (1945). 
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spawned sixty years of development of international human rights and 
humanitarian law.  An international proceeding to try those suspected of 
involvement in the September 11 attacks could do the same for the 
international law of terrorism. 
G. ENHANCING THE PERCEIVED LEGITIMACY OF UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENTAL ACTION
Finally, an international process would be more likely to be perceived 
as legitimate and therefore would help to establish broader societal support 
around the world both for the trials themselves and for antiterrorism efforts 
more generally.  Indeed, to the extent that decisions are not made solely by 
the United States but rather by an international panel of judges from 
multiple countries, the perceived fairness of the process would be 
enhanced, thereby helping to diffuse some resentment against the United 
States and perhaps leaving Americans less likely to be singled out and 
targeted in retaliatory action. 
A delineation of the factors that might contribute to the legitimacy of 
any particular international legal institution has been the focus of attention 
elsewhere,246 and a detailed discussion either of the general legitimacy of 
international norms and processes or the reasons people and states might 
obey or be influenced by them247 is beyond the scope of this Article.  For 
my purposes, it is sufficient to note that legitimacy is likely to be greater 
when the legal process under consideration bears certain hallmarks of 
fairness and, in particular, has greater participation by actors from multiple 
backgrounds.  A recent study of the ICTY’s legitimacy in Bosnia supports 
this view.  Interviews with a range of Bosnian jurists across the political 
and ethnic spectrum suggest that the best way to increase the court’s
legitimacy is to provide opportunities for greater involvement of Bosnians 
246. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 705 
(1998) (focusing on legitimacy as “that quality of a rule which derives from a perception on the part of 
those to whom it is addressed that it has come into being in accordance with right process”); Phillip R. 
Trimble, International Law, World Order, and Critical Legal Studies, 42 STAN. L. REV. 811 (1990) 
(book review) (arguing that international law is a form of “rhetoric” whose persuasiveness depends on 
its legitimacy, which in turn depends on the process whereby it arises, its consistency with accepted 
norms, and its perceived fairness and transparency). 
247. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 47 (2d ed. 1979) (“[A]lmost all nations 
observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the 
time.”) (emphasis omitted).  See generally Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International 
Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997) (book review). 
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in the work of the institution and greater outreach by the institution in 
Bosnia through education and information campaigns.248
The November 13 order prompted representatives from numerous 
countries to voice concern about the proposed military commissions.249  As 
the hesitancy of even European nations to extradite suspects makes clear, 
there is widespread resistance to the unilateral use of a forum that offers 
limited rights to the accused, that has no provision for an appeal to civilian 
authorities, and that imposes the death penalty, which the Europeans have 
abolished.250  Of course, such criticism has not been limited to Western 
Europe.251  Indeed, as the Berenson case demonstrates, when other
countries have used military tribunals with truncated procedures to try 
terrorism suspects, even the United States has expressed concerns about 
their legitimacy. 
Thus, the Administration’s use of indefinite secret detentions and 
military commissions is a particularly galling example of American 
exceptionalism, whereby procedures that the U.S. would not tolerate in 
others are justified as part of a righteous mission when they are in the U.S. 
interest.  Indeed, at the same time that the Administration has ignored the 
potential relevance of international law to the treatment of terrorism 
suspects, Administration officials have justified their actions in the 
language of a global moral crusade.252  Such a double standard surely 
contributes to the perceived illegitimacy of the proposed commissions. 
 248. The Human Rights Center and the International Human Rights Law Clinic, University of 
California, Berkeley, & the Centre for Human Rights, University of Sarajevo, Justice, Accountability, 
and Social Reconstruction: An Interview Study of Bosnian Judges and Prosecutors, 18 BERKELEY J. 
INT’L L. 102, 153–55 (2000) [hereinafter Joint Study].  See also Jose E. Alvarez, Crimes of 
States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 416 (1999) (“The ICTR, with a 
bench composed of the principal legal systems of the world but without a judge or judges from within 
Rwanda, has no . . . claim to representative legitimacy.”); Lawrence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L. J. 273, 300 (1997) (“If states 
party to a treaty establishing a supranational tribunal hope to enhance its legitimacy and authority, the 
experience of the [European Court of Justice] and the [European Court of Human Rights] suggests that 
they should give careful consideration to the background and experience of jurists who serve on it.”). 
249. See EU Ministers Lay Groundwork for Anti-terror Talks with U.S., AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
Feb. 15, 2002; Most Americans Can’t See Why Europeans Are So Upset, ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 2002, at 
26, 26–27. 
250. See id.
 251. For example, Richard Goldstone, Justice of the South African Constitutional Court, has 
criticized the commissions and has called for an international proceeding to try those responsible for 
September 11.  See Goldstone, supra note 116. 
252. See, e.g., Purdum, supra note 5, at A15 (quoting President Bush as saying that “our 
responsibility to history is . . . clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil”). 
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Increased protection of the rights of the accused within the military 
commission framework, or civilian trials within the existing U.S. domestic 
court system, could allay some of the concerns that have been raised.  But 
even domestic trials would not fully address concerns about the perceived 
credibility abroad of the convictions that might result.  A unilateral process 
sends a signal that the United States is acting alone against the rest of the 
world.  Even if the Administration enhances the protections for the rights of 
the accused, trials run solely by the United States are likely to foster a 
perception abroad that the proceedings are merely victors’ justice.  In 
contrast, a multinational decisionmaking process to determine the guilt or 
innocence of individuals suspected of participating in the September 11 
attacks stands a better chance of being regarded around the world as fair. 
We can see, even in the current crisis, how a multilateral process helps 
to generate legitimacy.  In the weeks immediately following September 11, 
the United States announced that it had evidence linking bin Laden to the 
attacks and indicating that the Taliban government of Afghanistan was 
intimately bound up in bin Laden’s terrorist activities.253  Citing security 
concerns, the Administration did not release information to demonstrate 
this point.254  But the Administration did share information privately with 
officials in other governments, including Prime Minister Tony Blair of 
Great Britain, who then made public statements reiterating the claims.255
These assertions enhanced support, outside the United States, for the 
Administration’s military effort in Afghanistan.256
Similarly, a multilateral proceeding to determine the guilt or 
innocence of the accused would enhance the perceived legitimacy of the 
process beyond the United States.  To the extent that a highly regarded 
Muslim judge were to participate in the trials, the process would stand a 
better chance of gaining support—or at least acquiescence—in the Arab-
Muslim world. 
To be sure, the mere creation of an international proceeding does not 
ensure its legitimacy either beyond our borders or within them.  Concerns 
about the politicization of such an entity can undermine its credibility.  
Within the United States, for example, opposition to the proposed 
253. See Tim Weiner & Benjamin Weiser, Officials Balk at Release of Indictment of bin Laden,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2001, at B4. 
254. Id.
255. See Britain’s Bill of Particulars: ‘“Planned and Carried Out the Atrocities,’” N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 5, 2001, at B4; Alan Cowell, Blair Says He’s Seen Proof of bin Laden Role, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 
2001, at B4. 
 256. Cowell, supra note 255. 
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International Criminal Court has stemmed in part from fears that, because it 
will not be directed by the UN Security Council (thereby depriving the 
United States of its veto power), the court could become hostage to the 
whims of a runaway prosecutor or could be manipulated by countries with 
political grievances against the United States.257  In addition, even an 
international tribunal may face accusations that it is providing victors’
justice.  For example, in Bosnia and Yugoslavia, some have criticized the 
ICTY as a political tool of western powers.258  Numerous other factors also 
influence an international judicial institution’s perceived credibility.  Yet 
increased participation by representatives of multiple countries is generally 
viewed as enhancing the credibility of an institution within those 
countries.259
The need to pay attention to the issue of legitimacy beyond our 
borders is no mere idealist vision; the credibility of any proceeding the 
United States uses to hold individual terrorism suspects accountable is in 
the direct strategic interest of the United States.  As described above,260 a 
process that is widely perceived as fair strengthens the multilateral 
intergovernmental efforts needed to combat terrorism.  At the same time, 
such a process might gain greater acceptance within societies around the 
world, thereby at least playing a part in helping to defuse the resentment 
toward the United States that may be one of the root causes of terrorism. 
In recent months the Administration has begun to recognize the need 
for public diplomacy efforts to win the “hearts and minds” of the Arab-
Muslim world.261  To that end, the Administration recently has launched an 
advertising campaign run by former Madison Avenue advertising 
executives to promote a positive image of the United States262—with little 
257. See, e.g., David J. Scheffer, America’s Stake in Peace, Security and Justice, AMER. SOC’Y.
INT’L L. NEWSLETTER Sept.–Oct. 1998, at 1, 9 (expressing concerns that prosecutor’s decisions could 
become politicized and emphasizing need for Security Council to exercise check on prosecutor’s
function). 
 258. In his trial before the ICTY for genocide and other crimes, former Yugoslav leader Slobodan 
Milosovic has levied this charge against the ICTY.  See, e.g., Ian Fisher, The Pointed Finger, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 17, 2002, at A14. A recent study of Bosnian judges and lawyers also suggests concerns, 
particularly within the Serbian ethnic group, about the politicization of the ICTY.  Joint Study, supra
note 248, at 131–32. 
 259. The Bosnia study makes this point quite forcefully: increased involvement of Bosnians in the 
ICTY would enhance its legitimacy in Bosnia.  Joint Study, supra note 248, at 146–47. 
260. See supra text accompanying notes 172–190. 
261. See Elizabeth Becker, In the War on Terrorism, a Battle to Shape Opinion, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
11, 2001, at A1. 
262. See id.
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success so far.263  A multilateral process to determine the guilt or innocence 
of individual terrorists would be one of the best advertising campaigns 
available to the United States. 
III.  A WORKABLE INTERNATIONAL APPROACH TO TRY 
TERRORISTS 
Regardless of the possible benefits from an international proceeding, 
one of the most common arguments against such an approach is that trying 
suspected terrorists in an international forum is unrealistic because it could 
not be established quickly and because it is politically unpalatable.  This 
Part therefore begins by addressing the implementation question, 
concluding that, while a number of international approaches would indeed 
be difficult to create and would run into procedural obstacles, at least one 
option (expanding the jurisdiction of current international tribunals) could 
be accomplished quite easily. 
The fact that there appears to be little political will in the United States 
to create a full-fledged international tribunal to try the perpetrators of the 
September 11 attacks leads to a more serious practical objection.  
Nevertheless, I argue that this objection too need not derail an international 
process altogether.  Instead, I offer two alternative models that have 
received insufficient consideration so far: an internationalized military 
commission and a hybrid domestic/international court based in Afghanistan 
itself.  Both models would be more palatable politically, while still 
retaining many of the benefits of an international process. 
A. AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL
Despite the benefits of an international proceeding, there is no existing 
international forum that, as presently constituted, could hear cases arising 
from the September 11 attacks.  For example, although the Permanent 
International Criminal Court (ICC) has recently been established,264 those 
suspected of committing the September 11 attacks cannot be tried in the 
court because it is not authorized to hear cases arising before its 
establishment.265  Likewise, although some academics and international 
263. See, e.g., James Dao, Panel Urges U.S. to Revamp Efforts to Promote Image Abroad, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 29, 2002, at A2; Jane Perlez, U.S. Is Trying to Market Itself to Young, Suspicious Arabs,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2002, at A1. 
264. See supra note 224. 
 265. Rome Statute, supra note 204, art. 11, at 11.  Ironically, for any future terrorist acts 
committed after the court is established that rise to the level of the crimes within the ICC’s subject 
matter jurisdiction—crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide—the ICC could provide an 
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lawyers favor the creation of a new ad hoc international tribunal to try 
those suspected of committing the September 11 attacks,266 such a prospect 
seems highly unlikely because the establishment of a new judicial body, 
even with the requisite political will, is a cumbersome process that would 
surely take time.267  And the existing international criminal tribunals⎯the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda⎯could also not be used, at 
least in their current form, because their jurisdiction is both temporally and 
spatially limited.268
Michael Scharf, however, has recently argued that the existing statute 
of the ICTY (or the ICTR, for that matter) easily could be amended to 
allow for trials of those suspected of committing the attacks of September 
11.269  Such an amendment could be enacted fairly swiftly, requiring only a 
Security Council Resolution.  This approach would also have the advantage 
ideal forum for holding suspects accountable.  Id. art. 5, at 3.  The ICC does not have jurisdiction over 
terrorist crimes as such; although it was suggested, no agreement could be reached on that issue.  See, 
e.g., Jerry Fowler, The Rome Treaty for an International Criminal Court: A Framework of International 
Justice for Future Generations, 6 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 1 (Fall 1998) (“The inclusion of drug trafficking 
and terrorism enjoyed significant support, though less than aggression.  In a resolution attached to the 
Final Act, the conference participants recommended that a review conference consider adding these 
crimes to the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.  As a practical matter, the Court’s onerous amendment 
provisions render it unlikely that these crimes will ever fall within the Court’s aegis.”).  Nevertheless, to 
the extent that a terrorist act qualifies as any one of the crimes over which the court does have 
jurisdiction—war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity—suspected terrorists could be tried in 
the ICC.  The opposition of the Bush Administration and the current Congress to the ICC is so 
vehement, however, that it seems highly unlikely that the ICC would be used for this purpose even in 
the event of future attacks against the United States. 
266. See, e.g., Goldstone, supra note 116; Slaughter supra note 116. 
 267. It should be noted, of course, that the international tribunal at Nuremberg was established in 
just a matter of months.  See TAYLOR, supra note 140, at 43–115.  Nevertheless, even if the United 
States were to support such a process, it might well become enmeshed in disagreements over whether 
its jurisdiction should include terrorist acts in other circumstances, most notably the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict.  See Koh, supra note 13. 
 268. The jurisdiction of the ICTY extends only to crimes committed in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia since 1991, ICTY Statute, supra note 115, art. 1 (“The International Tribunal shall have the 
power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law 
committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 in accordance with the provisions of the 
present Statute.”), and the jurisdiction of the ICTR extends only to crimes committed in 1994 in 
Rwanda or in neighboring states by Rwandan citizens.  
The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible 
for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda 
and Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations committed in the territory of 
neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994, in accordance with the 
provisions of the present Statute. 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/955 (1994); ICTR STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL, art. 1, at
http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute.html#statute [hereinafter ICTR].
 269. Scharf, supra note 116. 
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of relying on an existing institution that, despite some problems, has 
functioned quite well.  Moreover, because the institution is controlled by 
the Security Council, it may be a more politically palatable arrangement for 
the United States than the ICC.  Indeed, U.S. objections to the ICC are 
based in part on the fact that the Security Council does not exercise enough 
control over the court.270  The existence of this amendment option, 
therefore, seriously undermines arguments that an international process 
would be too difficult to establish or would inevitably spin out of control. 
B. POLITICALLY PALATABLE “QUASI-INTERNATIONAL” MODELS
Despite the readily available option of simply amending the statutes 
for tribunals already in existence, it is highly unlikely in the current 
political climate that a full-fledged international tribunal will be 
established.  Indeed, so far the Administration has adamantly refused to 
abandon the option of trying suspects before military commissions.271
Moreover, to the extent they have mentioned it at all, officials have made 
clear that they oppose establishing an international tribunal to try 
suspects.272  Given such political resistance to a full-fledged international 
proceeding, there are at least two other options worth considering, both of 
which still retain at least some of the benefits of an international tribunal, 
but might be more feasible politically. 
1.  An Internationalized Military Commission 
To the extent that the Administration does move forward with military 
commission trials, one way of achieving some of the benefits of an 
international proceeding in a more politically palatable form would be to 
internationalize the military commission process.  There is strong historical 
precedent for such an approach. After all, the leading recent historical 
examples of international trials are the post-World War II International 
Military Tribunal (“IMT”) at Nuremberg and the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East (“IMTFE”), both of which were military tribunals. 
 270. David Scheffer, the Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes during the Clinton Administration, 
articulated that part of the U.S. concern stemmed from the fact that “[u]nder Article 12, the ICC may 
exercise . . . jurisdiction over anyone anywhere in the world, even in the absence of a referral by the 
Security Council, if either the state of the territory where the crime was committed or the state of 
nationality of the accused consents.”  David J. Scheffer, Developments in International Criminal Law: 
The United States and the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 12, 18 (1999).  Of course, 
in order for the court to exercise jurisdiction in such cases, the case in question must satisfy the 
complementarity principle.  See Sadat & Carden, supra note 205, at 443–44. 
271. See Seelye, supra note 7. 
272. See Prosper Testimony, supra note 126. 
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As discussed previously, the primary impetus for the Nuremberg 
tribunal came from the United States.273  Moreover, Justice Robert Jackson, 
the chief prosecutor for the United States, exercised a great deal of control 
in shaping the court and the prosecution.274  Nonetheless, the court was 
established by multilateral agreement,275 and the judges, prosecutors, and 
staff were appointed from the four major allied powers: the United States, 
Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union.  In addition, although the 
Nuremberg Tribunal was officially designated a military tribunal, it was 
staffed only in part by military personnel, and only one judge, the Russian 
Nikitchenko, was a military judge.  The IMT indicted twenty-four 
defendants, tried twenty-two (one having hanged himself prior to trial and 
another having been declared medically incompetent), convicted nineteen 
(of which twelve were sentenced to death), and acquitted three.276
Although a multilateral proceeding modeled on Nuremberg would 
require the United States to relinquish control over many aspects of the 
proceedings, including the shape and composition of the court, the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), by contrast, 
might offer a more acceptable model because it would permit the United 
States to retain more control.  Indeed, unlike the Nuremberg tribunal, the 
IMTFE was largely directed by the United States.277  Where the IMT was 
established by multilateral agreement, the IMTFE was established by an 
executive decree of U.S. General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers in Japan.278  Under orders from the 
United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, MacArthur retained absolute authority 
over the establishment of rules, regulations, and procedures.279  Thus, 
although modeled on Nuremberg, the United States effectively set the rules 
for the proceedings. Moreover, the United States appointed the judges.280
In the end, judges from nine countries sat on the IMTFE, representing 
Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the Netherlands, France, Britain, the 
 273. See supra text accompanying notes 142–156. 
274. See TAYLOR, supra note 140, at 56–115. 
 275. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European 
Axis, Aug. 8, 194, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.  The agreement, initially signed by the United 
States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union, was subsequently signed by nineteen other nations. 
276. See TAYLOR, supra note 140, at 571–611. 
277. See R. JOHN PRITCHARD, THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL: THE COMPLETE TRANSCRIPTS 
(1989); R. John Pritchard, The International Military Tribunal for the Far East and Its Contemporary 
Resonances, 149 MIL. L. REV. 25, 27 (1995) [hereinafter Pritchard, International Military Tribunal]. 
278. See Pritchard, International Military Tribunal, supra note 277, at 27. 
279. See id. at 31. 
280. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946, art. 2, 
T.I.A.S. No. 1589, 4 Bevans 20, 22. 
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United States, the Soviet Union, and China, along with two colonial 
territories on the brink of independence, India and the Philippines.281
Twenty-eight individual defendants were indicted, and judgments were 
rendered against twenty-five, with no acquittals.  Seven of the twenty-five 
were sentenced to death.282
If the United States were to internationalize the military commission 
process along the lines of the IMTFE, the Administration could retain 
control over the shape of the proceedings while at least obtaining some of 
the benefits of an internationalized process.  Of course, in my view a 
civilian international proceeding would be preferable to a military 
proceeding.  Moreover, unless basic procedural safeguards were put in 
place to protect the rights of the accused, a military proceeding would 
violate international law. But if such protections were established, an 
internationalized proceeding could at least offer some of the legal process 
benefits described above while satisfying political constraints. 
Nonetheless, the benefit of internationalizing the process would 
depend in part on how wide a circle of judges the Administration would be 
willing to appoint.  Indeed, both the IMT at Nuremberg and the IMTFE 
have been criticized for not opening the circle beyond the Allied powers, 
thereby imposing victors’ justice.283  Yet even such a limited range of 
judges would be preferable to the purely unilateral victors’ justice that a 
completely U.S.-run domestic military commission process would offer. 
Thus, even if the judges on the commission were limited to Western 
European countries, the Administration would still increase the perceived 
legitimacy of the process.  If the Administration would further be willing to 
appoint judges from non-western countries, particularly Arab or Muslim 
judges, the credibility of the process would be even greater.  The 
appointment of jurists from countries such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, or 
India might prove to be too difficult for obvious diplomatic reasons; 
candidates acceptable to the United States might well be found, however, in 
South Africa or Indonesia, because those countries are democracies with 
jurists who are well-established and recognized both in the West and 
around the world.  Jurists of Arab or Muslim background who are citizens 
of the United States or Western European countries could also be 
considered. 
 281. Pritchard, International Military Tribunal, supra note 277, at 27 & n.3. 
282. Id. at 32. 
283. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, Nuremberg: Forty Years After, 80 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC.
59, 64 (1986). 
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Even if the procedures for and composition of an international military 
commission could be settled upon, however, the death penalty might 
remain a significant stumbling block.  Western Europeans would not likely 
be willing to take part in a court, even with enhanced protections for the 
rights of the accused, if the death penalty were to be imposed,284 and the 
Bush Administration might be unwilling to sacrifice the death penalty as an 
option.  Nonetheless, if Slobodan Milosevic can be sentenced to a 
maximum of life imprisonment for committing genocide, it is hard to argue 
that, despite the magnitude of the September 11 attacks, the perpetrators 
should receive a greater penalty.  In any event, if the death penalty proved 
to be too big an obstacle for the appointment of European judges, the 
Administration could appoint judges from non-European countries who 
might tolerate the death penalty. 
Administration officials often cite the many military commission trials 
that were held unilaterally, both by the United States and by other allied 
countries, after the IMT and the IMTFE did their work in Germany and the 
Far East.285  For example, in Germany, after trying the major Nazi War 
criminals in the international proceedings at Nuremberg, the United States 
held a series of twelve trials under the provisions of Control Council Law 
No.  10, in which 185 defendants, lower-level Nazi war criminals, were 
indicted.286  Many more cases were later tried before U.S.-convened 
military commissions, including 489 cases involving 1,672 defendants tried 
at Dachau.287  Other Allied forces held similar trials.288  By the end of 
1958, the Western Allies had used military tribunals to sentence 5,025 
Germans for war crimes. In the Far East, 4,200 Japanese were convicted 
before military tribunals convened by U.S., Australian, British, Chinese, 
Dutch, and French forces for atrocities committed during the war.289
Yet, it is important to recognize that these unilateral trials came only 
after a process in which the leading war criminals were tried in 
international proceedings.  Thus, the international process helped to define 
the appropriate legal norms and establish the legitimacy of the trials, which 
then paved the way for subsequent trials of lower-level offenders.  
284. See supra text accompanying notes 249–252. 
285. See, e.g., Prosper Testimony, supra note 126. 
 286. Telford Taylor, Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on the Nuremberg War Crimes 
Trials Under control Council Law No. 10, at 136–38 (1949). 
 287. The Simpson Report, Sept. 14, 1948, in PAUST ET AL., supra note 99, at 634–35. 
288. See, e.g., Matthew Lippman, Prosecutions of Nazi War Criminal Before Post-World War II 
Domestic Tribunals, 8 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2000). 
 289. Prosper Testimony, supra note 126. 
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Accordingly, these historic examples of military commissions at 
Nuremberg and Tokyo offer possible models for the Administration. 
2.  A UN-Supported Criminal Court Based in Afghanistan 
Another option that should be considered is a hybrid 
domestic/international court based in Afghanistan.  For peace to exist 
within Afghanistan—an urgent goal in the fight against terrorism—the new 
government requires substantial international assistance in creating a 
workable criminal justice system.  As U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War 
Crimes Pierre-Richard Prosper recently noted, “promoting the rule of law 
in Afghanistan” is not only a “fully necessary and justifiable end in itself,”
but it also “aids the overall war on terrorism.”290  Thousands of Al Qaeda 
and Taliban prisoners continue to be held in Afghanistan, and decisions 
must be made about whether they should be released, sent to another state 
for prosecution, or tried in Afghanistan.291  An important task for Afghan 
courts will be to hold those on all sides accountable for violations of the 
laws of armed conflict, as well as to try those responsible for serious crimes 
and human rights violations during the Taliban regime.  Meaningful 
accountability and fair proceedings will not be possible without a 
significant contribution of funding and expertise by the international 
community.292  As part of that effort, a hybrid court, with domestic Afghan 
judges sitting alongside judges from other countries, could be established to 
try those accused of human rights crimes, violations of the laws of armed 
conflict, crimes related to the September 11 attacks, and other terrorist 
acts.293
The United Nations has supported similar efforts elsewhere.  Although 
attempts to establish a hybrid domestic/international court in Cambodia 
have progressed very slowly294 and the project to establish such a court in 
 290. Pierre-Richard Prosper, Symposium, Reluctant Nation-Building: Securing the Rule of Law in 
Post-Taliban Afghanistan, 17 CONN. J. INT’L L. 433 (2002). 
291. See id.
 292. William Spencer, Symposium, Reluctant Nation-Building, Securing the Rule of Law in Post-
Taliban Afghanistan, 17 CONN. J. INT’L L. 445 (2002). 
 293. For an analysis of the viability of such hybrid tribunals in Afghanistan, see Laura A. 
Dickinson, Transitional Justice in Afghanistan: The Promise of Mixed Tribunals, Symposium on 
Terrorism and Ethnic Conflict, 29 DENV. J. INT’L. L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2002) [hereinafter Mixed 
Tribunals]. 
 294. Although the attempt to create such a tribunal stalled in February, see Seth Mydans, U.N. 
Ends Cambodia Talks on Trials for Khmer Rouge, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2002, at A4, recent reports 
suggest that the United Nations and Cambodia have renewed their efforts, see Seth Mydans, Cambodia 
and U.N. Break Icy Silence on Khmer Rouge Trials, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2002, at A11. 
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Sierra Leone is still underway,295 this hybrid court model has met with 
some preliminary success in East Timor and Kosovo.296  In East Timor, for 
example, the United Nations Transitional Administration for East Timor 
(UNTAET) has established a process under which “serious crimes” are to 
be tried before three-judge panels, comprised of two international judges 
and one East Timorese judge, sitting within the jurisdiction of the District 
Court of Dili.297 “Serious crimes” are defined as “war crimes,” “crimes 
against humanity,” and “genocide,” as well as murder and sexual offenses, 
insofar as the latter two crimes were committed between January 1, 1999, 
and October 25, 1999.298  Prosecutors and investigators are drawn from 
other countries, as well as from the local population.299
This hybrid court has faced some difficulties.  Critics charge that the 
Timorese people were not sufficiently consulted in the design of the 
tribunals and that the court adopted its criminal categories from the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, without enough sensitivity for 
the particular circumstances of East Timor.300  In addition, there is concern 
295. See S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4186th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 
(2000). 
 296. For a comparison of the United Nations efforts to help build a justice system and promote the 
rule of law in East Timor and Kosovo, see generally Dickinson, Mixed Tribunals, supra note 293; 
Hansjoerg Strohmeyer, Making Multilateral Interventions Work: The U.N. and the Creation of 
Transitional Justice Systems in Kosovo and East Timor, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFFAIRS 107 (2001). 
297. See Section 10 of United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) 
Regulation No. 2000/11 on the Organization of Courts in East Timor, U.N., 55th Sess., at 4, U.N. Doc. 
UNTAET/REG/2000/11 (2000), at http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/entaetR/Reg11.pdf, by which 
exclusive jurisdiction throughout East Timor in relation to the most serious crimes, including genocide, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity, has been vested in the Dili District Court.  Section 10 is 
further supported by UNTAET Regulation No. 2000/15 on the Establishment of Panels with Exclusive 
Jurisdiction for Serious Crimes, U.N., 55th Sess., at 2–14, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/15 (2000).  
This regulation grants the panels universal jurisdiction and contains, inter alia, the relevant penal 
provisions for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and torture, and it spells out internationally 
recognized principles of criminal law, taking into consideration the Statutes of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and of the International Criminal Court.  For an analysis of 
the serious crimes unit, see Laura A. Dickinson, The Dance of Complementarity: Relationships Between 
Domestic, International and Transnational Accountability Mechanisms in East Timor and Indonesia, in
THE MANY FORMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY: INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC METHODS OF HOLDING 
INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE FOR ATROCITIES (Jane Stromseth ed., forthcoming 2003); Suzannah Linton, 
Rising from the Ashes: The Creation of a Viable Criminal Justice System in East Timor, 25 MELB. U. L. 
REV. 122, 145–73 (2001); Strohmeyer, supra note 296; Joel C. Beauvais, Note, Benevolent Despotism: 
A Critique of U.N. State-Building in East Timor, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1101 (2001). 
 298. UNTAET Regulation No. 2000/15, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2000/15, supra note 297, at
§§ 1–2.
299. Id. at § 14.  See also Strohmeyer, supra note 296, at 118. 
300. See, e.g., Linton, supra note 297, at 150.  For a more positive view of the UNTAET justice 
sector in comparison to the rest of UNTAET, see Beauvais, supra note 297. 
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that this court has received insufficient funding from the international 
community. 
Nevertheless, these are not criticisms of the overall project, but rather 
of its execution, particularly in its early phases.  Recently, the mixed 
tribunals have made great progress.  By June of 2002, prosecutors had 
issued forty-two indictments for 112 individuals and obtained twenty-four 
convictions,301 and investigations into hundreds of other cases are being 
pursued.302  The hybrid court has thus played an important role in the 
accountability process for the mass atrocities committed when Indonesia 
pulled out of East Timor in 1999, a process that continues to aid efforts to 
establish the rule of law and promote peace and security in East Timor now 
that the country has gained independence.303
301. See id.
302. For example, in his August 22, 2001 daily press briefing, Fred Eckhard, Spokesman for the 
Secretary-General, stated the following: 
 Today in East Timor, the Deputy Prosecutor General for the Special Panel for Serious 
Crimes, Jean-Louis Gilissen, said his office had evidence in 674 cases of killings related to 
the violence connected to the 1999 popular consultation, and have already investigated 300 of 
those cases. 
 He said the Serious Crimes Unit had carried out considerable work despite its small size, 
with [thirty-one] investigators in the Unit.   
Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary-General, Aug. 22, 2001, at
http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2001/db082201.doc.htm.. 
 303. In Kosovo, the United Nations Mission has established a similar hybrid 
domestic/international process for trying serious crimes. International judges and prosecutors have 
served alongside domestic counterparts.  For example, as of December 2000, there were ten 
international judges and three international prosecutors serving in the five regions of Kosovo.  Report of 
the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, U.N. SCOR, 
55th Sess., at 8, U.N. Doc. 5/2000/1196 (2000) [hereinafter Report of the Sec.-Gen.].  See also DEP’T
OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND RULE OF LAW, ORG. FOR SEC. AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE, KOSOVO: A 
REVIEW OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, 1 SEPTEMBER 2000–28 FEBRUARY 2001, at 76 (2001), at 
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/justice/criminal_justice2.pdf (discussing the U.N. 
regulations dealing with the nature and kind of prosecutors and judges on these panels).  Due to the 
limited capacity of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to try all 
perpetrators of international crimes committed in Kosovo, it has been left to these hybrid courts to 
prosecute the less high-profile offenders.  Strohmeyer, supra note 296, at 119.  By the end of 2000, the 
courts had completed a total of thirty-five trials and investigations.  Report of the Secretary-General on 
the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., at 8, U.N. Doc. 
5/2000/1196 (2000).  As of mid-2001, eighteen cases of international crimes were pending before 
domestic courts in Kosovo, including thirteen cases of war crimes, four cases of genocide, and one case 
of crimes against humanity.  Strohmeyer, supra note 296, at 128 n.50.  A total of nineteen international 
judges had been appointed by December 2001, with a goal of thirty-four to be hired by mid-2002.  See
Justice, Focus Kosovo, December 2001, at http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/focuskos 
/dec01/focuskchron.htm; Interview with Clint Williamson, head of UNMIK Department of Justice, 
FOCUS KOSOVO, April 2002, at http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/focuskos/apr02/focusklaw1.htm.  For 
a more detailed discussion of the hybrid courts in East Timor, see Dickinson, The Dance of 
Complementarity, supra note 297.  For an overview of efforts to establish the rule of law in post-
conflict Kosovo, see Wendy S. Betts, Scott N. Carlson & Gregory Gisvold, The Post-Conflict 
Transitional Administration of Kosovo and the Lessons-Learned in Efforts to Establish a Judiciary and 
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Similarly, in Afghanistan, courts with local judges sitting alongside 
judges from other countries could be convened to try certain types of 
crimes, for example, violations of the laws of armed conflict, crimes 
against humanity, and terrorist acts outlawed by the international terrorism 
conventions.  The creation of these courts is necessary if for no other 
reason than to accommodate the sheer numbers of people who otherwise 
might need to face trial before U.S. military commissions or in other fora.  
Moreover, as the East Timor and Kosovo experiences indicate, support for 
the establishment of a strong judiciary is an essential foundation for lasting 
peace.304  A hybrid domestic/international structure helps to provide a 
vehicle for training and consulting with the local population and helps to 
establish a degree of independence in cases involving intense ethnic 
conflicts and rivalries.  Such a model may well be highly useful in 
Afghanistan, and important lessons can be learned from mistakes in 
Kosovo and Timor.  Certainly, in order to be successful, significant 
financial resources are required.  But such a hybrid judicial process could 
provide the best way of assuring accountability and deterring terrorism, 
human rights crimes, and violations of the laws of armed conflict.305
Although the United States might be unlikely to accept such a process for 
trying Taliban or Al Qaeda leaders, it might be willing to accept and 
support such trials for low-level Taliban or Al Qaeda operatives. 
While neither an internationalized military commission nor a hybrid 
domestic/international tribunal located in Afghanistan would offer the full 
benefits of a formal international tribunal, both are far more likely to be 
established given the current political constraints, and both could offer at 
least some of the strategic advantages discussed previously.  This is not to 
suggest that any of these international fora could be, or should be, the only
forum in which to hold suspected terrorists accountable for their actions. 
Rather, my claim is that the existence of an international forum, in addition 
to other mechanisms, would at least help to promote the key strategic legal 
process interests described previously. 
Nevertheless, if such an international forum were established, clear 
principles would be needed to determine which cases should be brought 
before it and which cases should be tried elsewhere.  For example, an 
the Rule of Law, 22 MICH. J. INT’L L. 371 (2001); Dickinson, Mixed Tribunals, supra note 296; 
Strohmeyer, supra note 296. 
304. See Betts et al., supra note 303, at 380–82.  See also Prosper, supra note 290, at 433–36. 
 305. Of course, there are significant hurdles that would need to be overcome in creating a mixed 
international tribunal that would be accepted by the local population.  For a discussion of these issues, 
see Dickinson, supra note 293. 
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international tribunal would be the most appropriate for trying the highest 
ranked and most responsible perpetrators of the most serious crimes.  
Indeed, international courts since Nuremberg have been used in this way.306
Thus, the ICTY,307 the ICTR,308 the proposed special court for Sierra 
Leone,309 and indeed the International Criminal Court310 all adopt versions 
of this principle.  Although attempting to determine which perpetrators to 
try in an international forum has sometimes been difficult,311 the principle 
itself is a sound one and has been widely accepted.  Moreover, if the 
jurisdiction of an international tribunal were limited to cases involving the 
September 11 attacks, many of the hazards posed by lingering 
disagreements about the definition and scope of terrorism could be avoided.  
Indeed, just this sort of temporal or incident-based limitation can be found 
in the statutes of the ICTR312 and, to a lesser degree, the ICTY.313
In contrast, if a hybrid court in Afghanistan were established, it would 
probably be best-suited for trying lower-level Al Qaeda and Taliban 
operatives for crimes committed on Afghan soil (or with at least a link to 
306. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the 
European Axis Powers, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6, 59 Stat. at 1547, 82 U.N.T.S. at 286 (providing for trial of  
“major” war criminals of the European Axis countries and conferring jurisdiction only over the serious 
international crimes of aggression, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity). 
307. See ICTY Statute, supra note 115, arts. 1–5 (establishing competence of court to consider 
“serious” violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia since 1991 and conferring jurisdiction over only violations of the “grave breaches”
provisions of the Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws of armed conflict, genocide, and crimes 
against humanity). 
308. See id. arts. 1–4 (establishing competence of the court to consider “serious” violations of 
international humanitarian law committed on the territory of Rwanda, and in neighboring states if 
committed by Rwandans, from January 1, 1994 through December 31, 1994 and conferring jurisdiction 
of court over only genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of Common Article 3 of Geneva 
Conventions and Protocol II to the Conventions). 
309. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1315, supra note 295, at 2 (recommending that special court for Sierra 
Leone should be competent to hear cases for serious violations of international law, including war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, and should have personal jurisdiction over those who bore the 
“greatest responsibility” for those crimes). 
310. See Rome Statute, supra note 204, arts. 1, 5–8, at 2–10 (establishing competence of court to 
hear cases involving “the most serious crimes of international concern” and conferring its jurisdiction 
over only genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes of aggression). 
 311. Telford Taylor, for example, has criticized the selection of individuals indicted at Nuremberg 
as too hasty and therefore as leading to serious mistakes.  See TAYLOR, supra note 140, at 90. 
312. See ICTR Statute, supra note 268, art. 1 (establishing competence of court to consider cases 
arising in the territory of Rwanda, and in neighboring states if committed by Rwandans, between 
January 1, 1994 and December 1, 1994 ). 
313. See ICTY Statute, supra note 115 (limiting competence of court to cases arising within the 
territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991).  A territorial-based limitation with respect to September 
11 could pose problems because many perpetrators may never have set foot on U.S. soil and because 
establishing the requisite links to U.S. territory for jurisdictional limitations might complicate the cases. 
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Afghanistan).  As between the hybrid court within Afghanistan and other 
Afghan courts, distinctions could be made based on the types of crimes 
committed, using the East Timor and Kosovo models.  Relevant crimes 
might include crimes against humanity, violations of the laws of armed 
conflict, and perhaps crimes of international terrorism as defined by the 
existing terrorism conventions.  Because the hybrid court could also serve 
the goal of ensuring more general accountability for serious human rights 
abuses committed before or during the Taliban regime, as well as abuses 
associated with the Northern Alliance insurgency itself, the court should 
have a relatively broad mandate to hear other Afghanistan-based human 
rights crimes as well. 
IV.  THE VALUE OF LEGAL PROCESS AMID SOCIAL AND 
POLITICAL CONFLICT 
Thus far, I have presented arguments that the United States should try 
suspected terrorists in proceedings that comport with fundamental due 
process principles as a matter of domestic and international law, and, 
further, I have contended that international trials that comport with these 
principles—at least for those most responsible for the September 11 
attacks—would best serve the strategic interests of the United States.  The 
first set of arguments takes as a given the importance of the rule of law, 
both domestically and internationally.  The second seeks to identify ways 
in which the observance of legal process values in the international realm, 
through the particular form of international adjudication, broadly advances 
U.S. interests.  Thus, both sets of arguments rely to some extent on the 
notion that law quells private vengeance.  In order to combat terrorism, on 
this view, we need to be perceived as complying with the rule of law 
ourselves.  Fair procedures are important if we want to deter future acts of 
terrorism or at least not inspire new ones. 
Although powerful, these approaches still may not address fully the 
law skeptics’ concern that placing too much faith in the peacemaking 
power of law is somewhat naive in the fight against international terrorism.  
Too fine a respect for legal niceties will not work in this context, we are 
told, because law will inevitably be used to advance strategic interests and 
will be unable to bridge intractable social divisions, such as those between 
Islamic fundamentalists and the West.  From this perspective, international 
law remains simply a set of formal principles to be used (or ignored) in 
order to advance strategic geopolitical interests, and, moreover, the schisms 
in the world run so deep that no amount of legal process can result in 
cooperation, compromise, or consensus. 
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One of the striking ironies of this law skeptic position, however, is 
that these are precisely the same types of arguments that critical legal 
theorists beginning in the early twentieth century repeatedly have made 
about ordinary domestic law.314  Thus, American critical scholars have, like 
the international relations realists, argued that the interpretation of legal 
norms is inherently political and shaped by social interests and that there 
are deep conflicts within society that cannot be resolved through law.  Yet, 
for the most part these critical scholars do not jettison the entire idea of 
legal process or judicial adjudication, and it is useful to consider why not.  
Although a more detailed analysis of these critical theorists and the 
application of their views to international law is beyond the scope of this 
Article, in this Part, I offer three principles about the value of legal process 
that I have derived from one such theorist, Robert Cover.  In addition, I 
suggest how these principles might illuminate the role that legal process 
and adjudication can play even in the midst of divisive international social 
and political conflict. 
I have taken inspiration from Cover because he, more than many 
others, explicitly acknowledged both the extent to which law is 
politicized—often violently so—as well as the degree to which human 
societies tend to be riven by conflict.  Yet, despite these observations, 
Cover did not dispense with the need for law and adjudication.  His work 
thus invites us to consider the way in which law and legal institutions gain 
their legitimacy and force in a world of competing and conflicting “norm-
generating communities.” Although Cover did not focus particularly on 
international legal questions, I believe that the insights one may draw from 
Cover about the role of law and adjudication in the face of social conflict 
are relevant not only to questions of domestic law but also to those posed in 
the international context. 
Cover does not shy away from the extent to which violence is bound 
up in the law.  Indeed, he argues that law is itself violence, in at least two 
senses.  First, law wreaks physical violence.  Perhaps most famously, he 
begins his article Law’s Violence with the provocative sentence: “Legal 
interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death.”315  Cover reminds us 
that, at the end of legal process, someone may be ordered to surrender 
314. See generally William W. Fisher III, The Development of Modern American Legal Theory 
and the Judicial Interpretation of the Bill of Rights, in A CULTURE OF RIGHTS: THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN 
PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND LAW—1791 AND 1991, at 266 (Michael J. Lacey & Knud Haakonssen 
eds. 1991) (providing a lucid and concise account of the way in which the legal realist insights shaped 
the development of more recent strands of American legal theory). 
 315. ROBERT COVER, Violence and the Word, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE
ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER, supra note 243, at 203 (citation omitted). 
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property or be taken into custody, or, in the most extreme case, executed: 
“A judge articulates her understanding of a text, and as a result, somebody 
loses his freedom, his property,  . . . even his life.”316  Furthermore, the act 
of legal interpretation seeks to legitimize this imposition of violence.317
Law does its violent work, leaving behind “victims whose lives have been 
torn apart by these organized, social practices of violence.”318
Second, and perhaps more importantly for our purposes, Cover argues 
that law does violence not only through meaning but to meaning by 
enforcing an official narrative and stamping out (or attempting to stamp 
out) other interpretations of norms that arise from various norm-generating 
communities: 
Judges are a people of violence.  Because of the violence they command, 
judges characteristically do not create law, but kill it.  Theirs is the 
jurispathic office.  Confronting the luxuriant growth of a hundred legal 
traditions, they assert that this one is law and destroy or try to destroy the 
rest. 
 But judges are also a people of peace.  Among warring sects, each of 
which wraps itself in the mantel of a law of its own, they assert a 
regulative function that permits a life of law rather than violence.319
Cover sees official state law not according to the classic liberal story, in 
which law replaces private vengeance and fills a vacuum created by the 
absence of law, but rather as the “jurispathic” imposition of a dominant 
interpretation that curbs alternative interpretations.320  This view stems 
from his belief that many types of communities, not simply the nation-state, 
generate norms that could be called law in some sense.321  Thus, an official 
state interpretation necessarily attempts to replace numerous existing 
“unofficial” interpretations.  Moreover, although the official state 
interpretation can alter competing interpretations dramatically, it cannot 
destroy them completely.  Ultimately, in a world of such competing 
narratives, official state interpretations of law must depend for their force 
316. Id.
 317. By repeatedly stressing the violence inherent in the law, Cover has sought to resist the trend 
to treat the interpretation of legal texts as merely a kind of interpretation similar to the interpretation of 
literature.  Thus, Cover emphasizes that “[n]either legal interpretation nor the violence it occasions may 
be properly understood apart from each other.” Id.
318. Id.
 319. ROBERT COVER, Nomos and Narrative, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE 
ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER, supra note 243, at 95, 155. 
320. Id.
321. See id. at 139–40. 
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on the acceptance of those interpretations by the inhabitants of the 
community over which they purport to establish authority.322
If one accepts this proposition and views violence as inherent in law, 
one might say that it then would not matter which legal response the United 
States chooses in order to hold terrorists accountable for the September 11 
attacks.  There should be no difference between a trial and a summary 
execution, or between an international proceeding and a domestic one.  
Yet, taking inspiration from Cover’s refusal to jettison law and adjudication 
in the face of deep social conflict, I suggest that there are several reasons 
for retaining law and legal process that can be derived from his insights.  
These reasons cast the debate about the appropriate proceedings for trying 
terrorists in a different light, one which may help to address the law-
skeptics’ concerns. 
A. MULTIPLE ACTORS IN THE SYSTEM ACT AS A CHECK
First, one of the distinctions between the violence of the law and other 
forms of violence is the extent to which many actors in a given institutional 
apparatus must be mobilized to do law’s violent work, according to 
collective decision rules.  As Cover suggests, “[N]o judge acts 
alone. . . . The application of legal understanding in our domain of pain and 
death . . . always require[s] the active or passive acquiescence of other 
judicial minds.”323  To implement a death sentence, for example, “[t]he 
most elementary understanding of our social practice of violence ensures 
that a judge know that she herself cannot actually pull the switch.”324  A 
trial judge, therefore, relies on the fact that there will always “be another 
judge to whom application could be made to stay or reverse her 
decision.”325  Moreover, it is not merely other judges who must be 
persuaded, but also the prison guards, the executioner, and other penal 
officials.326
Thus, there appears to be something about the multiplicity of actors 
involved that tames and legitimates law’s violence.  The fact that no one 
judge carries out an execution, as Cover suggests, “is not a trivial 
convention.  For it means that someone else will have the duty and 
322. See id. at 98–99 (noting that this “normative universe is held together by the force of 
interpretive commitments—some small and private, others immense and public”). 
 323. ROBERT COVER, Violence and the Word, in NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW, supra 
note 243, at 235 (emphasis omitted). 
324. Id. at 234. 
325. Id.
326. See id.
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opportunity to pass upon what the judge has done.”327  Although the 
warden and the penal officials differ from the various judges engaging in 
acts of interpretation (since their compliance is assumed to be relatively 
automatic), they nonetheless must accept the authority of the judges and the 
decision rules that give priority to some judges’ decisions over others in 
order to carry out law’s violent work.  All of these actors must accept the 
official story, at least enough to be willing to engage in the acts necessary 
to do law’s violence.  The collective nature of law’s violence therefore acts 
as an important check: 
So let us be explicit.  If it seems a nasty thought that death and pain are 
at the center of legal interpretation, so be it. . . . The alternative is truly 
unacceptable—that they be within our polity but outside the discipline of 
the collective decision rules and the individual efforts to achieve 
outcomes through those rules.  The fact that we require many voices is 
not, then, an accident or peculiarity of our jurisdictional rules.  It is 
intrinsic to whatever achievement is possible in the domesticating of 
violence.328
Cover, of course, is somewhat ambivalent about this conclusion, and 
elsewhere in his work he is less comfortable about the extent to which 
law’s violence can be domesticated.329  Yet his emphasis on the checking 
power of the collective is significant. 
Moreover, this insight offers a different way of thinking about the 
appropriate forum for trying suspected terrorists.  The Administration’s
military commission proposal severely limits the number of actors involved 
in the imposition of law’s violence by denying civilian judicial review and 
offering the possibility that trials will be held in secret.  The fact that the 
order and regulations were issued without consultation with or approval by 
Congress also suggests a limited checking function.  And, as discussed 
previously, neither the order nor the regulations provide a right of appeal to 
a non-military body.330  Thus, fewer actors are involved in the relevant 
decisionmaking, and those who are involved form part of an insular 
community with a hierarchical command structure, namely, the military.  
Domestic criminal trials would offer a greater check, and an international 
tribunal would offer a still greater check, as the number of individual actors 
327. Id.
328. Id. at 236. 
329. See Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns, Making Peace with Violence: Robert Cover on Law 
and Legal Theory, in LAW’S VIOLENCE 211, 233–41 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992). 
 330. Nov. 13 Order, supra note 8, at § 7(b)(2); DOD Regulations, supra note 10, at § 6(h)(4). 
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required to implement a given legal decision would be larger and more 
diverse. 
B. OFFICIAL LEGAL SETTINGS SERVE AS A FORUM FOR CONFLICTING 
NAARRATIVES
Second, legal settings serve as a forum in which social narratives 
emerge.  As Cover notes, law includes not only formal rules or precepts, a 
“corpus juris,” but also a “language and a mythos—narratives in which the 
corpus juris is located by those whose wills act upon it.”331  These 
narratives imbue law both with meaning and with its normative force.332
Moreover, the narratives of law form a way of comprehending current 
social reality and debating the shape of future worlds: 
To live in a legal world requires that one know not only the precepts, but 
also their connections to possible and plausible states of affairs.  It 
requires that one integrate not only the “is” and the “ought” but the “is,”
the “ought,” and the “what might be.” Narrative so integrates these 
domains.333
Inevitably, these narratives are both plural and collective.334
When these narratives emerge, however, they often—if not always—
conflict.  Different groups or subgroups read the precepts differently, or 
attach different significance to them.  An authoritative precept may be 
national in character, but “the meaning of such a text is always ‘essentially 
contested,’ in the degree to which this meaning is related to the diverse and 
divergent narrative traditions within the nation.”335  For example, as Cover 
observes, all Americans share the First, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the Federal Constitution as a “national text,” but we “do 
not share an authoritative narrative regarding [the Amendments’]
significance.”336  Indeed, “even if we had a national history declared by law 
to be authoritative,” we would not share the same account of that history.337
“Some of us would claim Frederick Douglass as a father, some Abraham 
Lincoln, and some Jefferson Davis.”338
 331. Cover, supra note 319, at 101. 
 332. Indeed, legal narratives “establish the paradigms for behavior.  They build relations between 
the normative and the material universe, between the constraints of reality and the demands of an 
ethic.” Id.
333. Id. at 102. 
334. See id.
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Furthermore, neither law, nor the narratives that emerge from the 
interpretation and application of law, fall exclusively within the domain of 
the state.  As Cover argues, “[T]he state is not necessarily the creator of 
legal meaning.”339  Other groups—subnational, supranational, or 
transnational—might serve as the basis for the generation of norms having 
a legal character.340  Nevertheless the language of law and its official 
setting can provide both a forum and a framework within which these 
narratives emerge, contributing to them and shaping them.  The type of law 
at issue in the given forum becomes the language of contest among the 
various collectives that might be subject to it.  Thus, an official state forum 
differs from other fora not in kind but rather in degree—it alone carries 
with it the coercive power capable of being deployed to attempt to enforce 
a particular interpretation.341  Although an official interpretation backed by 
force cannot kill off competing interpretations, it can alter them 
dramatically.342
Because Cover recognizes that legal process generates and shapes 
narratives significant to the communities involved in the proceedings, his 
work suggests a way of thinking about the question of where (and how) to 
try suspected terrorists in terms that have largely been missing from the 
debate thus far.  We must recognize that the process that is used will 
generate a narrative, or indeed, multiple narratives, that will play a 
significant role in determining law’s legitimacy.  Secret summary trials 
before military commissions as proposed by the Administration, like the 
more extreme option of summary executions, would not provide a forum 
for conflicting narratives.  To be sure, the Administration’s support for the 
military commissions likely stems in part from this fact.  Advocates of the 
secret military trials are concerned that terrorists might use a more open 
judicial process to make propaganda-type statements to criticize the United 
States and gain greater support for terrorism.343  Yet even summary secret 
trials or summary executions could not completely quell the alternative 
narratives.  Rather, such an approach merely moves these alternative stories 
outside the legal forum and adds an additional twist: a story about 
339. Id. at 103. 
340. See Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 131 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 
Dec. 2002) (arguing that jurisdictional rules should be modified to account for the fact that such non-
territorial communities articulate norms in the public forum of law). 
341. See Cover, supra note 319, at 144. 
342. See id. at 154. 
 343. See Ashcroft Testimony, supra note 4 (“[A]re we supposed to . . . create a new cable network 
of Osama PD or what have you, provide a world-wide platform from which propaganda can be 
developed?”). 
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American injustice.  Although such a tale might also be told within a legal 
forum—as Slobodan Milosevic is currently attempting to do during his trial 
for genocide at the Hague344—channeling that story into a legal forum is 
more likely to tame it.  And the more the procedures in place are perceived 
as fair, the better the chance that any story about injustice will lose traction 
and be contained. 
With regard to the choice between domestic and international trials, I 
have already suggested that, as in the Eichmann trial, the dominant 
narrative likely to emerge in a domestic trial—at least for those most 
responsible—could undermine the international nature of the crimes 
committed.345  This in turn could impede international efforts to combat 
terrorism.  The attacks might well be turned into a story about the 
terrorists’ anti-Americanism, rather than into an account of the 
international community standing together and isolating Al Qaeda.  Indeed, 
without an international proceeding of any kind, there would be little, if 
any, chance that the latter account could emerge.  The trial of the suspected 
terrorists would thus play no role in building bridges between the United 
States and other countries in efforts to combat terrorism. 
C. LAW PROMOTES ACCEPTANCE OF SHARED MECHANISMS FOR 
ADJUDICATING VALUES
Third, out of the clash among conflicting interpretations of norms 
articulated within legal fora, acceptance of shared mechanisms for 
adjudicating values might emerge.  That is, one might return to the notion 
of law playing a peacemaking role—but through the medium of the 
language and proceedings of law rather than simply through its disciplining 
authority.  On this view, law—and in particular adjudication—tames 
conflict at least to a degree because of the discourse it creates.  Law 
constructs an aspirational community that, over time, binds people together 
despite conflict. 
Although Cover does not explicitly assert this justification for law and 
adjudication, it is implicit in his work.  Indeed, Cover emphasizes the way 
in which the mythos arising from a legal setting is always collective and 
holds a normative force over that collective.346  Moreover, he suggests that 
without official legal narratives backed by force, the conflicting narratives 
344. See, e.g., Ian Fisher, Combative Milosevic Displays a Flair for Courtroom Tactics, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 20, 2002, at A4. 
345. See supra text accompanying notes 219–222. 
346. See COVER, supra note 319, at 102. 
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arising from competing norm-generating communities would be left to play 
out in an undisciplined, violent setting.347
And as discussed previously,348 Cover even wrote about the power of 
international criminal trials, such as the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
proceedings, “to project . . . new legal meaning into the future.”349  To 
Cover, the use of the legal forum was significant: in the case of Nuremberg 
and Tokyo, “[t]he fact of having shed blood in the juridical mode made the 
precedent one of special character.”350  Such a decision constructed 
procedural and substantive norms that could then be recognized and 
appropriated by a wide variety of communities.351
Thus, we can see that conflict mediated within the language of the law 
can build acceptance for, if not substantive norms, then at least procedures 
for adjudicating conflict.  That is, conflict may be endemic to society, but 
law and legal process provide a framework for setting boundaries to that 
conflict and a language for bridging at least some differences.  The debate, 
by taking place within the language and institutions of the law, can draw 
disparate communities into the discussion, at least to a degree. 
Stuart Hampshire has recently developed an argument along these 
lines.352  Drawing on Plato’s analogy between the soul and the city, he 
takes as a starting point the observation that conflict inheres in all society—
whether international, national, subnational, or transnational—and indeed 
manifests even within the individual psyche.353  Moreover, he argues that 
“justice cannot consist of any kind of harmony or consensus either in the 
soul or in the city, because there never will be such a harmony, either in the 
347. See id. at 236. 
348. See supra text accompanying notes 243–245. 
 349. COVER, supra note 243, at 196. 
350. Id.
 351. Indeed, although the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials were imposed by military victors, Cover 
describes the way in which the norms of those tribunals were available for appropriation by alternative 
communities seeking to challenge established power.  See id. at 197 (stating that although the tribunals 
were “employed . . . in the interests of power,” the precedent created “could not be so circumscribed”).  
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normative systems.  See PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE
TERROR AND ATROCITY 291–97 (2001) (listing twenty truth commissions established since 1982). 
352. See generally STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CONFLICT (2000) (discussing the relationship 
between conflict and the law). 
353. See id. at 3–4.
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soul or in the city.”354  According to Hampshire, there is no universal 
principle of substantive justice.  Rather, “[f]airness and justice in 
procedures are the only virtues that can reasonably be considered as setting 
norms to be universally respected.”355  Building again on “Plato’s inspired 
analogy between justice in the workings of an individual mind and justice 
in the city,” he suggests that “the one common and indisputable basis of 
morality, which makes a bridge between all moral differences in conflict-
prone humanity[, is] the habit of argument within the solitary soul that is 
modeled on the habit of argument within assemblies, committees, and law 
courts.”356  From this observation, he builds his thesis that justice is itself 
conflict.  Justice inheres in procedures and institutions that both allow 
opposing points of views to be heard, and do so in a manner that follows 
established, regular rules.357
In the international arena, Hampshire contends that “the human race is 
unlikely to survive for very long unless reasonably fair procedures develop 
and become accepted for negotiations and arbitrations in the settling of 
international conflicts threatening war.”358  He suggests that priority should 
be placed on “bringing into existence institutions and recognized 
procedures [rather than] declarations of universal principles,” and that 
“institutions earn respect mainly from their customary use and from their 
gradually acquired familiarity.”359
One of the most potent critiques of using an international legal 
proceeding to try those responsible for the September 11 attacks (or indeed 
other acts of terrorism) is rooted in the concern that the divisions between 
the United States and the rest of the world, in particular the Arab-Muslim 
world, run too deep for an international proceeding to work.  For example, 
critics point to the inability of the international community, even after 
decades of effort, to develop a coherent definition of terrorism.  In addition, 
they point to serious differences on other issues that likely would spring to 
the forefront of any effort to construct an international forum to try 
terrorists.  For example, some point to the discord that erupted at the recent 
World Conference on Racism, in which “several Islamic countries sought 
to use the forum to pursue their political grievances against Israel.”360  Any 
effort to establish an international tribunal to try terrorists would prompt 
354. Id. at 4. 
355. Id. at 53 (emphasis added). 
356. Id. at 72. 
357. See id. at 71, 97. 
358. Id. at 40. 
359. Id.
 360. Koh, supra note 13, at 343 n.41. 
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many of these same countries to “use their diplomatic clout” to contend 
that such a tribunal “should also try Israeli officials who bore no 
connection to the September 11 attacks,” a proposal “that Western 
proponents of the tribunals would find politically unacceptable.”361  One 
might also think that such deep differences between countries and cultures 
would render an Arab or Muslim judge incapable of presiding over the trial 
of an Arab or Muslim defendant accused of acts of terrorism in a fair or 
impartial manner.  And even if such a trial did take place, one might be 
concerned that, no matter how many procedural protections are provided, 
there would be little chance that a verdict convicting an Arab or Muslim 
defendant would be accepted as fair in the Arab-Muslim world. 
Nevertheless, although rifts between the United States and the Arab-
Muslim world certainly exist, and undeniably run deep, the existence of 
such rifts does not necessarily make international legal proceedings 
impossible.362  Indeed, the international realm does not have a monopoly 
on social conflict and dissension.  Serious conflicts exist within societies as 
well, yet such social rifts do not make law and legal process unattainable.  
Even if one accepts that greater division exists among nation-states than 
within any one of them, the difference might be better seen as one of degree 
rather than of kind.  The existence of social divisions should not itself be a 
bar to efforts to set up an adjudicatory process involving communities on 
both sides (or multiple sides) of the divide—otherwise, even domestic legal 
proceedings would be impossible and illegitimate. 
It is important to emphasize that I am not suggesting that a legal 
proceeding of any kind, let alone an international trial of terrorists, creates 
a shared narrative or cultural consensus.  It would clearly be too much to 
hope for that one could create such a shared narrative in the international 
context.  But even within the domestic setting, it would be difficult to 
achieve such a collective narrative, given the degree of social dissention 
that exists.363  Nevertheless, legal proceedings help to forge what we might 
361. Id.
 362. And of course the Arab-Muslim world does not have a monopoly on terrorism.  Even some 
of the suspected perpetrators of the September 11 attacks, widely believed to be members of the Al 
Qaeda terrorist network, are citizens of Western countries.  For example, Zacarias Moussaoui is a 
citizen of France.  Nor are all bin Laden members of Arab descent, as evidenced by the arrest of John 
Walker Lindh, a U.S. citizen apprehended while fighting for the Taliban and accused of belonging to Al 
Qaeda. 
 363. Certainly, Cover would be unlikely to expect such consensus.  See, e.g., COVER, supra note 
319, at 113 (“One great strength and one great dilemma of the American constitutional order is the 
multiplicity of legal meanings created out of the exiled narratives and the divergent social bases for 
their use.”). 
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call provisional compromises, both with respect to certain substantive 
norms—such as acts that fall so beyond the pale of the acceptable in almost 
all societies that they can be condemned as criminal—and procedural 
norms of fairness that allow people to accept outcomes even in the face of 
political or social disunity. 
In the international sphere, the issue of what constitutes fair 
procedures may be the easiest place to find agreement.  Although 
differences in the precise content of fair procedures might complicate 
efforts to establish an international forum, there is already a broad base of 
consensus on this issue, and it is unlikely that disagreements would be 
insurmountable.  The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
for example, has been widely ratified and establishes a baseline set of 
procedural norms,364 as do numerous other treaties.  Indeed, as discussed 
previously,365 some procedures are so widely accepted that they can now be 
considered a matter of customary international law.  Moreover, the existing 
international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
represent an existing compromise on many procedural issues.  Judges from 
a diverse array of countries sit on these tribunals, including judges from the 
Arab-Muslim world.366  Finally, even countries as far apart ideologically as 
the United States and Libya ultimately have been able to accept as fair the 
trial of Libyan terrorism suspects in a Scottish court convened in the 
Netherlands.  Ironically, the biggest obstacle to agreement about 
appropriate procedures for an international proceeding to try terrorism 
suspects might lie in the reluctance of the United States to adhere to widely 
accepted standards for just adjudication, rather than the Arab-Muslim 
world’s reluctance to accept “Western” conceptions of fair process. 
But in addition to compromises about procedure, provisional 
compromises about substantive norms relating to the September 11 attacks 
may also be possible.  Numerous governments, including many Arab-
Muslim governments, have strongly condemned the attacks as a violation 
of international law.  One need not delve into the contentious ground of the 
definition of terrorism to view the attacks as an international crime, 
because they would very likely qualify as crimes against humanity.367
Even within the highly contested debate about what constitutes terrorism, 
364. See ICCPR, supra note 70, art. 2, 999 U.N.T.S. at 173–74. One hundred and forty-eight 
countries have ratified the ICCPR, including Libya, Afghanistan, Syria, Kuwait, Iran, Iraq, and Egypt. 
 365. See supra text accompanying notes 106–115. 
 366. Judge Amin El Mahdi of Egypt, for example, sits on the ICTY.  United Nations ICTY 
General Information, supra note 182. 
367. See supra text accompanying notes 204–208. 
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there is widespread agreement that certain acts, such as the hijacking of 
airplanes, the commission of acts of violence on airplanes, the taking of 
diplomatic hostages, and the like, are so beyond the pale that they qualify 
as criminal.  The multiple, widely ratified terrorism conventions reflect this 
view.368  And elements of the September 11 attacks would clearly fall 
within these existing treaties.369  Thus, although widespread agreement on 
the precise scope of terrorism does not exist—one person’s terrorist is still 
another person’s freedom fighter—there is a broad-based compromise that 
certain terrorist acts are so extreme that they qualify as criminal acts in any 
circumstances.  This compromise is almost certainly strong enough to 
sustain an international trial of the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks. 
Furthermore, the purported normative differences between “Western”
and “Muslim” interpretations of the Al Qaeda attack may be exaggerated.  
Indeed, a strong argument can be made that the September 11 attacks and 
other similar terrorist acts violate Islamic law and Islamic principles.  
Sohail Hashmi has observed that “the overwhelming consensus of modern 
scholars is that Islamic ethics endorses international humanitarian law, 
including the Geneva Conventions, that makes the deliberate targeting of 
noncombatants and the terrorizing of civilian populations a war crime.”370
Hashmi traces these principles to a verse of the Qur’an that states: “And 
fight in God’s cause against those who wage war against you, but do not 
transgress limits, for God loves not the transgressors.”371  He notes that, 
according to authoritative tradition, the Prophet Mohammed always 
instructed military commanders to “adhere to certain restraints, including 
giving fair notice of attack and sparing women and children.”372
Successors of the Prophet have further developed these rules, clearly 
establishing the principles of “discrimination [with respect to targets] and 
proportionality of means.”373  Hashmi also emphasizes that modern Muslim 
368. See supra text accompanying notes 209–215. 
369. See supra text accompanying notes 209–215. 
 370. Sohail Hashmi, Terrorism and Jihad 7 (Nov. 9, 2001) (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Hashmi, Terrorism].  See also Sohail Hashmi, The Terrorists’ Zealotry Is Political Not Religious,
WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2001, at B1. 
 371. Hashmi, Terrorism, supra note 370, at 6 (quoting Qur’an 2:190). 
372. Id.
373. Id. at 8.  Hashmi notes that the first caliph, Abu Bakur, is recorded as advising: 
Do not act treacherously; do not act disloyally; do not act neglectfully.  Do not mutilate; do 
not kill little children or old men, or women; do not cut off the heads of the palm-trees or burn 
them; do not cut down the fruit trees; do not slaughter a sheep or a cow or a camel, except for 
food.  You will pass by people who devote their lives in cloisters; leave them and their 
devotions alone.  You will come upon people who bring you platters in which are various 
sorts of food; if you eat any of it, mention the name of God over it. 
Id.
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interpreters have continued to develop these principles.  For example, the 
Syrian scholar Wahba al-Zuhayli interprets the verse from the Qu’ran 
quoted above as saying: “Do not fight anyone unless they fight you.  
Fighting is thus justified if you fight the enemy and the enemy fights you.  
It is not justified against anyone who does not fight the Muslims . . . . ”374
Zuhayli thus “clearly rules out the possibility of collective responsibility, 
that all citizens belonging to a perceived foe are somehow responsible.”375
Other scholars have made similar arguments.  Indeed, an eminent historian 
of Islam at Harvard University, Roy P.  Mottahedeh, recently has launched 
a project to involve Muslim scholars in drawing up an indictment of Bin 
Laden under Islamic law.376  Thus, at least on certain topics, there is a very 
real possibility that compromises and provisional agreements even about 
substantive norms can be forged. 
The insights that can be drawn from the work of Robert Cover, and 
approaches that can be drawn from domestic critical legal theory more 
broadly, offer an alternative set of arguments about why law is still 
important despite conflict, whether that conflict exists within a state or 
internationally.  These arguments do not idealistically assume that legal 
process will quell all private violence, heal all social divisions, or forge 
complete consensus.  To the contrary, they start from the premise that deep 
underlying social conflict will always result in bitter disputes about the 
interpretation of legal norms and that interpretations of those norms will 
often be affected or determined by political commitments.  Yet 
adjudication remains essential as a way of ensuring the involvement of 
multiple actors, creating a forum for dispute among competing narratives, 
and providing a context for the development of provisional compromises 
about procedural and substantive norms.  Thus, even from the skeptical 
vantage point of critical legal theory, the adjudicatory process offers 
significant advantages despite the fact that violence and political conflict 
are everywhere and always present. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Moments of national crisis or uncertainty often make it seem as if the 
rule of law is merely a quaint artifact of a more innocent time.  Indeed, one 
might be tempted to think that if the rule of law cannot prevent acts of 
destruction like the ones we witnessed on September 11, then we might be 
374. Id. at 9. 
375. Id.
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better off jettisoning belief in law altogether.  Instead, we might turn to the 
imagined security of power politics and military muscle. 
The Bush Administration has largely embraced this perspective.  
Particularly with regard to international law, Administration officials have 
rarely acknowledged the force of legal norms even when they are obeying 
them.  Such an attitude reinforces the view that law in general, and 
international law in particular, are merely aspects of political strategy and 
therefore lack any independent impact or usefulness.  In the thrall of this 
conception of international law, the Administration has held hundreds of 
people in indefinite secret detention and issued a surprising order stating 
that individuals suspected of terrorism could be tried before military 
commissions rather than in domestic or international fora. 
In this Article, I have attempted to refute the law skeptics and to make 
a case both against military commissions and in favor of an 
internationalized process.  First, I have recounted the rule of law arguments 
that the military commissions and the mass detentions of terrorism suspects 
as proposed by the Administration would violate the United States 
Constitution, a variety of international treaties to which the United States is 
a signatory, and customary international law.  Second, I have observed that 
even if one believes that obedience to legal niceties should take a back seat 
to strategic interests, an international legal process would actually best 
serve those strategic interests by helping to promote international 
cooperation in the fight against terrorism, the capture and extradition of 
terrorism suspects, the isolation of Al Qaeda from the rest of the Islamic 
world, and the lessening of resentment that might breed further acts of 
terrorism.  As the Roosevelt administration realized in moving to establish 
the Nuremberg trials, international legal process can be an essential part of 
a realpolitik consideration of effective policy.  Thus, although an 
international legal process surely cannot guarantee our safety or even our 
success in stamping out Al Qaeda, such an approach stands the best chance 
of advancing our long-term interests in the fight against terrorism.  Third, I 
have suggested that an international process would not be difficult to 
establish and that, even if the political will for an international tribunal is 
lacking, an internationalized military commission and a hybrid 
international/Afghan court offer effective alternatives that provide at least 
some of the benefits of an international process while still providing more 
U.S. control.  Moreover, I have noted that none of the various options with 
regard to accountability for acts of terrorism are mutually exclusive, and 
that some combination of mechanisms is likely to be both necessary and 
desirable.  Fourth, I have offered an alternative perspective on the 
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importance of adjudication drawn from the insights of Robert Cover.  As 
Cover and other domestic critical legal theorists have made plain, it is not 
only international law that is inevitably a by-product of social disunity and 
political decisionmaking, but domestic law as well.  Yet such theorists do 
not dismiss the importance of adjudication because they see legal process 
as a way of including multiple participants in decisionmaking, providing a 
forum for competing narratives, and offering the hope of developing 
provisional compromises about procedural and substantive norms over 
time.  Thus, law is not rendered irrelevant by the existence of political 
imperatives and social disunity; it is instead rendered all the more 
necessary. 
Together these arguments provide several possible responses to those 
who say law is an unnecessary or burdensome straight-jacket at a time 
when important interests are threatened.  Moments of national emergency 
not only test our commitment to the rule of law, but also force us to 
consider why we care about the rule of law in the first place—to consider 
what values adherence to law’s rule serves, and what interests it advances.  
In short, they force us to ask what law gets us, as a nation and as a people.  
The answers to these questions are far less obvious than one might assume.  
Nevertheless, by suggesting a number of different avenues for approaching 
this question, I hope that I have provided a space for further consideration 
of the various ways in which the norms of legal process are both useful and 
important, even in (and perhaps especially in) a time of national crisis. 
